Central Michigan University Faculty Ass'n v. Central Michigan University

273 N.W.2d 21, 404 Mich. 268, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 426, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2401
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 28, 1978
DocketDocket No. 59753
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 273 N.W.2d 21 (Central Michigan University Faculty Ass'n v. Central Michigan University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Michigan University Faculty Ass'n v. Central Michigan University, 273 N.W.2d 21, 404 Mich. 268, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 426, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2401 (Mich. 1978).

Opinion

Blair Moody, Jr., J.

On April 30, 1973, the academic senate of Central Michigan University passed a resolution adopting a teaching effectiveness program which provided that students, as well as department faculty, evaluate the faculty members. Although the form of and weight to be given the student evaluations in department recommendations were not specified, the program did provide that "[departmental recommendations for reappointment, promotion and tenure should be accompanied by evidence of teaching effective-

[275]*275On January 28, 1974, the Central Michigan University Faculty Association charged the university with an unfair labor practice. The faculty association claimed that Section I of the teaching effectiveness program was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and, therefore, it was impermissible for the university to unilaterally adopt the program.

Administrative Law Judge Schlomo Sperka upheld the faculty association’s unfair labor practice charge, finding that the university had violated § 10 of the public employment relations act (hereinafter PERA) by unilaterally adopting and implementing the teaching effectiveness program without bargaining with the exclusive, certified collective bargaining agent of its faculty.

The university appealed to the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (hereinafter MERC). In a split decision, the two-member majority reversed Judge Sperka’s decision and dismissed the unfair labor practice charge. After discussing the difference between institutions of higher learning and other public employers as related to the scope of bargaining, the MERC majority found the program in question to be predominantly a matter of educational policy and not mandatorily negotiable. MERC reasoned that since Central Michigan University derives its existence from constitutional authority, § 15 of the PERA does not have full application when applied to university employees. Const 1963, art 8, § 6.

The Court of Appeals, over the dissent of the Honorable Michael F. Cavanagh, upheld the MERC decision. 75 Mich App 101; 254 NW2d 802 (1977). We granted leave to appeal. 401 Mich 831 (1977).

[276]*276I

The issue on this appeal is whether the elements, procedures and criteria involving evaluations for purposes of reappointment, retention and promotion are "other terms and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the PERA. The crux of this issue is the question whether the nature of the public employment alters the scope of mandatory bargaining.

It is well settled that Michigan’s institutions of higher education are public employers subject to the provisions of the PERA. Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University v Labor Mediation Board, 384 Mich 561; 184 NW2d 921 (1971); Regents of the University of Michigan v Employment Relations Comm, 389 Mich 96; 204 NW2d 218 (1973). The duty of a public employer to bargain collectively with the employees’ representative is set forth in § 15 of the PERA, patterned after § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act1 (hereinafter NLRA). Section 15 provides, in relevant part:

"A public employer shall bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees as defined in section 11 and is authorized to make and enter into collective bargaining agreements with such representa[277]*277tives. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15).

In both the PERA and NLRA, the collective bargaining obligation is defined as the mutual duty of labor and management to bargain in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”. The subjects included within the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” are referred to as "mandatory subjects” of bargaining. Once a specific subject has been classified as a mandatory subject of bargaining, the parties are required to bargain concerning the subject, and neither party may take unilateral action on the subject absent an impasse in negotiations. See generally Morris, ed, The Developing Labor Law, (Washington, D C: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc, 1971), chs 14-16; National Labor Relations Board v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp, 356 US 342; 78 S Ct 718; 2 L Ed 2d 823 (1958); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp v National Labor Relations Board, 379 US 203; 85 S Ct 398; 13 L Ed 2d 233; 6 ALR3d 1130 (1964).

The United States Supreme Court has concluded that one of the primary purposes of the NLRA is labor relations peace and that this objective can best be achieved by adopting a liberal approach to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. See, for example, Fibreboard Paper Products, supra. Following the Federal courts’ approach, Michigan has adopted a broad view of "other terms and conditions of employment”. See, for [278]*278example, Van Buren Public School Dist v Wayne Circuit Judge 61 Mich App 6; 232 NW2d 278 (1975).

In Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 55; 214 NW2d 803 (1974), this Court looked to the private sector for examples of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and found:

"[S]uch subjects as hourly rates of pay, overtime pay, shift differentials, holiday pay, pensions, no-strike clauses, profit sharing plans, rental of company houses, grievance procedures, sick leave, work-rules, seniority and promotion, compulsory retirement age, and management rights clauses, are examples of mandatory subjects of bargaining. ” (Emphasis added.)

Furthermore, after looking to Federal precedent, the Court of Appeals recently held that the subject of promotional standards and the criteria for those standards are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 61 Mich App 487; 233 NW2d 49 (1975), lv den 395 Mich 756 (1975).

In the instant case we are asked whether the elements, procedures and criteria involving evaluations for purposes of reappointment, retention and promotion are "other terms and conditions of employment”. MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). We conclude that reappointment, retention and promotion criteria are "other terms and conditions of employment” and are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

II

Having reached this conclusion, we must now address the critical question whether the nature of the public employment alters the scope of the [279]*279collective bargaining obligation of particular public employers. The university makes essentially a two-fold argument for excluding the procedures and criteria for reappointment, retention and promotion from the mandatory subject category to which they would otherwise belong. First, the university maintains that the unique status accorded the state universities by constitutional and statutory authority2 justifies excluding the subject of promotion and retention evaluation criteria from the scope of the mandatory bargaining obligation.

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Bluebook (online)
273 N.W.2d 21, 404 Mich. 268, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 426, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-michigan-university-faculty-assn-v-central-michigan-university-mich-1978.