OPINION
RESTANI, Judge.
This action is before the court on crossmo-tions for summary judgment, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994), as plaintiff challenges denial of its protest of a Customs valuation decision with regard to beer imported from Canada.
FACTS
The merchandise at issue was imported via four entries made in 1993. At the time of entry normal duty rates had been replaced by a 50 percent duty. By virtue of a “Side Letter Agreement,” dated January 14, 1993, the exporter, Molson Brewing Company, agreed to reimburse Miller Brewing Company for the duty paid.
One of Miller’s subsidiaries, Century Importers, is the importer of record. Another subsidiary paid the original invoice price to Molson and after importation Molson reimbursed it for the duties paid. Thus, as of January 14, 1993, the sum total of the sales agreements resulted in a price (known as the “Transfer Price”) which was to be the same from Miller’s point of view, no matter what the duty rate. From Molson’s point of view, what it actually received in payment was going to change depending on the duty paid. This appears to be essentially a “duty paid” price transaction. The parties, however, did not label this a “duty paid” transaction, nor did the papers submitted at entry reflect anything other than a unitary invoice price.
Plaintiff asserts that, nonetheless, this was a “duty paid” transaction and that this was revealed to Customs when plaintiff presented the side agreement to Customs prior to liquidation of the entries, together with evidence of the monetary adjustments made between Molson and Miller after the duty was paid.
Defendant argues that it properly calculated transaction value for purposes of calculation of duties. Defendant states that there was only a transaction price, and it did not include duties. The adjustment for which plaintiff seeks credit, it asserts, is a post-importation rebate to price which is not relevant to the transaction value calculation.
Post-importation adjustments to price are not considered in calculating the transaction value of the merchandise, but duties ultimately paid by the exporter are not dutiable if the duty is identified separately from the price.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4)(B) (1988). The issue for the court to resolve, then, is whether a duty component of transfer price was identified separately from the price of the merchandise, and at what juncture the duty must be so identified.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from the statute and regulations that, for transaction value purposes, it does not matter what method is used to arrive at the price.
See
19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a(b) (1988);
see also
19 C.F.R. § 152.103 (1993)(“the price ... will be considered without regard to its method of derivation.”)
Thus, neither Molson or Miller’s understanding of the value of the goods, nor the sequence of documents or any other similar matter is relevant. Price is determinative, no matter how it is reached. Further, repayment of duties to the importer after importation to fulfill the bargain in a “duty paid” sale is not a “rebate of price” within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4) (1988).
The importer pays the duty in the first instance and the exact amount of duty is not known until liquidation, which occurs after importation.
See
Deposition of John T. Ryan, at 18, 20, Def.’s Opp. Br., at Ex. F, at 5, 6. (U.S. Customs Field National Import Specialist, as representative of defendant) [hereinafter “Ryan Deposition”]. Both parties agree that the net payment to the exporter, which is usually made after importation, would not include the amounts paid as duty, in the normal duty paid price case. Defendant has not demonstrated that a post-importation adjustment between the parties solely on account of the duties paid by the importer is substantively different from a post-importation net payment that excludes duties paid by the importer.
The court concludes there is no conflict between the direction of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(3)(B) not to calculate a transaction value which includes an identified customs duty and the direction of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4) not to lower the transaction value price to reflect post-importation rebates of price. A repayment of identified
duties
is not a “rebate of price” within the meaning of the statute. The statute clearly distinguishes between duty adjustments and adjustments to price. As neither
Allied International v. United States,
16 CIT 545, 795 F.Supp. 449 (1992), nor
Esprit de Corp. v. United States,
17 CIT 195, 817 F.Supp. 975 (1993), relied on by defendant, involved post-importation repayment of duty in a “duty paid” transaction, they are inapposite.
As indicated, it is undisputed that at the time of entry, the sales price contained in the invoices accompanying the entry papers did not indicate to Customs that the transaction involved a duty paid sale. The issue is whether this is crucial and whether plaintiff is precluded from providing the information at a later date. The statute suggests that the entry documentation should break out the price
from the
duty,
see
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b), but the Ryan deposition makes clear that all that is needed in the entry documentation is an indication that the sales price is “duty paid,” because specific duty rates are applicable and Customs uses a formula to calculate the price portion of the “duty paid” price. Ryan Deposition, at 20, Def.’s Opp. Br., at Ex. F, at 6. Thus, to Customs, duties are separately identified as long as the transaction is denominated “duty paid.” It is not necessary to say, X amount is the price portion and Y amount is the duty portion. In any ease, by the time of liquidation, the original duty portion of the transfer price was identified because the adjustments were known.
What occurred in this case was an error in the preparation of the entry papers, so that the duty-paid nature of the price was not indicated at entry. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (1988), documentary errors of this type in entry papers ordinarily may be corrected.
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OPINION
RESTANI, Judge.
This action is before the court on crossmo-tions for summary judgment, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994), as plaintiff challenges denial of its protest of a Customs valuation decision with regard to beer imported from Canada.
FACTS
The merchandise at issue was imported via four entries made in 1993. At the time of entry normal duty rates had been replaced by a 50 percent duty. By virtue of a “Side Letter Agreement,” dated January 14, 1993, the exporter, Molson Brewing Company, agreed to reimburse Miller Brewing Company for the duty paid.
One of Miller’s subsidiaries, Century Importers, is the importer of record. Another subsidiary paid the original invoice price to Molson and after importation Molson reimbursed it for the duties paid. Thus, as of January 14, 1993, the sum total of the sales agreements resulted in a price (known as the “Transfer Price”) which was to be the same from Miller’s point of view, no matter what the duty rate. From Molson’s point of view, what it actually received in payment was going to change depending on the duty paid. This appears to be essentially a “duty paid” price transaction. The parties, however, did not label this a “duty paid” transaction, nor did the papers submitted at entry reflect anything other than a unitary invoice price.
Plaintiff asserts that, nonetheless, this was a “duty paid” transaction and that this was revealed to Customs when plaintiff presented the side agreement to Customs prior to liquidation of the entries, together with evidence of the monetary adjustments made between Molson and Miller after the duty was paid.
Defendant argues that it properly calculated transaction value for purposes of calculation of duties. Defendant states that there was only a transaction price, and it did not include duties. The adjustment for which plaintiff seeks credit, it asserts, is a post-importation rebate to price which is not relevant to the transaction value calculation.
Post-importation adjustments to price are not considered in calculating the transaction value of the merchandise, but duties ultimately paid by the exporter are not dutiable if the duty is identified separately from the price.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4)(B) (1988). The issue for the court to resolve, then, is whether a duty component of transfer price was identified separately from the price of the merchandise, and at what juncture the duty must be so identified.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from the statute and regulations that, for transaction value purposes, it does not matter what method is used to arrive at the price.
See
19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a(b) (1988);
see also
19 C.F.R. § 152.103 (1993)(“the price ... will be considered without regard to its method of derivation.”)
Thus, neither Molson or Miller’s understanding of the value of the goods, nor the sequence of documents or any other similar matter is relevant. Price is determinative, no matter how it is reached. Further, repayment of duties to the importer after importation to fulfill the bargain in a “duty paid” sale is not a “rebate of price” within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4) (1988).
The importer pays the duty in the first instance and the exact amount of duty is not known until liquidation, which occurs after importation.
See
Deposition of John T. Ryan, at 18, 20, Def.’s Opp. Br., at Ex. F, at 5, 6. (U.S. Customs Field National Import Specialist, as representative of defendant) [hereinafter “Ryan Deposition”]. Both parties agree that the net payment to the exporter, which is usually made after importation, would not include the amounts paid as duty, in the normal duty paid price case. Defendant has not demonstrated that a post-importation adjustment between the parties solely on account of the duties paid by the importer is substantively different from a post-importation net payment that excludes duties paid by the importer.
The court concludes there is no conflict between the direction of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(3)(B) not to calculate a transaction value which includes an identified customs duty and the direction of 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(4) not to lower the transaction value price to reflect post-importation rebates of price. A repayment of identified
duties
is not a “rebate of price” within the meaning of the statute. The statute clearly distinguishes between duty adjustments and adjustments to price. As neither
Allied International v. United States,
16 CIT 545, 795 F.Supp. 449 (1992), nor
Esprit de Corp. v. United States,
17 CIT 195, 817 F.Supp. 975 (1993), relied on by defendant, involved post-importation repayment of duty in a “duty paid” transaction, they are inapposite.
As indicated, it is undisputed that at the time of entry, the sales price contained in the invoices accompanying the entry papers did not indicate to Customs that the transaction involved a duty paid sale. The issue is whether this is crucial and whether plaintiff is precluded from providing the information at a later date. The statute suggests that the entry documentation should break out the price
from the
duty,
see
19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b), but the Ryan deposition makes clear that all that is needed in the entry documentation is an indication that the sales price is “duty paid,” because specific duty rates are applicable and Customs uses a formula to calculate the price portion of the “duty paid” price. Ryan Deposition, at 20, Def.’s Opp. Br., at Ex. F, at 6. Thus, to Customs, duties are separately identified as long as the transaction is denominated “duty paid.” It is not necessary to say, X amount is the price portion and Y amount is the duty portion. In any ease, by the time of liquidation, the original duty portion of the transfer price was identified because the adjustments were known.
What occurred in this case was an error in the preparation of the entry papers, so that the duty-paid nature of the price was not indicated at entry. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(a) (1988), documentary errors of this type in entry papers ordinarily may be corrected. Thus, while it is optimal to identify “duty paid” status at entry, it may be so indicated to Customs prior to liquidation, if the omission is due to clerical error. 19 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(4). Further, the statute permits correction of other factual errors both before and within one year after liquidation.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1520(c) (1994). If there is some reason why a factual mistake in the identification of the “duty paid” nature of a sales price should be treated differently from any other mistake of fact, it has not been demonstrated by defendant. Moreover, even if the statute could be interpreted to permit Customs to impose a more stringent test for the correction of this type of error, one would expect regulations to spell out the inapplicability of normal correction measures. There is nothing in the statutes or regulations, however, which indicates that failure to identify the “duty paid” status of a sale
at the time of entry
is an error which may never be corrected. For example, if the statute actually said identified
at time of entry or within X days thereafter,
one would have a better argument that timing was of the essence.
The court notes that because amounts of duty are easily determined by applying the specific rates set forth in domestic law, there is no fact-finding required by Customs, once it knows that the transaction is “duty-paid.” Thus, the concern expressed in
Generra Sportswear Co. v. United States,
905 F.2d 377, 380 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citing
Moss Mfg. Co. v. United States,
896 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed.Cir.1990)), that Commerce not engage in a “formidable fact-finding task” in valuing merchandise, is not raised. The legislative history of the statutory provision at issue makes clear that a simplified valuation regime was intended. S. Rep. 96-249, at 119 (1979),
reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 505 (The amendments “represent a simplification of U.S. law and add significantly more predictability regarding the value which will be used for customs purposes.”). There is no indication, however, that simple mistakes may not be corrected, particularly where, as here, the inquiry to be made by Customs is not complicated by fact finding Congress intended would be avoided.
Accordingly, the court finds that if “transaction value” valuation methodology applies to these entries, plaintiff will prevail. Defen
dant has belatedly indicated that it might not have applied transaction value if it had viewed this as a “duty paid” situation, but it did not plead in the alternative to reevaluate the entries under another valuation methodology. Further, Customs did not propose to examine the relatedness of parties with an eye to using another valuation method, even when it knew the size of what it considered a “rebate.” Thus, the argument that the size of the duty in a duty-paid sale would have triggered an investigation which might have resulted in use of another valuation methodology seems disingenuous. In any case, the court accepts the pleadings as they are, as well as the parties’ mutual assertions that all material facts are not in dispute.
Judgment is entered for plaintiff. Entry Nos. 112-5838964-9, 112-6033706-5, 112-6033707-3, and 112-6033750-3 shall be revalued and reliquidated in accordance with this opinion, and refund shall be made to plaintiff with interest thereon, as provided by law.
JUDGMENT
This case having been submitted for decision and the Court, after deliberation, having rendered a decision therein; now, in conformity with that decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that judgment is entered for plaintiff. Entry Nos. 112-583896^9, 112-6033706-5, 112-6033707-3, and 112-6033750-3 shall be revalued and reliquidated in accordance with this opinion, and refund shall be made to plaintiff with interest thereon as provided by law.