Central Appalachian Coal Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Romie C. Fletcher

679 F.2d 1086, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18777
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 2, 1982
Docket81-1340
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 679 F.2d 1086 (Central Appalachian Coal Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Romie C. Fletcher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Appalachian Coal Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Romie C. Fletcher, 679 F.2d 1086, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18777 (4th Cir. 1982).

Opinion

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

Central Appalachian Coal Co. (Central) appeals the decision of the Benefits Review Board (Board) which granted benefits to the claimant under the Black Lung Benefits *1087 Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (Supp. 1976). Because we find that the Board applied the proper legal standards and that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s factual determinations, we affirm the holding of the Board.

I.

The claimant worked in the coal mines virtually all of his adult life. Until he resigned on October 24, 1974, the claimant had worked for Central for twenty-four years. The principal jobs held by the claimant at Central were those of “trackman” and “timberman.” The two jobs involved the loading and unloading of wooden ties and metal rails, positioning and fastening the rails for the track, running a motor, and erecting heavy wooden supports for the mines. All of these functions involved heavy work, except running a motor. The claimant never ran a motor full time for Central, but he would drive a motor out to lay track in the morning and drive the motor back to the shop at the end of the work day.

At the administrative law hearings, it was found that the claimant had a sixth grade education 'and that there was evidence of pneumoconiosis, though there was not sufficient medical evidence for a finding of disability without resort to vocational factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.426 (1981). At the second hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AU) Central presented as a witness S. Thomas Serpento, Director of Personnel at West Virginia University. Mr. Serpento had conducted a survey of employers in the area proximate to the claimant’s residence and testified that sedentary, light, and medium exertion levels of work were available in the area. He also testified as to the skills possessed by the claimant, the availability of jobs claimant could perform, the claimant’s comparability with others who had applied for jobs at West Virginia University, and the unemployment rate.

The Board held that once the claimant establishes disability due to black lung that would prevent him from returning to his usual or regular coal mine employment, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to identify gainful work requiring the miner’s skills, to show that the location of the jobs is within commuting distance for the miner, and to show that the miner would have a reasonable opportunity to be hired. The AU found that Central had not met its burden of proof to rebut the prima facie showing of disability by the claimant through the testimony of Mr. Serpento. Central now appeals the Board’s affirmance of the finding by the AU that the claimant had proved his disability and that Central failed to meet its burden of proof.

II.

A.

The Board held that once the claimant shows that he cannot return to his previous coal mine work, the burden of proof shifts to the coal mine operator. Central argues that the burden of proof does not shift and, if it does, the claimant did not meet his burden because he can still perform one function that was part of his work in the coal mine.

Central’s argument that the burden of proof does not shift is contrary to the plain reading of the Black Lung Benefits Act. Section 402(f) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (Supp.1976), provides that the black lung standards defining disability “shall not provide more restrictive criteria than those applicable under (the Social Security Act) ...” Disability for the purposes of Social Security is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), and it is undisputed that the burden of proof shifts in Social Security disability cases once the claimant shows that he cannot return to his previous work. Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1975). Central argues, however, that because the claim is being contested under 20 C.F.R. § 410.426 (1981) (“Determining total disability”) in this instance, rather than 20 C.F.R. § 410.412 (1981) (“ ‘Total disability’ defined”), there is no requirement to be as lenient as Social Security disability. Central’s argument is not per *1088 suasive. A claimant must be within the standards of both § 410.426 and § 410.412 before he can be granted black lung benefits. Furthermore, § 410.412 incorporates § 410.426, 1 thereby indicating that the regulations should be read consistently. The Board was correct in holding that the burden of proof is upon the operator once the claimant establishes that he cannot return to his former coal mine job.

B.

Central also contends that the claimant has not carried the burden of showing that he cannot return to his previous coal mine work under § 410.426(d). 2 His previous jobs with Central as trackman and timberman principally consisted of heavy work but evidence revealed that the claimant could no longer perform heavy work. Central would have us consider the individual functions that made up the jobs and hold that if the claimant can still perform any function remotely involved in the claimant’s previous job description, then the claimant has not shown that he is unable to return to his past work. We decline the opportunity to so hold.

In particular, one of the functions of the claimant’s past work was to drive a motor to a work site and then drive it back to the shop at night. Central thus contends that the claimant was a motorman. 3 The operator has chosen this function of the claimant’s past job, and a relatively insignificant one at that, and argues that since this function was medium exertion level work the claimant could return to his previous job without having to engage in heavy labor.

We do not agree with Central that “previous coal mine work” means any small function involved in a past job. The regulations require, instead, that a claimant prove that he can no longer practically perform the duties listed in the description of his past job. Being able to perform a single function of that job is not sufficient if it does not allow the worker to accomplish the purpose of his position. The claimant carried his burden of proof in this situation by showing that he could not return to the positions of timberman or trackman.

III.

Once the burden of proof shifted to the mine operator, Central contends that the Board erred by applying the wrong standards. Although we do not endorse the language used by the Board, we find that it applied the proper standards to reach its decision.

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679 F.2d 1086, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18777, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-appalachian-coal-company-v-director-office-of-workers-ca4-1982.