Cesar Enrique Lopez (A-072-241-167) v. Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01525
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Cesar Enrique Lopez (A-072-241-167), No. 1:26-cv-01525 CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 Warden of the California City Detention Facility, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 Petitioner Cesar Enrique Lopez (A-072-241-167), a native of Mexico who is proceeding 19 without counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 In 20 October 1996, petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. On 21 May 6, 2025, petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 22 officials. ICE initiated removal proceedings against petitioner based on his criminal convictions. 23 This habeas action concerns petitioner’s detention. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 In October 1996, petitioner was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 26 resident. (ECF Nos. 8 at 1, 8-1 at 4.) On March 8, 2007, petitioner was convicted of voluntary 27 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 11.) 1 manslaughter in Los Angeles Superior Court in violation of California Penal Code § 192(a), and 2 he was sentenced to 3 years in prison. (ECF No. 8-1 at 8-18.) On June 22, 2023, Petitioner was 3 convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, fiancé, boyfriend, girlfriend, or 4 child’s parent in San Bernardino Superior Court in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(a), 5 and he was sentenced to 270 days in prison “eligible for County Jail Weekend/Work Release 6 program” and three years of probation.2 (ECF No. 8-1 at 20-27.) 7 On May 6, 2025, petitioner was detained by ICE. (ECF No. 1 at 6, 13; ECF No. 8-1 at 5.) 8 On May 7, 2025, petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear placing petitioner in removal 9 proceedings and charging him with being subject to removal under Immigration and Nationality 10 Act (“INA”) section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as having been convicted of a 11 crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child 12 abandonment. (ECF No. 8-1 at 30-32.) On November 12, 2025, an immigration judge found 13 petitioner was removable as charged and ordered his removal to Mexico. (ECF No. 8-1 at 34-37.) 14 On December 3, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) received petitioner’s appeal of 15 his removal order, and his appeal to the BIA remains pending. (ECF No. 8-1 at 39-41.) 16 On February 23, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, motion to 17 proceed in forma pauperis, and motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3.) On 18 February 25, 2026, the assigned district judge referred the matter to the assigned magistrate judge 19 for further proceedings. (ECF No. 6.) On February 26, 2026, this Court granted petitioner leave 20 to proceed in forma pauperis, set a briefing schedule, and informed the parties that the Court 21 would defer ruling on petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel until after reviewing 22 respondents’ response to the petition. (ECF No. 7.) On March 5, 2026, respondents timely filed 23 a response to the petition and a motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner did not 24 2 Petitioner’s allegations in the petition regarding these two criminal convictions are inconsistent 25 with the government’s allegations. See e.g., ECF No. 1 at 6 (allegation that “the D.A. dismissed” his manslaughter charges). Where the government’s allegations regarding petitioner’s criminal 26 history are supported by state court records submitted with the government’s response (see ECF 27 No. 8-1 at 8-18, 20-27) and petitioner had an opportunity to respond to the government’s submission but did not contest the government’s allegations, the Court finds the 2007 and 2023 28 convictions as presented in this background section. 1 file a reply. (See Docket.) On March 17, 2026, a consent order issued reassigning this case to the 2 undersigned for all purposes upon the consent of the parties. (ECF No. 11.) Briefing is now 3 complete. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 6 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 7 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 8 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 9 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 10 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 11 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 12 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 13 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 14 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 15 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 Petitioner challenges his continued detention as a violation of following the Fifth 18 Amendment due process clause. (ECF No. 1 at 18-19.) Respondents argue that petitioner is 19 subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) because his convictions for 20 voluntary manslaughter and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant are “two or more 21 crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct” 22 under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). (ECF No. 8 at 2.) As such, respondents argue that 23 petitioner’s detention is constitutional. (Id. at 2-5.) 24 A. Due Process Claim 25 In analyzing petitioner’s challenge to his detention, the court “must first identify the 26 statutory provision that purports to confer” authority for his detention. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 27 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court accepts without deciding respondents’ 28 contention that petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) because he is subject to 1 removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his two criminal convictions for crimes 2 involving moral turpitude: California Penal Code § 192(a) for voluntary manslaughter and 3 California Penal Code § 273.5(a) for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. See 4 Ortiz v. Garland, 25 F.4th 1223, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding California Penal Code § 192(a) 5 voluntary manslaughter is a crime involving moral turpitude); Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 6 F.3d 1058, 1064-67 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that spousal abuse under § 273.5 is a crime involving 7 moral turpitude, but § 273.5 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the 8 statute is broad and covers multiple types of relationships); see also Valdez v. Garland, 28 F.4th 9 72, 77 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding certified criminal information and certified minute order from 10 state court sentencing were proper conviction documents); 12/1/2020 Felony Complaint (certified 11 complaint charging Lopez with a violation of § 273.5(a) for “willfully inflict[ing] corporal injury 12 resulting in a traumatic condition upon Jane Doe, who was someone with whom the defendant 13 had a dating relationship”) (ECF No. 8-1 at 20-23); 6/22/2023 Minute Order (certified minute 14 order from sentencing) (ECF No. 8-1 at 24-27).3 The Court also notes that petitioner is not 15 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) because his removal order is not administratively final 16 where his appeal to the BIA is pending. See Ocampo v Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 2010) 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)) (an order of removal becomes final “only upon the earlier of 18 (i) a BIA determination affirming the order or (ii) the expiration of the deadline to seek the BIA’s 19 review of the order.”). Pursuant to § 1226(c), “detention is mandatory, and a noncitizen of the 20 United States … therefore is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 21 3 The Court accepts without deciding the government’s 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) contention 22 because the Court’s ruling on the petitioner’s due process claim is not dependent upon finding 23 that petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)(B). In addition, whether petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)(B) is a complex determination and the record is not fully developed 24 before this Court to make this determination. Further, the Court notes that while respondents cite to Cervantes v. Holder, 772 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that California Penal 25 Code § 273.5(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude (see ECF No. 8 at 2), the government’s citation suggests that all § 273.5(a) convictions are crimes involving moral turpitude. But the 26 Ninth Circuit has held that § 273.5(a) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, with 27 some § 273.5(a) convictions qualifying as a crime involving moral turpitude and others may not. See Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1064-67. It is also unclear what the effect of Mathis v. United 28 States, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), may be on this line of cases. 1 F.4th 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 2 303 (2018). 3 This does not end the inquiry, however, because petitioner has raised a due process claim. 4 While the Supreme Court has rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 5 in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), an as applied challenge is not foreclosed and Justice 6 Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Demore specifically noted that “since the Due Process Clause 7 prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as [Kim] could 8 be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the 9 continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532. In addition, “[t]he Ninth 10 Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens 11 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” Loba L.M. v. Andrews, et al., No. 1:25-cv-00611-JLT-SAB, 12 2025 WL 2939178, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 13 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); see Avilez, 69 F.4th at 538 (declining to determine 14 whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c)). 15 “Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a 16 bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third 17 Circuits have found that ‘the Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ 18 limitation upon the duration of detention ... under [section 1226(c)].’” Loba L.M., 2025 WL 19 2939178, at *5 (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021); citing Black v. Decker, 20 103 F.4th 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2024) (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen's constitutional right to due 21 process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond 22 hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 23 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still 24 bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due process affords them a bond hearing 25 once detention becomes unreasonable)). “[E]ssentially all district courts that have considered the 26 issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond 27 hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv- 28 01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation 1 adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Loba L.M., 2 2025 WL 2939178, at *5. This Court joins other courts that have found that unreasonably 3 prolonged detention pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond hearing can violate due process. See 4 Keo v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:26-CV-01192-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5 17, 2026); Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5. 6 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 7 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that 8 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 9 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause 10 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 11 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process 12 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their 13 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 15 The court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim4 “in two steps: the first asks whether 16 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines 17 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with 18 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing 19 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The Court concludes 20 that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his freedom from detention. See Keo, 2026 WL 21 747117, at *2 (concluding clear liberty interest in freedom from detention where petitioner was 22 detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for over 37 months). Petitioner has been detained over ten months 23 since May 2025, and faces prolonged detention during his appeal to the BIA and further potential 24 judicial review. This also exceeds the time period the Supreme Court noted in Demore: “the 25 detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in 26 which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to 27 4 The Court notes that its due process analysis is not dependent on finding petitioner is detained 28 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). 1 appeal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 530. 2 Next, the court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of the 3 protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has “regularly 4 applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to removal 5 proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 6 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in 7 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim 8 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible 9 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration 10 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews, 11 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous 12 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest.5 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 13 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from 14 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at 15 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing 16 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 17 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s 18 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”). 19 While petitioner’s detention for over ten months is not as lengthy as other similar cases, the 20 length of future detention is unknown and indefinite where his appeal to the BIA is pending and 21 briefing deadlines have not yet passed, he does not yet have a final removal order, further judicial 22 review is available after the BIA appeal. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 39-41 (BIA received appeal on 23

24 5 “District courts within this Circuit have adopted a variety of multi-factor tests for determining at what point a noncitizen detained pursuant to a mandatory detention statute is constitutionally 25 entitled to a bond hearing.” Mohammed v. Warden of California City Detention Center, No. 1:26-cv-00118-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 192368, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (applying Matthews 26 test to prolonged detention claim under § 1225(b)(1)). Cf. Keo, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 27 (applying seven factor test from Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *7, to prolonged detention claim under § 1226(c)). As the considerations in the various multi-factor tests are relevant to the due 28 process analysis, the Court will address them within the Mathews framework. 1 December 3, 2025 and briefing is due March 31, 2026).) In addition, the record before the Court 2 does not indicate whether there have been any delays caused by either the petitioner or the 3 government. The first factor therefore weighs in petitioner’s favor. 4 Second, “[t]he risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] 5 has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 6 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in 7 purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen 8 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. 9 ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Here, petitioner has been detained since 10 May 2025 without a bond hearing to evaluate whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the 11 community. It is not this Court’s role to determine whether petitioner is a danger or flight risk, 12 and a neutral arbiter may very well determine that petitioner is a danger given the seriousness of 13 his underlying convictions that make him removable and his prior criminal history. 14 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest 15 in enforcing immigration laws and in public safety, but respondent’s interest in detaining 16 petitioner without a hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 17 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts 18 are routine, and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Overall, balancing 19 these factors, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under the Due Process 20 Clause where he has been detained for over ten months, his appeal to the BIA was recently filed 21 and is still pending, and the length of his future detention is unknown where further judicial 22 review is available and the removal order is not yet final.6 See also Jose G. M. L. v. Warden of 23 the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, et al., No. 1:26-CV-0047-TLN-EFB, 2026 WL 24 472987, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026) (granting preliminary injunctive relief for a bond hearing 25 where the petitioner’s detention under § 1226(c) exceeded six months). 26

27 6 Respondents note that if the petition is granted, the appropriate relief is a bond hearing and not release from detention. (ECF No. 8 at 6-7.) The Court agrees that release is not appropriate and 28 orders a bond hearing. ] B. Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel 2 Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) There currently exists 3 || no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 4 | F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any 5 || stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 6 || Cases. Because the Court grants the petition, the Court does not find the interests of justice 7 || require appointment of counsel. Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel is therefore denied. 8 C, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss 9 For the reasons set forth above, respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied. 10 | IV. CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 13 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) is DENIED. 14 3. Respondents are ordered to provide petitioner Cesar Enrique Lopez (A-072-241-167) 15 with a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker within fourteen (14) days of this 16 order where the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing 17 evidence that petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. 18 4. Because petitioner is proceeding pro se, respondents shall file a status report within 19 seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing. 20 5. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close 21 this case. 22 23 || Dated: March 26, 2026 A aA 24 Ly {nn spe CHI SOO KIM 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 esk/lope.1525.26.merits. 28