USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-2327
CESIA SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:18-cv-03106-GJH)
Submitted: June 29, 2022 Decided: August 16, 2022
Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: David A. Branch, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christopher E. Humber, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Cesia Sanchez, a Latina woman of Hispanic ancestry, appeals the district court’s
orders dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims she filed against her former employer,
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. (“Whole Foods”) and granting Whole Foods’ motion for
summary judgment on her breach-of-contract claim. On appeal, she asserts that the district
court improperly dismissed her claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment
and that the court erred in dismissing these claims with prejudice. She also challenges the
court’s denial of relief on her breach-of-contract claim. We affirm.
We review an order granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Feminist
Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018). “In conducting such a
review, we are obliged to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Id. “However, legal conclusions pleaded
as factual allegations, unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, and naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement are not entitled to the presumption of
truth.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
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Section 1981 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Courts long relied on
the McDonnell Douglas * burden-shifting framework to evaluate § 1981 claims of
race-based discrimination in employment where, as here, the plaintiff does not provide any
direct evidence of discrimination. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that McDonnell Douglas does not address the
causation standard relevant for § 1981 racial-discrimination claims. Comcast Corp. v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Instead, to survive a
motion to dismiss on such a claim, “a plaintiff must initially plead . . . that, but for race,
[she] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Id.
Sanchez’s complaint simply does not allege facts showing that her race was a causal
factor in her disparate treatment, much less that it was the but-for cause. Because
Sanchez’s complaint provides no plausible basis for us to conclude that racial
discrimination caused her employer to take the contested actions against her, the district
court properly dismissed this claim.
A plaintiff may also pursue a hostile-work-environment claim under § 1981. See
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). “A
hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
* McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 4 of 6
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id.
(cleaned up). To state a hostile-work-environment claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must
allege “that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s [race];
(3) which is sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of
employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the
employer.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2016)
(cleaned up); see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277.
The complaint fails to support a reasonable inference that any of the conduct alleged
related to Sanchez’s race. And, even if one were to assume that Whole Foods’ conduct
was racially tinged, the complaint does not plausibly allege that such conduct was severe
or pervasive enough to alter Sanchez’s conditions of employment and create an abusive
work environment. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Sanchez’s
hostile-work-environment claim.
Sanchez also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her § 1981 claims with
prejudice without providing her an opportunity to amend. Although district “courts should
freely give leave to amend when justice so requires[,] . . . a district court does not abuse its
discretion by declining to grant a request to amend [a complaint] when it is not properly
made as a motion,” ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 217-18
(4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, Sanchez never requested the opportunity to amend her
complaint. Moreover, even on appeal, Sanchez has provided no insight as to what
additional factual allegations she could make that would correct the defects in her
complaint. Accordingly, this claim fails.
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USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-2327
CESIA SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:18-cv-03106-GJH)
Submitted: June 29, 2022 Decided: August 16, 2022
Before KING and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: David A. Branch, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christopher E. Humber, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Cesia Sanchez, a Latina woman of Hispanic ancestry, appeals the district court’s
orders dismissing the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims she filed against her former employer,
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. (“Whole Foods”) and granting Whole Foods’ motion for
summary judgment on her breach-of-contract claim. On appeal, she asserts that the district
court improperly dismissed her claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment
and that the court erred in dismissing these claims with prejudice. She also challenges the
court’s denial of relief on her breach-of-contract claim. We affirm.
We review an order granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Feminist
Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018). “In conducting such a
review, we are obliged to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Id. “However, legal conclusions pleaded
as factual allegations, unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, and naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement are not entitled to the presumption of
truth.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 3 of 6
Section 1981 provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Courts long relied on
the McDonnell Douglas * burden-shifting framework to evaluate § 1981 claims of
race-based discrimination in employment where, as here, the plaintiff does not provide any
direct evidence of discrimination. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that McDonnell Douglas does not address the
causation standard relevant for § 1981 racial-discrimination claims. Comcast Corp. v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Instead, to survive a
motion to dismiss on such a claim, “a plaintiff must initially plead . . . that, but for race,
[she] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Id.
Sanchez’s complaint simply does not allege facts showing that her race was a causal
factor in her disparate treatment, much less that it was the but-for cause. Because
Sanchez’s complaint provides no plausible basis for us to conclude that racial
discrimination caused her employer to take the contested actions against her, the district
court properly dismissed this claim.
A plaintiff may also pursue a hostile-work-environment claim under § 1981. See
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). “A
hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
* McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 4 of 6
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id.
(cleaned up). To state a hostile-work-environment claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must
allege “that there is (1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s [race];
(3) which is sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of
employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the
employer.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2016)
(cleaned up); see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277.
The complaint fails to support a reasonable inference that any of the conduct alleged
related to Sanchez’s race. And, even if one were to assume that Whole Foods’ conduct
was racially tinged, the complaint does not plausibly allege that such conduct was severe
or pervasive enough to alter Sanchez’s conditions of employment and create an abusive
work environment. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Sanchez’s
hostile-work-environment claim.
Sanchez also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her § 1981 claims with
prejudice without providing her an opportunity to amend. Although district “courts should
freely give leave to amend when justice so requires[,] . . . a district court does not abuse its
discretion by declining to grant a request to amend [a complaint] when it is not properly
made as a motion,” ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 217-18
(4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, Sanchez never requested the opportunity to amend her
complaint. Moreover, even on appeal, Sanchez has provided no insight as to what
additional factual allegations she could make that would correct the defects in her
complaint. Accordingly, this claim fails.
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Finally, Sanchez asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
to Whole Foods on her breach-of-contract claim. “We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651,
659 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate
“‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In
making this determination, “courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility
determinations.” Id. (cleaned up). However, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than
conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or
the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.
Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Employment is presumed to be at will in Maryland. Towson Univ. v. Conte, 862
A.2d 941, 947 (Md. 2004). This presumption, however, can be overcome where the
employee shows the employer put forth a policy “that limit[s] the employer’s discretion to
terminate an indefinite employment or . . . set[s] forth a required procedure for
termination.” Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798, 803 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985); see Towson Univ., 862 A.2d at 947. The employee also must show that she
“justifiably relied” on the employer’s policy. Castiglione v. John Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d
786, 793 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
Maryland recognizes implied contracts based on provisions of employee manuals.
Staggs, 486 A.2d at 803. However, an express disclaimer will relieve the employer of any
5 USCA4 Appeal: 20-2327 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/16/2022 Pg: 6 of 6
contractual obligations that the handbook may otherwise create. Fournier v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 569 A.2d 1299, 1301 (Md. 1990). To do so, the policy manual must “clearly
and conspicuously disclaim contractual intent.” Castiglione, 517 A.2d at 793.
The plain language of Whole Foods’ policies demonstrates that Whole Foods clearly
and conspicuously informed Sanchez that her employment was at will. The disclaimers
preclude Sanchez from being able to show that she justifiably relied on Whole Foods’
policies as creating any contractual rights. Therefore, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to Whole Foods on Sanchez’s breach-of-contract claim.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED