Center for Biological Diversity v. US Fish and Wildlife Service

350 F. Supp. 2d 23, 59 ERC (BNA) 1809, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25146, 2004 WL 2889524
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 14, 2004
DocketCIV.A. 03-1110(JDB)
StatusPublished

This text of 350 F. Supp. 2d 23 (Center for Biological Diversity v. US Fish and Wildlife Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Center for Biological Diversity v. US Fish and Wildlife Service, 350 F. Supp. 2d 23, 59 ERC (BNA) 1809, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25146, 2004 WL 2889524 (D.D.C. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BATES, District Judge.

In this action brought under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g), and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Western Watersheds Project (collectively, “plaintiffs”) challenge as arbitrary and capricious the finding of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that the listing of the Montana fluvial arctic grayling (a salmonid fish) as a threatened or endangered species is “warranted but precluded” by other priorities, and that “expeditious progress” is being made to address these other priorities. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii). Plaintiffs also claim that the FWS has failed to comply with the ESA by declining to emergency list the grayling as a threatened or endangered species. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii).

This litigation commenced in May 2003, when plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the decade-long finding of the FWS, determined most recently in its 2002 Candidate Notice of Review (“CNOR”), that listing the grayling as threatened or endangered under the ESA was “warranted but precluded” by other administrative priorities. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At a hearing on the motions held on April 20, 2004, FWS explained that it would soon be publishing a new CNOR that would update the agency’s findings on the grayling. Two weeks later, the FWS published the new CNOR (“the 2003 CNOR”), which again declined to list the grayling as threatened or endangered and instead continued to describe the listing of the grayling to be “warranted but precluded.” In papers filed after the hearing, FWS argued that the 2003 CNOR had made the complaint against the 2002 CNOR moot. Plaintiffs responded that since a new CNOR was published roughly every year, the agency’s failure to list the grayling came within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.

The Court concluded that “expedited briefing on a complaint amended to reflect plaintiffs’ objections to the new CNOR” would “provide the best opportunity for timely, meaningful judicial review.” Mem. and Order dated July 6, 2004. In the ensuing months, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and the parties briefed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 3, 2004, the Court held a hearing on the renewed motions for summary judgment. FWS revealed at this hearing that yet another CNOR was in the works, but explained that it would not be arguing mootness this time around and that it was prepared to proceed on the basis of the challenge to the 2003 CNOR.

The ESA creates a schemte wherein the FWS is permitted to categorize the listing of the grayling as “warranted but precluded” only if it finds that listing is “precluded” by other priorities and that “expeditious progress” is being made on those priorities. Specifically, the statute requires the FWS to find that listing “is precluded by pending proposals to determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened species” and that “expeditious progress is being made to add qualified species to either of the lists [of threatened and endangered species] and to remove from such lists species for which the protections of this chapter are no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i). The statute also makes *25 these findings subject to judicial review. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii). A House Conference Report indicates that in cases “challenging the Secretary’s claim of inability to propose an otherwise warranted petitioned action, the court will, in essence, be called on to separate justifications grounded in the purposes of the act from the foot-dragging efforts of a delinquent agency.” H. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 21-22 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2863 (emphasis added). It is precisely such foot-dragging that plaintiffs insist is at work here.

FWS defends its “warranted but precluded” determination in the 2003 CNOR by noting that it has taken final listing actions for 14 species since June 2002, and that it has been sensitive to the plight of the grayling (by, for example, increasing the grayling’s priority level to a “3” in the most recent CNOR 1 ). 69 Fed.Reg. at 24,-881, 24885. Plaintiffs counter that 14 listings is far fewer than the number of listings FWS had made in similar periods in the past ten years (between 1996 and 1997, for example, FWS listed approximately 149 candidate species as threatened or endangered), and that each of the 14 listing actions have resulted from court orders or settlement agreements, not from voluntary listing by FWS. Plaintiffs also point out that the increase in the priority level of the grayling accomplishes little for the grayl-ing if the FWS will only list species in reaction to litigation.

FWS therefore places a great deal of weight, in both its 2003 CNOR and its papers to this Court, on the constraints under which it says it is operating. It emphasizes that Congress has appropriated a limited budget for listing activities, and that “the bulk of the funds that would be otherwise available for adding qualified species to the list in FY 2003 and FY 2004 have been spent or will be spent on complying with court orders and court-approved settlement agreements to designate critical habitat and make petition findings.” 69 Fed.Reg. at 24,885. FWS maintains that it has used the resources available to it efficiently and productively and that it has therefore been making “expeditious progress” in the light of its financial limitations and judicial obligations.

The Court cannot meaningfully assess whether the agency has efficiently used the resources available to it simply by taking the agency at its word. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir.2001) (“warranted but precluded” finding is arbitrary and capricious where there is “no basis to evaluate the Secretary’s conclusion that immediate action is precluded by other more urgent matters”). Although the scope of review of an agency finding is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency must at least “examine the relevant data and articulate! ] a reasoned explanation for its action,” and the reviewing court must determine “whether the record, taken as a whole, contains such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. United States, 762 F.2d 1053, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1985); St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Thompson, 224 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2002) (agency action is “arbitrary and ca *26 pricious” if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence” in the record).

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350 F. Supp. 2d 23, 59 ERC (BNA) 1809, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25146, 2004 WL 2889524, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/center-for-biological-diversity-v-us-fish-and-wildlife-service-dcd-2004.