Chad Batterman v. Henry Hilles, III

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: February 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-2661
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2661 __________

CHAD BATTERMAN, Appellant

v.

HENRY HILLES, III; JUDGE HENRY HILLES, III ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-02431) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 1, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 9, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Chad Batterman alleges in his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

that Defendant Henry Hilles III, a Pennsylvania judge sitting on the Montgomery County

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Court of Common Pleas, denied him his constitutional rights while deliberating on a

“protracted, tortuous custody battle” between Batterman and his estranged wife.

Batterman v. Santo, 285 A.3d 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (non-precedential). Batterman

alleges that Judge Hilles took on the role of advocate in favor of Batterman’s wife, and

engaged in other improper conduct while acting as a judge. He sued Judge Hilles in both

his official and individual capacities. Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

the District Court dismissed Batterman’s Complaint and did not grant leave to amend due

to the futility of doing so. Batterman timely filed an appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of the

District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to

state a claim. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). “[W]e accept

all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. Judge Hilles is

protected by judicial immunity from damages liability, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 355–56 (1978), as the actions described in the Complaint were all “function[s]

normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Since Judge Hilles did not act “in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction,” he retains judicial immunity. Id. (quoting Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). 2 In his brief, Batterman argues that Judge Hilles exceeded the bounds of normal

judicial conduct, and engaged in the role of advocate on behalf of Batterman’s wife by

excessively questioning the litigants. But a family court judge is required “to make a

penetrating and comprehensive inquiry, and if necessary, to develop the record itself,”

Lewis v. Lewis, 406 A.2d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), which would require asking

questions of the parents so as to ascertain the best interests of the child to the best of the

judge’s ability. See generally 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5328(a). In these circumstances, and

even accepting Batterman’s allegations, we are satisfied that Judge Hilles is protected by

judicial immunity. See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769.

Furthermore, with respect to the claims presented against Judge Hilles in his

official capacity, he shares in Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment because, as a judge, he is an arm of the state. See Benn v. First Judicial

Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005); see generally A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.

Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). Additionally, since Batterman did not allege that

a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, his claims for

injunctive relief are barred. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

prohibits Batterman, to the extent that he is attempting to do so, from “inviting district

court review and rejection” of any final judgment that allegedly injured him and was

rendered in state court before the district court proceedings began. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State,

938 F.3d 453, 458–61 (3d Cir. 2019). 3 For these reasons, dismissal of Batterman’s claims was warranted, as was the

decision to deny leave to amend. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the

District Court. We also grant Judge Hilles’ motion for leave to file a supplemental

appendix.