Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & R. Ry. Co.

32 F. 187
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri
DecidedSeptember 19, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 32 F. 187 (Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & R. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & R. Ry. Co., 32 F. 187 (circtedmo 1887).

Opinion

Brewer, J.

The question now presented for determination is the compensation to he allowed to the receivers. The master, upon consideration of the testimony, allowed each $112,500. Exceptions were taken by the purchasing committee, and these exceptions bring the matter before us for consideration. Heretofore all the principal allowances in this case have been settled by the agreement of the parties, and after such agreement all the court’s action has been a proforma approval. But this allowance is contested, and a large volume of testimony taken.

As preliminary I remark that there has been no little implied criticism in the language of appellate courts of the magnitude of the allowances made in foreclosure cases to counsel, receivers, and others. We are admonished by utterances of the supreme court to be cautious in this respect. in the case of Hinckley v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 153, the amount allowed to the receiver was $10,000, for nearly two years’ services. He claimed $1,000 per month. Upon this the supreme court, through Mr. Justice Miller, made this observation:

“The principal witnesses of appellant to sustain this exception are two gentlemen who were themselves receivers of other roads, and thought they rightfully received $900 in oncease, and $1,000 in the other, per month. Perhaps they were the best judges of the value of their own services; but such is not always the case, andas there is conflicting testimony, and as this is the first time we liave been called on to review the allowance made to railroad receivers by the circuit courts, we do not see that the economical administration of insolvent companies will be promoted, or that justice requires a higher standard of compensation than these courts generally give, to whose discretion the subject must be largely remitted.”

In the case of Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, certain allowances were set aside by the supreme court, and in respect to this matter of allowances generally this language is to be found:

“In the vast amount of litigation which has arisen in this country upon railroad mortgages, where various parties have intervened for the protection of their rights, and the fund has been subjected to the control of the court, and placed in the hands of receivers or trustees, it has been the common practice, as well in the courts of the United States as in those of the states, to make fair and just allowances for expenses and counsel fees to the trustees, or other [188]*188parties, promoting the litigation, and. securing the due application of the property to the trusts and charges to which it was subject. .Sometimes, no doubt, these allowances have been excessive, and perhaps illegal; and we. would be very far from expressing our approval of such large allowances to trustees, receivers, and counsel as have sometimes been made, and which have justly excited severe criticism. Still, a just respect for the eminent judges under whose direction many of these cases have been administered, would lead to the conclusion that allowances of this kind, if made with moderation and a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the fund, are not only admissible, but agreeable to the principles of equity and justice.”

This court has, in the progress of this very case, as well as at other times, expressed its intention to proceed cautiously, and, while giving adequate compensation, tó not overstep the bounds of such compensation. I remark again that the question of allowances is a judicial one, and while, as it is said, the matter is left to the discretion of the court, it is discretionary only in the sense that there are no fixed rules to determine the pfoper allowance, and is not discretionary in the sense that .the courts are at liberty to give anything more than a fair and reasonable compensation. We desire to see the officers and agents of the court well paid, in order that men of character and ability may be willing to accept the burdens and responsibilities of these trusts; but at the same time we may not forget that the property to be charged with these allowances is not ours, that there are many thousands scattered all over the land who are the owners, whose property by the strong hand of the law has been taken out of their custody, and who look to us to see that no unjust or excessive burden is cast upon them. We may not exercise the generosity of owners, but are closely limited to the justice of judges. Our duties are as sacred, our responsibilities more solemn than those of any other parties connected with this foreclosure, for our action is almost certainly final.

With these preliminary observations I pass to a consideration of the facts. We have already allowed these receivers $50,000 each, and the purchasing committee, representing the present owners of the property, insist that this is full compensation. The master, estimating the duration of the trust at three and one-half years, has allowed, as I have stated, $112,500 to each. It is well said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in the case of Cowdrey v. Railroad Co., 1 Woods, 331:

“It would hardly be a proper rule for governing this case to inquire what another even competent person would have been willing to do the work for. The receiver’s office is not put up at auction. His compensation is not fixed on that principle at all. The chancellor selects a person whom he regards competent and trustworthy, and the amount of compensation is graduated somewhat by the duties, and somewhat by the responsibilities, of the situation. It seems to me that the peculiar duties, responsibilities, and accountability of a receiver entitle him to a larger amount than would be demanded by the head officer of an ordinary railroad of this size.”

The administration of this Wabash property has been under my supervision. It is true that my then associate, Judge Treat, was more familiar with all the details, and therefore exercised a more immediate and constant supervision, and was doubtless more familiar with all the [189]*189varied slops taken in it, and we lose the benefit of his knowledge in coming to our conclusions; but I am familiar enough with its administration to appreciate its magnitude, and the labor and responsibility of the receivers; and beyond the testimony which was given before us of the general outlines of the administration, I rest upon my own recollection and knowledge of what took place. In determining the amount of compensation, we are to regard the magnitude of the trust, the care and responsibility springing therefrom, the time occupied in performing its duties, the skill and ability displayed, and the success which has attended its administration. Messrs. Tutt and Humphreys were appointed receivers in the latter part of May, 1884. The last of the property was surrendered to the purchasing committee on the first of April, 1887. During the trust they have received and paid out about $60,000,000. The mileage at the time of their appointment was about 3,600 miles. The property did not consist of a single line covered by a single mortgage, but was a system made up of the consolidating and leasing of some 30 or 40 different roads, upon each of which was one or more mortgages. About $4,000,000 of floating and pressing debts were resting upon the company; its credit was gone; it was a wreck. The property itself in many parts of the system was in very poor condition.

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Bluebook (online)
32 F. 187, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-trust-co-v-wabash-st-l-r-ry-co-circtedmo-1887.