Central Institute for Experimental Animals v. Jackson Laboratory

726 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54012, 2010 WL 2228571
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 1, 2010
DocketC-08-05568 RMW
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 726 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (Central Institute for Experimental Animals v. Jackson Laboratory) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Institute for Experimental Animals v. Jackson Laboratory, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54012, 2010 WL 2228571 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT

RONALD M. WHYTE, District Judge.

Defendant, the Jackson Laboratory (“Jackson”), moves for summary judgment that its accused NSG mouse does not infringe plaintiff, the Central Institute for Experimental Animals (“CIEA”),’s asserted patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.

I. BACKGROUND

CIEA is a non-profit Japanese corporation that develops animal models used for scientific research. Jackson is an independent nonprofit research institution and the world’s largest repository of research mice. On December 12, 2008, CIEA filed a complaint against Jackson, alleging patent and trademark infringement and unfair competition. CIEA asserts that a particular type of immunodeficient mouse produced by Jackson, called the NSG mouse, infringes United States Patent No. 7,145,055 (“'055 Patent”). The '055 Patent claims a method of producing an immunodeficient mouse by backcrossing two strains of mice as well as the mouse produced by this method and the use of the mouse. The method claimed in the '055 Patent involves backcrossing 1 a NOD/Shi mouse with a C.B.-17-scid mouse to create a NOD/Shi-scid mouse and then back-crossing the NOD/Shiscid mouse with an interleukin 2 receptor á chain gene knock *1047 out mouse (“IL-2Rá KO mouse”). See '055 Patent 35:10-22.

Following a tutorial and claim construction hearing, the court construed the term “NOD/Shi mouse” to mean a non-obese diabetic mouse that: (1) has not been reproductively separated from the NOD mouse colony created by Dr. Susumu Makino at Shionogi Research Laboratories or (2) has been reproductively separated from that colony by 20 or fewer generations. Dkt. No. 145 at 14. The court construed “NOD/Shi-scid mouse” to mean a mouse strain produced by multiple backcross generations of a C.B.-17 scid mouse with a NOD/Shi mouse. Id

It is undisputed that Jackson’s NSG mouse is created by backcrossing a NOD/ LtSz-scid mouse. Because NOD/LtSz-scid mice are produced from NOD/LtSz mice, which have been reproductively separated from Dr. Makino’s NOD mouse colony for over 20 generations, a NOD/LtSz-scid mouse is not a NOD/Shi-scid mouse. Accordingly, CIEA concedes that under the court’s claim construction Jackson’s NSG mouse does not literally infringe the '055 Patent. Dkt. No. 153 ¶ 4. The parties dispute whether Jackson’s NSG mouse infringes the '055 Patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

II. ANALYSIS

CIEA seeks to claim infringement under the doctrine of equivalents based on its contention that use of the NOD/LtSz-scid mouse is equivalent to use of the NOD/Shiscid mouse in the context of the invention. Jackson argues that CIEA is barred from asserting infringement under this theory because: (1) the '055 Patent discloses but fails to claim use of NOD/LtSz-scid mice, and (2) adopting CIEA’s position that any substrain of NOD mice are equivalent to the NOD/Shi mice would vitiate the NOD/ Shi and NOD/Shi-scid claim limitation in its entirety.

A. The Disclosure-Dedication Rule

When a patent discloses but does not claim subject matter, the unclaimed subject matter is dedicated to the public and cannot be recaptured under the doctrine of equivalents. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed.Cir.2002). This rule, which is referred to as the disclosure-dedication rulé, is based on the fundamental principle that the claims define and give notice of the scope of patent protection. Id at 1052. What is claimed is protected, and “what is not claimed is public property.” Id at 1053 (quoting Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361, 5 S.Ct. 174, 28 L.Ed. 665 (1884)). Because the claims, not the specification, are the sole measure of the patentee’s right to exclude, the disclosure of unclaimed subject matter in the specification “has made it public property if it was not so before.” Id. Permitting recapture of this subject matter under the doctrine of equivalents would “conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right” and negate the notice function served by the claims. Id at 1054 (quoting Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed.Cir.1997)). Application of the disclosure-dedication rule is a question of law and thus is appropriate for summary judgment. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2004)).

In PSC, the Federal Circuit considered how specific a disclosure in a written description must be to dedicate matter to the public and held that:

if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public. *1048 This ‘disclosure-dedication’ rule does not mean that any generic reference in a written description necessarily dedicates all members of that particular genus to the public. The disclosure must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.

PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed.Cir. 2004). In other words, the relevant test is whether one of ordinary skill in the art reading the patent could identify a specific, unclaimed alternative and understand that it could be used as a substitute for the claimed matter. This test is met when the patent mentions the alternative in a way that would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. See Toro, 383 F.3d at 1334. The disclosure of unclaimed subject matter need not satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id.

B. Application to the '055 Patent

The disclosure-dedication rule would preclude CIEA from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents if the '055 Patent disclosed use of the NOD/LtSz-scid mouse as an alternative since it did not claim such use of the NOD/LtSz-scid mouse.

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726 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54012, 2010 WL 2228571, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-institute-for-experimental-animals-v-jackson-laboratory-cand-2010.