1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION 10 11 CESAR TOMAS AVALOS, CASE NO. CV 25-11434-AS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, MOTION TO REMAND 15 Defendant. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 19 On August 5, 2025, Plaintiff Cesar Tomas Avalos (“Plaintiff”), 20 filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors LLC 21 (“Defendant”), in Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 22 25STCV23049, asserting claims under the California Song-Beverly 23 Consumer Warranty Act for breach of express warranty, breach of 24 the implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of 25 California Civil Code section 1793.2. (Dkt. No. 1-1, at 10-16 26 (“Complaint”)). On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff served the Summons 27 and Complaint on Defendant. (Dkt. No. 7-1, at 5-6). On September 28 4, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1- 1 2). On December 1, 2025, Defendant filed the Notice of Removal, 2 removing the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. 3 (Dkt. No. 1). 4 5 On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand 6 (“Motion”) along with a supporting Memorandum of Points and 7 Authorities (“Motion Mem.”), a declaration of counsel (“Plata 8 Decl.”) and an exhibit. (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiff contends that 9 remand is warranted because Defendant’s removal of the case to this 10 Court (1) was untimely and (2) fails to establish that the case 11 satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement. (See Motion Mem. 12 at 5-10). On January 6, 2026, Defendant filed an Opposition to the 13 Motion, along with a supporting declaration of counsel (“Fitch 14 Decl.”) and exhibits. (Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiff followed with a 15 Reply on January 22, 2026. (Dkt. No. 13). 16 17 For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.1 18 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 21 Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed 22 by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any 23 civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 24 of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 25 removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the 26
27 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (See Dkt. Nos. 5-6). 28 1 district and division embracing the place where such action is 2 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original subject 3 matter jurisdiction where an action presents either a federal 4 question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under 5 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Generally, a court has diversity jurisdiction 6 only when there is complete diversity of citizenship among adverse 7 parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 8 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Remand to state court may be ordered for lack of 9 subject matter jurisdiction or any defect in the removal procedure. 10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 11 12 To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal 13 jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor of remand. See Harris 14 v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); see 15 also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 16 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the limited 17 jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing 18 the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” 19 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). If there is any 20 doubt as to whether removal is proper, remand must be ordered. 21 Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 22 1988). “The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing 23 federal jurisdiction.” Id. 24 25 DISCUSSION 26 27 As indicated above, Plaintiff’s Motion contends that remand 28 is warranted because Defendant’s removal (1) was untimely and (2) 1 fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. 2 (See Motion Memo at 4-10). The Motion is denied. 3 4 A. Defendant’s Removal Was Timely 5 6 1. Applicable Law 7 8 The Ninth Circuit has explained that there are three pathways 9 for removal of an action from state court based on diversity 10 jurisdiction. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 11 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). The first two pathways are contained 12 in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and impose thirty-day deadlines for removal. 13 See Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021). 14 The third pathway is based on reading 28 U.S.C. § 1446 together 15 with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and permits removal up to one year from the 16 filing of the complaint, but this pathway only applies if the first 17 two do not. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26. 18 19 The first pathway is set forth by § 1446(b)(1) and states that 20 “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be 21 filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through 22 service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 23 forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is 24 based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the 25 defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court 26 and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period 27 is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Section 1446(b)(1) “only 28 applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on 1 its face,” as determined “through examination of the four corners 2 of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a 3 duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 4 5 The second pathway is set forth by § 1446(b)(3) and states in 6 relevant part that “if the case stated by the initial pleading is 7 not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days 8 after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 9 copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 10 which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or 11 has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Section 1446(b)(3) 12 is triggered only where “an amended pleading, motion, order, or 13 other paper . . . [makes] a ground for removal unequivocally clear 14 and certain.” Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. 15 16 The third pathway is based on the interaction of § 1446 with 17 § 1441. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Section 1441(a) states that 18 “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any 19 civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 20 of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by 21 the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the 22 United States for the district and division embracing the place 23 where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth 24 Circuit has explained “that §§ 1441 and 1446, read together, permit 25 a defendant to remove outside the two thirty-day periods on the 26 basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul 27 of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. 28 Thus, “a defendant who has not lost the right to remove because of 1 a failure to timely file a notice of removal under § 1446(b)(1) or 2 (b)(3) may remove to federal court when it discovers, based on its 3 own investigation, that a case is removable.” Id. at 1123. The only 4 time limit on removal under this third pathway is that a defendant 5 must file the notice of removal within one year of the filing of 6 the complaint. Id. at 1126 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) for the 7 one-year time limit). 8 9 2. Analysis 10 11 It is undisputed that Defendant removed this case to this 12 Court more than thirty days after service of the Complaint; indeed, 13 removal occurred almost four months after service, long after 14 Defendant already had answered the Complaint. (See Plata Decl. ¶¶ 15 5-6, 9). Defendant asserts that the thirty-day deadlines of § 16 1446(b)(1) and § 1446(b)(3) do not apply here because Plaintiff’s 17 Complaint is ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s state of citizenship and 18 the amount in controversy. (See Notice of Removal at 6-10; 19 Opposition at 14-18). Particularly as to the latter, as Defendant 20 points out, the Complaint fails to provide any of the values needed 21 to calculate the amount of damages sought. 22 23 Plaintiff contends that a thirty-day deadline applied because 24 the face of the Complaint provided sufficient information for 25 Defendant to plausibly allege that the amount in controversy was 26 met. (See Motion Mem. at 5-8). The Complaint asserts breach-of- 27 warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 28 arising out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2024 Chevrolet Equinox RS 1 on October 18, 2023. (See Compl. at 1-4). As relief, the Complaint 2 seeks a rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all 3 monies expended on the subject vehicle, general, special, 4 incidental, and consequential damages, as well as a civil penalty 5 of up to two times the amount of actual damages, along with 6 attorneys’ fees and costs. (See Compl. at 5). 7 8 The Song-Beverly Act permits the purchaser of a vehicle to 9 obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer, 10 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. 11 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). The usage offset is calculated based on 12 “the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to 13 the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the 14 manufacturer.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). In addition, under newly 15 enacted California law, defendants in actions seeking restitution 16 for motor vehicles are entitled to offset from the purchase price 17 any negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, third-party sold 18 optional equipment, and unpaid financing. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 19 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f). 20 21 In Plaintiff’s Complaint, not only is the amount of damages 22 unspecified, but so too are the purchase price, the mileage, and 23 any other facts related to the subject vehicle aside from the make, 24 model, year, and Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”). Plaintiff 25 nonetheless asserts that this information alone sufficed for 26 Defendant to estimate the vehicle’s market value and thereby 27 calculate the total damages sought, given that Defendant has 28 “sophisticated knowledge of the motor vehicle industry” and was 1 the vehicle’s “manufacturer and distributor.” (Motion Mem. at 6- 2 7). 3 4 It is true that defendants are required to “apply a reasonable 5 amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability,” and 6 “[m]ultiplying figures clearly stated in a complaint is an aspect 7 of that duty.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 8 1140 (9th Cir. 2013). However, when no such figures are provided, 9 “defendants need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork,” 10 id., nor are they expected to rely on their “subjective knowledge” 11 or “pre-complaint documents to ascertain whether a case stated by 12 an indeterminate initial pleading is actually removable,” Carvalho 13 v. Equifax Inf. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2010). 14 To the contrary, as indicated above, the thirty-day deadline under 15 § 1441(b)(1) applies only if the basis for removal may be determined 16 by examining “the four corners” of the Complaint itself, “not 17 through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” 18 Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 19 20 Thus, absent any specific allegations of the dollar value of 21 the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the vehicle 22 and claims for broad categories of damages are insufficient to 23 trigger the removal deadline. See, e.g., Alvarez-Munguia v. Ford 24 Motor Co., 2024 WL 69076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024) (complaint 25 did not trigger thirty-day removal deadline because it alleged only 26 categories of relief and did not identify any “specific measure of 27 damages, nor [did] it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and 28 costs incurred”); Pastrana v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2024 WL 2817533, 1 at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024) (thirty-day deadline was not 2 triggered where the complaint did not “list a dollar amount 3 corresponding to the damages”); Moran v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 4 4532755, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023) (“[W]hile Defendant could 5 have made a plausible guess that the amount in controversy in this 6 case exceeded $75,000, Defendant was under no obligation to do 7 so.”); see also Valentin v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2026 WL 836347, at 8 *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (“A substantial majority of courts 9 have found that without pleading facts about the vehicle’s value, 10 a complaint is indeterminate concerning the amount in controversy 11 and therefore removability is not yet clear.” (collecting cases)). 12 13 As the values needed to calculate damages are not contained 14 within the “four corners” of Plaintiff’s Complaint, § 1441(b)(1) 15 does not apply. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 16 17 As indicated above, § 1446(b)(3) provides another pathway 18 whereby removal may be accomplished within thirty days after 19 receipt of “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other 20 paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 21 which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). To 22 qualify, the amended pleading, motion, order, or “other paper” must 23 make the basis for removal “unequivocally clear and certain.” 24 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. 25 26 Plaintiff contends that the amount of controversy became 27 “unquestionably ascertainable” at least by October 7, 2025, when 28 Plaintiff produced a copy of the subject vehicle’s sales agreement 1 which identified the vehicle’s total sales price – $58,620.15. 2 (Motion Mem. at 3, 7-8; Plata Decl. ¶ 8; see Fitch Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 3 A). However, “[w]hile Plaintiff[] disclosed the purchase price of 4 the vehicle” by providing the sales agreement, he “did not provide 5 information about the vehicle’s ‘payoff history’ or the number of 6 miles driven. Defendant therefore lacked information needed to 7 calculate the available damages.” Stewart v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 8 WL 2848991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (citing Lopez v. Gen. 9 Motors, LLC, 2025 WL 2629545, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025); 10 Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Co., 2025 WL 907544, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 11 Mar. 24, 2025))). In other words, as numerous district courts have 12 concluded in similar circumstances, the Complaint and sales 13 agreement, by themselves, did not make the amount in controversy 14 “unequivocally clear and certain” to Defendant, as needed to 15 trigger § 1446(b)(3). See, e.g., Valentin, 2026 WL 836347, at *3 16 n.4 (“The car sales agreement alone did not trigger removal under 17 the ‘unequivocally clear and certain’ standard.”); Bateman v. Gen. 18 Motors LLC, 2026 WL 412521, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026) 19 (“[W]hile the Sales Agreement may have made it likely that the 20 amount in controversy requirement was met, ‘likely’ is not 21 ‘unequivocally clear and certain.’ . . . [Plaintiff’s] production 22 of the Sales Agreement did not meet the high standard for triggering 23 removability.” (citation omitted)); Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *3 24 (amount in controversy was not “unequivocally clear and certain” 25 absent loan payment history). To calculate damages with sufficient 26 certainty, Defendant needed to resort to information obtained 27 though its own investigation or from documents that Plaintiff 28 disclosed later. 1 Furthermore, without sufficient information to calculate 2 actual damages with certainty, Defendant also had no basis to 3 calculate civil penalties. See, e.g., Stewart, 2025 WL 2848991, at 4 *4 (same); Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *4 (same); Bateman, 2026 WL 5 412521, at *4 (same). There was also no information in the Complaint 6 or other papers to calculate attorneys’ fees. 7 8 Accordingly, since neither § 1446(b)(1) or § 1446(b)(3) are 9 applicable, Defendant timely filed the Notice of Removal within 10 one year of the commencement of this action. Roth, 720 F.3d at 11 1125. 12 13 B. Defendant Has Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence 14 that the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000 15 16 1. Applicable Law 17 18 As previously noted, § 1332 “gives federal district courts 19 original jurisdiction of all civil actions ‘between . . . citizens 20 of different States’ where the amount in controversy exceeds 21 $75,000.” Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) 22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). “Where, as here, it is unclear 23 from the face of the complaint whether the amount in controversy 24 exceeds $75,000, ‘the removing defendant bears the burden of 25 establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount 26 in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” Chavez v. 27 JP Morgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation 28 omitted); Guglielmo v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th 1 Cir. 2007); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of 2 Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010) 3 (“[I]n a case that has been removed from state court to federal 4 court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 5 the proponent of federal jurisdiction – typically the defendant in 6 the substantive dispute – has the burden to prove, by a 7 preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.”). “A 8 defendant may rely on reasonable assumptions to prove that it has 9 met the statutory threshold.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 10 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2020). The parties also may submit evidence, 11 “including affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment- 12 type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of 13 removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th 14 Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 15 16 “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total 17 amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s 18 liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th 19 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “In that sense, the amount in 20 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could 21 reasonably recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 22 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 23 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018)) (emphasis in original). Thus, 24 the amount in controversy is the amount “at stake” in the litigation 25 at the time of removal, “whatever the likelihood that [the 26 plaintiff] will actually recover them.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 417. 27 28 1 “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, 2 punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, 3 and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or 4 contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 5 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 6 7 2. Analysis 8 9 Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to meet its 10 burden to establish the amount in controversy necessary to provide 11 this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. (Motion Mem. at 8-10; 12 Reply at 4-7). However, as set forth below, Defendant has provided 13 ample evidence to support its amount-in-controversy allegations 14 based on Plaintiff’s claims for (a) actual damages and (b) civil 15 penalties.2 16 17 a. Actual Damages 18 19 Under the Song-Beverly Act, the purchaser of a vehicle may 20 obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer, 21 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. 22 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). The usage offset (or “mileage offset”) 23 is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by a fraction with 24 a denominator of 120,000 and a numerator of “the number of miles 25 traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first 26 2 Because the threshold is satisfied based on the calculation 27 of actual damages and civil penalties, the Court need not address Defendant’s estimate of attorneys’ fees. 28 1 delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). 2 In addition, under newly enacted California law, defendants in 3 actions seeking restitution for motor vehicles are entitled to 4 offset from the purchase price any negative equity, manufacturer’s 5 rebate, third-party sold optional equipment, and unpaid financing. 6 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).3 The Ninth Circuit 7 has explained that, because “an estimate of the amount in 8 controversy must be reduced if ‘a specific rule of law or measure 9 of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable,’” 10 consideration of the Song-Beverly Act’s offsets in calculating the 11 amount in controversy is “appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor 12 Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Morris v. 13 Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)). 14 15 Here, Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle (a 2024 16 Chevrolet Equinox RS) on October 18, 2023, for $58,620.15, with 18 17 miles on the odometer. (Fitch Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A at 1 (sales 18 agreement)). On July 8, 2024, with 21,887 miles on the odometer, 19 Plaintiff presented the vehicle to a dealership for repair of the 20 defect claim he appears to be pursuing here. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. B (repair 21 history summary)). Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle before 22 discovering this alleged nonconformity was 21,869 miles (21,887— 23 18). As Defendant points out, dividing this number by 120,000 and 24 multiplying this by the cash price of the vehicle — which is 25
26 3 Section 871.27 was enacted as part of California Assembly Bill 1755 and went into effect on January 1, 2025. See A.B. 1755, 27 2023-24 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Because this action was initiated after January 1, 2025, these requirements apply here. 28 1 $36,460.00 (see Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 2) — results in an estimated 2 mileage offset of $6,644.53. See Cal. Civil Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). 3 Additionally, Defendant has identified $4,222.00 in other offsets 4 for optional third-party contracts. (Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 2); Cal. 5 Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27. Deducting these offsets of $4,222.00 and 6 the usage/mileage offset of $6,644.53 from the total purchase price 7 of $58,620.15 results in $47,753.62. 8 9 The amount of unpaid financing also must be deducted. As of 10 July 17, 2025, Plaintiff had $32,390.09 remaining in unpaid 11 financing. (Fitch Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. C (loan payoff estimate)). As 12 Defendant notes, “[g]iven that this matter is unlikely to resolve 13 early, it would be reasonable to estimate at least 18 additional 14 monthly payments of $715.65 prior to resolution of trial and any 15 appeal, leaving an estimated $19,508.39 in unpaid financing.” 16 (Opposition at 19; see Fitch Decl. Ex. A at 1). By then subtracting 17 that amount from $47,753.62, Defendant posits that the amount of 18 “actual” damages at issue here is $28,245.23.4 19 20 21
22 4 This estimate of actual damages presented in Defendant’s Opposition is appropriately revised from the $47,753.62 estimate 23 presented in the Notice of Removal. (See Notice of Removal at 5). “[A] notice of removal must include only ‘a plausible allegation 24 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 25 threshold.’” Schneider, 756 F. App’x at 700 (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)). “The 26 preponderance of the evidence standard applies only after ‘the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's 27 allegation’ and ‘both sides submit proof.’” Id. at 700-01 (quoting Owens, U.S. at 89). 28 1 Plaintiff contends that this latter calculation of future loan 2 payments is speculative. (See Reply at 4-5). However, because the 3 amount in controversy “is simply an estimate of the total amount 4 in dispute,” Defendant “is permitted to rely on a chain of reasoning 5 that includes assumptions to calculate the amount in controversy.” 6 Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) 7 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant’s 8 assumptions are reasonable, and its calculations are supported by 9 sufficient documentation. 10 11 b. Civil Penalty 12 13 In addition to actual damages, the Complaint seeks a civil 14 penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages (see Compl. 15 at 5), as permitted for willful violations of the Song-Beverly Act, 16 see Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). “Courts treat the Song-Beverly Act’s 17 civil penalties akin to punitive damages,” Carillo v. FCA USA, LLC, 18 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Suman v. Superior 19 Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309, 1317 (1995)), and “[i]t is well 20 established that punitive damages are part of the amount in 21 controversy in a civil action,” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 22 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. 23 Society, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943)). 24 25 Plaintiff contends that Defendant cannot merely assume the 26 maximum civil penalty award and must instead “offer evidence of 27 willfulness that might support such an award.” (Motion Mem. at 10; 28 Reply at 5-6). Here, however, the Complaint expressly alleges that 1 Defendant’s conduct was willful (see Compl. ¶ 17, 24, 28) and seeks 2 “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual 3 damages pursuant to [California] Civil Code section 1794(c)” 4 (Compl. at 5). In such circumstances, several courts have 5 appropriately found that maximum civil penalties may be included 6 in calculating the amount in controversy. See Amavizca v. Nissan 7 N. Am., Inc., 2023 WL 3020489, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) 8 (“Many courts have included the maximum civil penalty available 9 under the Song-Beverly Act as part of the amount in controversy, 10 at least when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted 11 willfully and requests the full penalty in the complaint.” 12 (collecting cases)); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 13 872, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]his Court sides with the majority 14 of courts and more recent cases, which find civil penalties 15 appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in 16 controversy without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against 17 itself’ with respect to liability for civil penalties.”); Perez v. 18 Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2985229, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) 19 (“[S]everal courts have found that maximum civil penalties may be 20 included in calculating the amount in controversy. This is 21 especially true where, as here, there are ‘allegations in the 22 [Complaint] that Defendant’s conduct was willful.’ ‘Moreover, 23 Defendant is not required to prove the case against itself.’” 24 (citations omitted)). 25 26 Applying this maximum (two-times) civil penalty here 27 ($28,245.23*2), as Defendant points out, brings the total amount 28 to $84,735.69 ($28,245.23 + ($28,245.23*2)), which well exceeds 1 $75,000. See also Carillo, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (denying a 2 motion to remand after finding the amount in controversy satisfied 3 based on “the amount of actual damages available as restitution” 4 of $25,018.70, which when adding the civil penalty of twice the 5 amount ($50,037.40), amounted to a total of $75,056.10 in 6 controversy); Perez, 2025 WL 2985229, at *4 (same, for $36,071.22 7 in damages plus a two-times civil penalty, for a total of 8 $108,213.66). Accordingly, Defendant has demonstrated that it is 9 more likely than not that the amount in controversy exceeds the 10 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. 11 12 CONCLUSION 13 14 Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 DATED: May 6, 2026 19 /s/ __________ 20 ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28