Central Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Crane

198 F.2d 808
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 16, 1952
Docket12884_1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 198 F.2d 808 (Central Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Crane) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Crane, 198 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1952).

Opinion

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.

At all pertinent times, Central Fruit & Vegetable Company, hereafter called Central, was a partnership doing business at Dallas, Texas; West Texas Produce Company, hereafter called West, was a partnership doing 'business at Forth Worth, Texas; Raymond M. Crane was an individual doing business as Associated Fruit Distributors at Los Angeles, California, and was a broker, within the meaning of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S. C.A. § 499a et seq. ; 1 and John C. Kazanjian was an individual doing business as Red Lion Packing Company at Exeter, California, and was a dealer, within the meaning of the Act. 2

Central and West filed with the Secretary of Agriculture an “informal” complaint on October 21, 1944, and a “formal” complaint on January 22, 1946, against 'Crane and Kazanjian, based on §§ 2 and 5-7 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 499b, 499e-499g. The “formal” complaint, hereafter called the complaint, alleged, in substance, that Crane and Kazanjian had, on or about October 3, 1944, contracted to sell to Central and West, on or after December 10, 1944, 10 carloads, hereafter called cars, of U. S. No. 1 Emperor grapes, 3 to be placed in storage by Kazanjian in October, 1944 — 4 cars to Central and 6 cars to West — all of which were to be shipped from California to Texas, and that Crane and Kazanjian had failed to deliver any grapes to Central and West, or either of them, and, by such failure, had violated § 2 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 499b, and damaged Central and West in sums aggregating $16,575. The complaint prayed for an order awarding Central and West “such amount of damages as they [might] be entitled to receive.”

Pursuant to subsection (c) of § 6 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 499f, the complaint was served on, and answers were filed by, Crane and Kazanjian^ and a hearing was held before a duly authorized examiner of the Secretary in the Southern District of California — the district in which Crane and Kazanjian did business. Thereafter, on April 23, 1948, pursuant to subsection (a) of § 7 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 499g, the Secretary 4 rendered a decision, stating therein his findings and conclusions, and made and entered a reparation order directing Kazanjian to pay as damages, on or before May 23, 1948, $6,133.25 to Central and $10,112.16 to West, with 5% interest on each amount from December 10, 1944, and dismissing the complaint as to Crane. From that order Kazanjian appealed on May 21,1948, to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, pursuant to subsection (c) of § 7.

As required by that subsection, the District Court treated the case as a civil action for damages and tried it de novo. Thereafter the District Court stated its findings and conclusions and entered a judgment dismissing the action, thus, in effect, affirming that part of the order which dismissed the complaint as to Crane and reversing that part of the order which required Kazanjian to pay damages to Central and West. From that judgment Central and West have appealed to this court.

Central and West were adversely affected by that part of the order which dismissed the complaint as to Crane. There *810 fore Central and West could have appealed to the District Court, 5 but they did not. By not appealing to the District Court, they acquiesced in, and waived their right to complain of, that part of the order which dismissed the complaint as to Crane. Therefore they cannot be heard to complain of that part of the judgment which affirmed that part of the order. Therefore that part of the judgment is presumed to be correct.

There remains for review that part of the judgment which reversed that part of the order which required Kazanjian to pay damages to Central and West.

As indicated above, the ground on which damages were claimed of Kazanjian was that he contracted to sell 10 cars of grapes to Central and West and failed to deliver them. Kazanjian denied that he contracted to sell any grapes to Central and West. Central and West did not claim that they and Kazanjian dealt with each other directly, but claimed that Crane, for Kazanjian’s account, and Jay Margules, 6 for Central and West’s account, made a contract whereby Crane, for Kazanjian’s account, contracted to sell to Central and West, on or after December 10, 1944, 10 cars of U. S. No. 1 Emperor grapes, to be placed in storage by Kazanjian in October, 1944 — 4 cars to Central and 6 cars to West- — and that Kazanjian authorized Crane to make the contract and confirmed it after it was made; all of which Kazanjian denied. Thus, in effect, Central and West claimed, and Kazanjian denied, that Kazanjian, acting by and through Crane, contracted to sell the 10 cars of grapes to Central and West.

There was evidence to the following effect :

At all pertinent times, Kazanjian was engaged in the business of selling grapes. During grape seasons prior to 1944, Crane was Kazanjian’s broker and, as such, sold grapes for Kazanjian’s account. On or shortly before September 26, 1944, Crane and Kazanjian had a conversation wherein Kazanjian refused to employ Crane as Kazanjian’s broker for the 1944 grape season, because ceiling prices for grapes had been established under the Emergency Price Control Act, SO U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., the demand for grapes at ceiling prices exceeded the supply, and Kazan-jian therefore did not need a broker.

After that conversation, Crane sent Margules three telegrams — one on September 26, 1944, and two on October 2, 1944 7 —but Kazanjian did not authorize Crane to send any of those telegrams, did not read or see any of them and was not bound by any of them.

On October 2, 1944, Crane and Kazan-jian had a telephone conversation wherein Crane stated, in substance, that he had found buyers (not named or identified) who were willing to make contracts with Kazanjian, whereby the buyers would contract to buy from Kazanjian, and Kazan-jian would contract to sell to the buyers, on or after December 10, 1944, IS cars of U. S. No. 1 Emperor grapes, to be placed in storage by Kazanjian in October, 1944, and that, if Kazanjian would make such contracts, Crane would arrange for storage of the grapes; and Kazanjian stated, in substance, that he was willing to make such contracts on terms which he specified in that conversation, 8 but Kazanjian did not authorize Crane to make any contract or any sale for Kazanjian’s account.

*811 On October 3, 1944, Margules signed a memorandum entitled “Standard Memorandum of Sale” and sent a copy to Central, a copy to West and a copy to Crane, but none to Kazanjian. Kazanjian did not sign tlie memorandum, did not authorize anyone to sign it, did not receive, read or see it and was not bound by it.

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198 F.2d 808, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-fruit-vegetable-co-v-crane-ca9-1952.