Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 3, 2023
• Docket: 21-7737
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 1 of 10

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7737

CHAD EDWIN LANGFORD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HECTOR JOYNER, Warden FCI Estill; UNKNOWN ASSISTANT HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR, FCI Estill; MS. CHAMBERS; MS. BOATRIGHT; MS. LLOYD; MR. MIDOCK; JOHN DOE, employee of FCI Estill in his individual capacity; RICHARD DOE, employee of FCI Estill in his individual capacity; RICHARD ROE, employee of FCI Estill in his individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (5:21-cv-00811-TMC)

Argued: January 27, 2023 Decided: March 2, 2023

Before WYNN, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kathleen Michelle Stoughton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Corey F. USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 2 of 10

Ellis, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 3 of 10

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Chad Langford, represented by counsel, brought a single-count complaint alleging

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs on the part of multiple Defendants, all

officials at the federal prison where he was incarcerated. The district court dismissed the

complaint. Because Langford failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part

of each Defendant, we affirm.

I.

We recount and accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Mays v. Sprinkle,

992 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2021).

In March 2018, Langford was incarcerated at FCI Estill federal prison in South

Carolina. On March 20, he experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was

transported from FCI Estill to an outside hospital, Hampton Regional Medical Center

(“HRMC”), for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and

Langford was returned to FCI Estill. J.A. 7. 1

From March 20 through March 28, Langford’s health grew progressively worse.

During this time, he “continually brought to the attention of the Defendants . . . that his

condition was worsening, that he was suffering acute and excruciating pain and feared he

was dying.” J.A. 7. He could “barely walk” and, with the assistance of other inmates and

in a wheelchair, was “repeatedly” brought to the FCI Estill medical offices where he was

1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 4 of 10

“refused treatment or even an examination of his physical condition” even though “his

worsening medical condition was obvious from his physical appearance.” J.A. 7. He also

spent most of the rest of his time “immobile in the showers because of his uncontrollable

diarrhea.” J.A. 7. Ultimately, on March 28, a substitute physician observed Langford in the

medical waiting area, ordered an examination, and sent him back to HRMC for emergency

surgery. Langford was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel

obstruction. He remained at HRMC for several weeks after surgery and alleges permanent

injury as a result.

In March 2021, Langford, with the assistance of counsel, filed the present complaint

bringing a single count under the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Defendants are

officials at FCI Estill, including Hector Joyner, a former warden; Alexis Chambers and

Jade Lloyd Lee, nurses; Felicia Boatright, a case manager; and Steven Midock, a former

unit manager, as well as several unidentified officials. 2

Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim. In October 2021, the district court granted Defendants’ motion and

dismissed the complaint. Langford timely appealed.

II.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

2 Except for the warden, the full names and positions for the other Defendants were provided by Defendants in their motion to dismiss, not by Langford in his complaint.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 5 of 10

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has clarified that this means a complaint, to survive

a motion to dismiss, must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests only ‘the sufficiency of a complaint.’”

Mays, 992 F.3d at 299 (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.

1999)). The district court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true

and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. However, the court need not

accept “legal conclusions,” “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” or

“conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We review the grant of a motion to dismiss

de novo. Mays, 992 F.3d at 299.

Here, Langford alleges deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under

the Eighth Amendment. “An Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs includes objective and subjective elements.” Id. at 300 (citing

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014)). “The objective element requires a

‘serious’ medical condition.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178). This prong is not at

issue here; Defendants concede that Langford has pled a serious medical condition in the

form of his small bowel obstruction and related complications.

Rather, this case turns on the subjective element. The subjective prong requires the

prison official to have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” specifically,

“deliberate indifference” to inmate health. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994)). In turn, “deliberate indifference” requires that the prison official have “actual

5 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 6 of 10

subjective knowledge of both the inmate’s serious medical condition and the excessive risk

posed by the official’s action or inaction.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178).

Defendants argue that Langford’s “generalized, conclusory, and collective

allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.

Response Br. at 13. We are constrained to agree.

The problem with this matter arises from the manner of the pleading. The complaint

makes only collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each

individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial

of his Eighth Amendment rights. Courts have been critical of complaints that “fail[] to

isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant,” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519

F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008), or that “make[] only categorical references to

‘Defendants,’” Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012).

The courts have reasoned that requiring specific factual allegations for each

defendant gives fair notice to that defendant of the plaintiff’s claim and the underlying

factual support. See, e.g., Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250 (“Given the complaint’s use of . . . the

collective term ‘Defendants’ . . . it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain

what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed.”); Marcilis, 693

F.3d at 596–97 (collecting cases). That reasoning is consistent with Bivens liability, which

is “personal, based upon each defendant’s own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh,

275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has made clear that to state a

plausible Bivens claim, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556

6 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 7 of 10

U.S. at 676 (emphasis added). Applied to his Eighth Amendment Bivens claim, then,

Langford needed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege that each Defendant actually

knew about his serious medical condition and the risks of failing to treat him.

But even accepting the facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in

Langford’s favor, he failed to meet this standard. In his complaint, Langford did not

identify who the Defendants are beyond being employees at FCI Estill, in what capacity

each Defendant interacted with Langford, or how (or even if) each Defendant was

responsible for Langford’s medical treatment.

Rather, the allegations are general. Langford alleges that he brought to the attention

of “the Defendants,” without specifying which ones, that his health was worsening. J.A. 7.

Likewise, he says he was “refused treatment,” but again does not say by which Defendant.

J.A. 7. He alleges that he was “immobile in the showers” because of his deteriorating

health, but does not identify which, if any, of the Defendants was aware of this or even saw

him in the showers. J.A. 7. He concludes by claiming “Defendants acted with culpable and

deliberate indifference to [his] medical condition.” J.A. 9. But these are the type of

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” and “legal conclusions”

that are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

On appeal, Langford argues that the repeated general references to “Defendants” in

his complaint are sufficient because he brings the same allegations against each Defendant,

so “Defendants” functions as a shorthand alternative to listing each Defendant by name.

But Langford has the burden of pleading a facially plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

7 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 8 of 10

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis added). And it is not reasonable

to infer liability against each Defendant based on the facts alleged.

This is especially the case with the nonmedical Defendants (the warden, case

manager, and unit manager), where Langford’s “global manner of pleading” makes his

claim against those Defendants “less plausible because some of the individual defendants

had no reason to have known or interacted with [Langford] at the time of the alleged

violations.” Barrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Johnston Cnty., 590 F. App’x 208, 211 (4th Cir.

2014) (per curiam); see SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th

Cir. 2015) (in antitrust case, criticizing attempt to “assemble some collection of defendants

and then make vague, non-specific allegations against all of them as a group”), as amended

on reh’g in part (Oct. 29, 2015). For example, shorn of facts alleging otherwise, we cannot

reasonably infer that the warden saw Langford in the medical offices or personally denied

him treatment. And the complaint is otherwise devoid of allegations that these particular

Defendants were aware of Langford’s poor health or the risks of failing to treat him. If

anything, the opposite is true: the complaint acknowledges that Langford was sent to an

outside hospital on March 20 after complaining of abdominal pain and nausea, which

produced “unremarkable” test results. J.A. 7.

Even with the medical Defendants—the two nurses—there are no allegations that

either nurse treated or refused to treat Langford, saw him in the FCI Estill medical offices

during the relevant time, or was even working on the days in question. Indeed, outside of

8 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 9 of 10

the case caption and a single paragraph identifying the parties, no Defendant is specifically

mentioned by name in the complaint. And only a single paragraph in the factual allegations

section of the complaint even employs the collective term “Defendants,” in which Langford

merely states he “continually brought to the attention of the Defendants” that his health

was worsening. J.A. 7.

We do not categorically foreclose the possibility that a complaint that makes

allegations collectively against “Defendants” may sometimes survive a motion to dismiss.

After all, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-

specific task.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Similarly, the use of “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” where

a plaintiff does not know the actual name of a defendant prior to discovery may be

acceptable, so long as the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations as to that

defendant to state a plausible claim. We simply hold that, as pled, this complaint falls short.

In sum, we are mindful of the fact that, at this early stage in the litigation, a plaintiff

will not come to court fully armed with the requisite facts to prove their case. For that

reason, we do not require a complaint to contain “detailed factual allegations.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to

each defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. This is baked into Rule 8’s requirement that the

complaint “show” the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); accord Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (alterations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a))).

9 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7737 Doc: 31 Filed: 03/03/2023 Pg: 10 of 10

On the facts as alleged in this case, Langford has failed to adequately plead that each

Defendant was aware of his medical condition and aware of the risks of failing to treat him,

as required to state a plausible Eighth Amendment Bivens claim.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we must affirm the district court’s grant of Defendants’

motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED