Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Val. R.

22 S.E. 90, 40 W. Va. 627, 1895 W. Va. LEXIS 49
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedApril 17, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 22 S.E. 90 (Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Val. R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Val. R., 22 S.E. 90, 40 W. Va. 627, 1895 W. Va. LEXIS 49 (W. Va. 1895).

Opinions

Holt, PRESIDENT:

In reviewing this case I have patiently followed the points involved down to minute details with an expenditure of time that would he manifest by giving such details, but that would encumber this opinon with a mass of statements and figures which could answer no useful end.

The conclusions reached are tire following: First. The 'Jewett receipts for payment of one hundred shares of stock are already in the name of John. P. Logan, by certificate Ho, 6, for one hundred shares, issued to him as assignee, on the 19th day of February, 1873. Second. There is a high degree of probability that the receipts of payment taken in the name of R. D. Barclay made -for stock, say twenty thousand dollars by Col. Thomas A. Scott from 22d September, 1870, to 9th August, 1872, are not, and have not been since the 15th day of September, 1874, subsisting outstanding evidences of his ownership, legal or equitable, of that amount or any amount of the stock of the Central Improvement Company. At any rate,- from some cause, whatever it may be, Col. Scott’s estate is not made to appear now to be the owner of any stock in the Central Improvement Company. Third. The Central Improvement Company owed its creditors the [631]*631snm of three hundred and eighty one thousand nine hundred and ninety six dollars and seventy one cents. It had a decree against the Shenandoah Valley Railroad Company for seven hundred and ninety one thousand three hundred and thirty eight dollars, with interest from the 1st day of July, 1890, till paid — and it had nothing else; but there were liens and charges against the railroad, etc., of the railway company decreed to be sold, of higher dignity, and first to be paid, amounting to six million and six hundred thousand dollars. This was in the stringency of 1873, and, unless some one could be induced to bid something over the amount of this prior lien, then the Central Improvement Company would have of assets not one cent. All the creditors thought it wise and best to give parties who were able to buy a bonus of two hundred thousand dollars, afterwards reduced to one hundred and sixty thousand dollars, to make the property bring seven million and one hundred thousand dollars or over. On'e hundred and thirty four out of one hundred and thirty eight in value of the stockholders thought 'this, the best — the only — thing to do, and did it in an informal way. The only one who complains 'is one stockholder, who has about one and thirty nine one-hundredths of the stock; say, four thousand one hundred dollars. He ‘knew of the arrangement in its mailing and accomplishment, but stood by without assent or dissent. He also knew that his elsewise insolvent corporation was largely in debt. It was no error in the court, under such circumstances, to charge his stock with its proper proportional part of this item of expense.

I have no question but that'the Jewett stock is already, in and allowed to John P. Logan. Logan' was not a subscriber; Jewett was, with receipts for his one hundred shares, containing the following: “This receipt to be surrendered upon receipt of stock.”-' So that these receipts were evidence of the ownership of stock, and were used to transfer and pledge and deposit as collateral for loans, just as the certificates were. Jewett, about that time, and at the time of his death, in the early part of November, 1875, was hard pressed; “and at his death his estate was in a very complicated condition, and his securities were scattered 'everywhere, and it was [632]*632with great difficulty that we could ascertain really what he had. We had to go round personally to the different banks and places where his securities and papers were hypothecat-ed to get any information about them at all.” (Exhibit of William. M. Stewart, Sr., one of his executors).

Logan gave a note for five thousand dollars for his purchase of stock. He found the note in bank indorsed by Judge Jewett, and, when he paid it, the money was put to Judge Jewett’s credit, and the certificate of stock was issued to Logan himself, on the 19th day of February, 1873. The treasurer’s memorandum on his books shows that receipts of payment of some one were used. Whose receipts of payment for the one hundred shares of stock were used if not those of Jewett? His receipts of'payment were never taken up and money returned. There was only one hundred and thirty eight thousand dollars in all. One hundred and thirty four thousand dollars including the Logan 'five thousand dollars, are accounted for; and now to allow this to Jewett’s estate runs the amount to one hundred and thirty nine thous- and dollars, which can not well be so if the treasurer’s official report of money paid in on stock, proved by his deposition in this case to be correct, is to‘be taken as true. It is no answer to say that in reaching this conclusion the court would be taking a mere conjecture, based on probability. Courts, in determining’ facts, act upon nothing else but probabilities of more or less cogency and convincing power. In fact, all human conduct and belief is based on probabilities. All that wo have to see to is that we do not go by what is called “mere conjecture” — an inference based on presumptive evidence so slight, so non-exclusive of other reasonable modes of explanation, as to amount to a mere suspicion or surmise; a thing based on feeble or scanty evidence. There is nothing to contradict' this but the fact that he once had receipts which can not now be found. This is because these executors have overlooked in. the wrong place, and not in the right place, that is, among the file of receipts surrendered among the papers of the company, if such things were preserved. I will illustrate the distinction by the Scott claim of stock in [633]*633this case. When I started to examine this record, and to xeadandre-readthe evidence,and to scrutinize.the transcript of the treasurer’s booh of issue of certificates of stock, my .attention was arrested by the following, all on the one page (268) as follows:

Page 258. No. 15. 133 shares.
Issued to M. Baird. 8 — 6, 1874..
Received certificates as above described.
M. Baird,
By M. Baird & Co., in liq.,
Per W. 0. Stroud.
Transferred to No. 30, Canceled.
No. 16. 267 shares.
Issued to Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co.
8 — 6, 1874.
Received certificates as above described.
Void — Not issued, J. P. G-.
No. 16. ■ 267 shares.
Issued to Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co.
8 — 16, 1874.
Received certificates above described.
Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co:
Per W. C. Stroud.

Here we have the receipts of payment of twenty thousand dollars for four hundred shares of stock presented by M. Baird and Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co., acting by one W. C. Stroud, neither of them apparently original subscribers, but M. Baird holding and presenting through Stroud such receipts to the amount of six thousand six hundred .and fifty dollars, and Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co.

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Bluebook (online)
22 S.E. 90, 40 W. Va. 627, 1895 W. Va. LEXIS 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crumlishs-admr-v-shenandoah-val-r-wva-1895.