MEMORANDUM DECISION Apr 28 2015, 9:12 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Stephen T. Owens Gregory F. Zoeller Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Cory Lightner Ellen H. Meilaender Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chad Byrd, April 28, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 54A05-1409-PC-448 v. Appeal from the Montgomery Circuit Court. The Honorable David A. Ault, State of Indiana, Special Judge. Appellee-Respondent Cause No. 54C01-1107-PC-2404
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 1 of 8 [1] Chad Byrd appeals the denial of his petition post-conviction relief. Byrd argues
that the trial court committed reversible error when it accepted his guilty plea.
Specifically, Byrd claims that he plead guilty while simultaneously maintaining
his innocence. Byrd also argues that his guilty plea was not supported by a
sufficient factual basis. Finding that the evidence supports the decision of the
post-conviction court, we affirm.
Facts [2] The facts underlying this case are as follows: In November 2009, Byrd, who
was then twenty-four years old, was at his parents’ house for a meal. Byrd’s
brother was also present. At some point during the family gathering, Byrd
retrieved his twenty-gauge shotgun and entered his parents’ living room. From
approximately ten feet away, Byrd pointed the shotgun at his brother and pulled
the trigger. Byrd’s brother was killed from a shot to the head. Byrd later
alleged that his brother had molested him during childhood and that he was
thinking about the molestation around the time he pulled the trigger.
[3] On November 12, 2009, Byrd was charged with murder. On December 2,
2010, Byrd pleaded guilty but mentally ill to murder in exchange for a cap of
fifty-five years on the executed portion of his sentence. The trial court twice
asked Byrd if he realized that by pleading guilty to the charge he would be
admitting that he “knowingly or intentionally killed another human being, to
wit, [his brother].” Tr. p. 33, 35. Byrd affirmed that he understood. The trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 2 of 8 court informed Byrd of the rights he was waiving by this admission, and Byrd
stated that he understood.
[4] During the factual basis examination, Byrd again confessed to knowingly or
intentionally killing his brother. After this admission, the following exchange
occurred between Byrd and the State:
State: Whose gun did you use to shoot [your brother]? Byrd: Mine. State: Did you know it was loaded? Byrd: No. State: Well, you told Doctor Crane1 you used the loaded gun right? Byrd: No. State: Well, in fact, the gun was loaded wasn’t it? Byrd: Yeah. State: And it was your intention to shoot your brother? Byrd: No. State: You in fact shot your brother didn’t you? Byrd: Yeah. Tr. p. 41-42 (emphases added). In addition, Byrd stated that he came from a
hunting family and was aware of what happened when one shot something
with a shotgun. Further, Dr. Crane reported that, in reference to the shooting,
Byrd said, “‘I was angry. I went to my sister’s room and got a gun from the rack
. . . there were two . . . one was loaded . . . a 20-gauge shotgun.’” Appellant’s
1 Dr. Crane is a psychiatrist who conducted a two-hour psychiatric evaluation of Byrd after the shooting. Appellant’s App. p. 73-80.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 3 of 8 App. p. 74. Byrd testified that he was truthful when he spoke to Dr. Crane. At
the close of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court found a sufficient factual basis
and accepted Byrd’s plea of guilty but mentally ill. On December 22, 2010, the
trial court imposed a sixty-year sentence, with five years suspended. This Court
affirmed Byrd’s sentence on direct appeal.2
[5] On July 26, 2011, Byrd filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the post-
conviction court held a hearing on September 5, 2013. On September 2, 2014,
the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
denying relief. Byrd now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the post-conviction court’s
judgment. McWhorter v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
The findings of fact by the post-conviction court are “accepted unless ‘clearly
erroneous.’” Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Ind.
Trial Rule 52(A)). “To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction
relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly
and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-
conviction court.” McWhorter, 945 N.E.2d at 1272.
2 Byrd v. State, Cause No. 54A01-1101-CR-4, 2011 WL 2277474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 4 of 8 I. Protestation of Innocence [7] Byrd alleges, based on his testimony at the guilty plea hearing, that he did not
know the gun was loaded and did not intend to kill his brother. He contends
that this testimony negated a material element of the crime of murder and
establishes that he was pleading guilty while simultaneously protesting his
innocence.
[8] Under Indiana law, “[a] trial court may not accept a plea of guilty from one
who in the same breath professes innocence.” Atchley v. State, 622 N.E.2d 502,
503 (Ind. 1993). Indeed, to accept such a plea constitutes reversible error. Ross
v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983).
[9] However, Byrd acknowledged that he understood the nature of the offense
charged and that his plea was an admission of that charge. The trial court twice
asked Byrd if he understood that he was pleading guilty to the charge that he
“knowingly or intentionally killed another human being, to wit, [his brother].” Tr.
p. 33, 35 (emphasis added). Twice, Byrd confirmed that he understood.
[10] During the factual basis inquiry, the State also asked Byrd if he did “knowingly
or intentionally kill another human being, particularity did you kill your brother .
. . .” Tr. p. 37 (emphasis added). In response, Byrd confirmed that he
knowingly or intentionally killed his brother. Id. At no point in the record did
Byrd say he was innocent or make an effort to contest his guilty plea. Such
admissions contradict the argument that Byrd was simultaneously protesting his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 5 of 8 [11] Additionally, Byrd’s testimony does not negate the necessary elements for the
crime of murder. The crime of murder requires that the defendant “knowingly
or intentionally” killed another human being. Ind.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Apr 28 2015, 9:12 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Stephen T. Owens Gregory F. Zoeller Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Cory Lightner Ellen H. Meilaender Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chad Byrd, April 28, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 54A05-1409-PC-448 v. Appeal from the Montgomery Circuit Court. The Honorable David A. Ault, State of Indiana, Special Judge. Appellee-Respondent Cause No. 54C01-1107-PC-2404
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 1 of 8 [1] Chad Byrd appeals the denial of his petition post-conviction relief. Byrd argues
that the trial court committed reversible error when it accepted his guilty plea.
Specifically, Byrd claims that he plead guilty while simultaneously maintaining
his innocence. Byrd also argues that his guilty plea was not supported by a
sufficient factual basis. Finding that the evidence supports the decision of the
post-conviction court, we affirm.
Facts [2] The facts underlying this case are as follows: In November 2009, Byrd, who
was then twenty-four years old, was at his parents’ house for a meal. Byrd’s
brother was also present. At some point during the family gathering, Byrd
retrieved his twenty-gauge shotgun and entered his parents’ living room. From
approximately ten feet away, Byrd pointed the shotgun at his brother and pulled
the trigger. Byrd’s brother was killed from a shot to the head. Byrd later
alleged that his brother had molested him during childhood and that he was
thinking about the molestation around the time he pulled the trigger.
[3] On November 12, 2009, Byrd was charged with murder. On December 2,
2010, Byrd pleaded guilty but mentally ill to murder in exchange for a cap of
fifty-five years on the executed portion of his sentence. The trial court twice
asked Byrd if he realized that by pleading guilty to the charge he would be
admitting that he “knowingly or intentionally killed another human being, to
wit, [his brother].” Tr. p. 33, 35. Byrd affirmed that he understood. The trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 2 of 8 court informed Byrd of the rights he was waiving by this admission, and Byrd
stated that he understood.
[4] During the factual basis examination, Byrd again confessed to knowingly or
intentionally killing his brother. After this admission, the following exchange
occurred between Byrd and the State:
State: Whose gun did you use to shoot [your brother]? Byrd: Mine. State: Did you know it was loaded? Byrd: No. State: Well, you told Doctor Crane1 you used the loaded gun right? Byrd: No. State: Well, in fact, the gun was loaded wasn’t it? Byrd: Yeah. State: And it was your intention to shoot your brother? Byrd: No. State: You in fact shot your brother didn’t you? Byrd: Yeah. Tr. p. 41-42 (emphases added). In addition, Byrd stated that he came from a
hunting family and was aware of what happened when one shot something
with a shotgun. Further, Dr. Crane reported that, in reference to the shooting,
Byrd said, “‘I was angry. I went to my sister’s room and got a gun from the rack
. . . there were two . . . one was loaded . . . a 20-gauge shotgun.’” Appellant’s
1 Dr. Crane is a psychiatrist who conducted a two-hour psychiatric evaluation of Byrd after the shooting. Appellant’s App. p. 73-80.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 3 of 8 App. p. 74. Byrd testified that he was truthful when he spoke to Dr. Crane. At
the close of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court found a sufficient factual basis
and accepted Byrd’s plea of guilty but mentally ill. On December 22, 2010, the
trial court imposed a sixty-year sentence, with five years suspended. This Court
affirmed Byrd’s sentence on direct appeal.2
[5] On July 26, 2011, Byrd filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the post-
conviction court held a hearing on September 5, 2013. On September 2, 2014,
the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
denying relief. Byrd now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the post-conviction court’s
judgment. McWhorter v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
The findings of fact by the post-conviction court are “accepted unless ‘clearly
erroneous.’” Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Ind.
Trial Rule 52(A)). “To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction
relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly
and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-
conviction court.” McWhorter, 945 N.E.2d at 1272.
2 Byrd v. State, Cause No. 54A01-1101-CR-4, 2011 WL 2277474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 4 of 8 I. Protestation of Innocence [7] Byrd alleges, based on his testimony at the guilty plea hearing, that he did not
know the gun was loaded and did not intend to kill his brother. He contends
that this testimony negated a material element of the crime of murder and
establishes that he was pleading guilty while simultaneously protesting his
innocence.
[8] Under Indiana law, “[a] trial court may not accept a plea of guilty from one
who in the same breath professes innocence.” Atchley v. State, 622 N.E.2d 502,
503 (Ind. 1993). Indeed, to accept such a plea constitutes reversible error. Ross
v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983).
[9] However, Byrd acknowledged that he understood the nature of the offense
charged and that his plea was an admission of that charge. The trial court twice
asked Byrd if he understood that he was pleading guilty to the charge that he
“knowingly or intentionally killed another human being, to wit, [his brother].” Tr.
p. 33, 35 (emphasis added). Twice, Byrd confirmed that he understood.
[10] During the factual basis inquiry, the State also asked Byrd if he did “knowingly
or intentionally kill another human being, particularity did you kill your brother .
. . .” Tr. p. 37 (emphasis added). In response, Byrd confirmed that he
knowingly or intentionally killed his brother. Id. At no point in the record did
Byrd say he was innocent or make an effort to contest his guilty plea. Such
admissions contradict the argument that Byrd was simultaneously protesting his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 5 of 8 [11] Additionally, Byrd’s testimony does not negate the necessary elements for the
crime of murder. The crime of murder requires that the defendant “knowingly
or intentionally” killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (emphasis
added). The mens rea element of the crime of murder is disjunctive and requires
the State to show either intent or knowledge. Thus, even if Byrd did not intend
to kill his brother, a finding that he did so knowingly would support the
conviction for the crime of murder. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’
if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is
doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (emphasis added). Even if Byrd did not
intend to shoot his brother, he pulled the trigger while aware of a high
probability that such an act could kill his brother.
[12] Also, even if Byrd did not know the gun was loaded, he did not testify that he
believed it was unloaded. It is reasonable for the trial court to infer that Byrd, a
hunter, using his own gun, was aware of the high probability that aiming and
firing an unchecked shotgun at his brother’s head could cause death. In
reviewing the evidence, it was not unreasonable for the post-conviction court to
conclude that Byrd knowingly committed the crime of murder.
II. Sufficient Factual Basis [13] Next, Byrd claims that the factual basis used to support the crime of murder
was insufficient to maintain his plea of guilty. In Indiana, “[a] factual basis
exists when there is evidence about the elements of the crime from which a
court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty.” Oliver v. State,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 6 of 8 843 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). A factual basis may be established
in a variety of ways: “(1) by the State’s presentation of evidence on the elements
of the charged offenses; (2) by the defendant’s sworn testimony regarding the
events underlying the charges; (3) by the defendant’s admission of the truth of
the allegations in the information read in court; or (4) by the defendant’s
acknowledgment that he understands the nature of the offenses charged and
that his plea is an admission of the charges.” Oliver, 843 N.E.2d at 588.
[14] Here, Byrd’s own testimony establishes the following facts: that he was part of a
hunting family; that he understood what happened when one shot something
with a shotgun; that he aimed the shotgun at his brother’s head; that he pulled
the trigger; that he used his own shotgun; that he was angry at his brother when
he pulled the trigger; and, that he killed his brother. Furthermore, Dr. Crane’s
psychiatric evaluation states that Byrd said he chose a loaded gun from the gun
rack to shoot his brother. Byrd testified that he was truthful with Dr. Crane.
These facts support the factual basis for the plea.
[15] Additionally, on multiple occasions, Byrd acknowledged that he understood the
nature of the offense charged and that his plea was an admission of the crime of
murder. Tr. p. 33, 35, 37. Such acknowledgements support the factual basis for
the crime of murder. See Oliver, 843 N.E.2d at 588 (holding that a “factual basis
may be established . . . by the defendant’s acknowledgment that he understands
the nature of the offenses charged and that his plea is an admission of the
charges.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 7 of 8 [16] We cannot hold that the evidence as a whole leads “unerringly and
unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the post-conviction
court.” McWhorter, 945 N.E.2d at 1272. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of
the post-conviction court.
[17] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A05-1409-PC-448 | April 28, 2015 Page 8 of 8