Cfirstclass Corp. v. Silverjet Plc

560 F. Supp. 2d 324, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45745, 2008 WL 2389811
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 11, 2008
Docket07 Civ. 6371 (SHS)
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 560 F. Supp. 2d 324 (Cfirstclass Corp. v. Silverjet Plc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cfirstclass Corp. v. Silverjet Plc, 560 F. Supp. 2d 324, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45745, 2008 WL 2389811 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

SIDNEY H. STEIN, District Judge.

Between 2005 and 2006, plaintiff Cfir-stclass Corporation entered into two contracts with FlyJet Limited, a London-based enterprise, pursuant to which FlyJet agreed to provide Cfirstclass with an aircraft to fly between England, the United States, and the Caribbean. According to Cfirstclass, defendant Silverjet PLC subsequently acquired FlyJet in order to take control of the aircraft for its own transatlantic air service. Contending that Fly-Jet’s failure to deliver the aircraft caused Cfirstclass significant financial injury, Cfir-stclass asserts claims against Silverjet for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship, tortious interference with contract, and unjust enrichment. Sil-verjet now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), asserting that Cfirstclass’s claims are barred by the forum selection clauses contained in the parties’ agreements. Because Cfirstclass’s claims are within the scope of the forum selection clauses and enforcing the clauses would be neither unreasonable nor unjust, that motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2005, and January 18, 2006, Cfirstclass and FlyJet entered into, respectively, an Aircraft Seat Charter Agreement and a General Sales Agency Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 5; Aircraft Seat Charter Agreement, Ex. A to Decl. of Geoffrey C. Upton dated Oct. 1, 2007 (“Upton Decl.”); General Sales Agency Agreement, Ex. B to Upton Decl.) These contracts required FlyJet to provide Cfir-stclass with a specially configured Boeing 767-200 aircraft, with which plaintiff was to fly certain international routes between England, the United States, and the Caribbean. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Pursuant to the agreements, Cfirstclass deposited $750,000 with FlyJet. (Id. ¶ 6.) Cfirstclass alleges that it also spent more than $2 million to complete a custom fitting of the aircraft and to prepare to service the aircraft once it was delivered. (Id. ¶ 7.)

In approximately October 2006, Silverjet acquired all of the outstanding shares of FlyJet and all its assets. (Id. ¶ 8.) According to Cfirstclass, Silverjet did so in order to take control of FlyJet’s Boeing 767-200 as part of a plan to inaugurate its own transatlantic air service. (Id. ¶ 9.) Allegedly, Silverjet has subsequently derived substantial income from its use of the aircraft. (Id.)

One month after Silverjet acquired Fly-Jet, the parties agreed that Silverjet would provide Cfirstclass with a comparable aircraft by February 2007 or pay a monthly penalty of $100,000 for each month after February 2007 that delivery of the plane was delayed. (Id. ¶ 10.) FlyJet failed to furnish any aircraft, however, and, in a letter dated May 25, 2007, it purported to terminate the agreements and assess charges against the $ 750,000 deposit that Cfirstclass had given FlyJet. (Id. ¶ 11.)

The Aircraft Seat Charter Agreement and the General Sales Agency Agreement contain identical “Applicable Law and Jurisdiction” clauses that provide as follows: “This Agreement wherever made or to be performed shall be governed and construed in accordance with English law and all disputes arising hereunder shall be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of England and Wales.” (Aircraft Seat Charter Agreement ¶ 12.1; General Sales Agency Agreement ¶ 12.1.)

II. DISCUSSION

There is a split of authority in the Second Circuit regarding the appropriate *327 procedural mechanism by which to enforce a forum selection clause. Decisions variously suggest that the proper vehicle would be (1) a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), see AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 152 (2d Cir.1984); (2) a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), see Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 382 (2d Cir.2007); and (3) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Evolution Online Systems, Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505, 508 n. 6 (2d Cir.1998). But see New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B & W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir.1997) (“[T]here is no existing mechanism with which forum selection enforcement is a perfect fit”). Sil-verjet brings the present motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), which the Court believes is appropriate. 1 See Direct Mail Prod. Servs. Ltd. v. MBNA Corp., No. 99 Civ. 10550(SHS), 2000 WL 1277597, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000). Cfirstclass does not contest Silverjet’s choice of procedural mechanism.

The burdens on a plaintiff opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause are similar to those “imposed on a plaintiff to prove that the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over his suit or personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” and accordingly, courts apply the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting enforcement of the forum selection clause. New Moon Shipping, 121 F.3d at 29.

“Determining whether to dismiss a claim based on a forum selection clause involves a four-part analysis” that was recently summarized in Phillips as follows:

The first inquiry is whether the clause was reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement. See, e.g., D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir.2006). The second step requires us to classify the clause as mandatory or permissive, i.e., to decide whether the parties are required to bring any dispute to the designated forum or simply permitted to do so. See John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1994). Part three asks whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause. See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1358-61 (2d Cir.1993).

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560 F. Supp. 2d 324, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45745, 2008 WL 2389811, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cfirstclass-corp-v-silverjet-plc-nysd-2008.