Celik v. Dundar, No. Cv95 0142921 S (Jul. 12, 1995)

1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8192
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 12, 1995
DocketNo. CV95 0142921 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8192 (Celik v. Dundar, No. Cv95 0142921 S (Jul. 12, 1995)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Celik v. Dundar, No. Cv95 0142921 S (Jul. 12, 1995), 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS The plaintiff, Remzi Celik, has filed a complaint against the CT Page 8193 defendants, Ismail V. Dundar, Gokhan Acun, Hurriyet, (a turkish newspaper publishing company), and Hurriyet TV Productions, (Hurriyet TV). In the first count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by the defendant, Dundar, a reporter and Turkish national employed by the defendant Hurriyet and/or Hurriyet W. The plaintiff alleges that Hurriyet and/or Hurriyet TV publish newspapers for circulation in the United States and abroad, along with producing television programs. The second count alleges, as to Dundar alone, that his conduct was willful and reckless. The third and fourth counts allege that Hurriyet and Hurriyet TV, respectively, promoted, encouraged and ratified Dundar's assault of the plaintiff and that Dundar's actions were within the scope of his employment. The fifth and sixth counts, brought against Dundar, Hurriyet and Hurriyet TV, allege conspiracy and a violation of General Statutes 42-110a, et seq, (CUTPA), respectively. The seventh and eighth counts allege intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy against all four of the defendants.

The defendants filed the present motion to dismiss, and in their supporting memorandum, the defendants argue that (1) service was insufficient as to Dundar and Acun pursuant to General Statutes § 52-59b and the Hague Convention; (2) service was insufficient as to Hurriyet and Hurriyet TV productions pursuant to General Statutes § 33-411(d) and; (3) the process served was insufficient pursuant to 33-411(d). The defendants attached to their memorandum of law a copy of the original summons, a copy of the sheriff's return, and copies of affidavits of Simli Uluk, and Roy Ward. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "The grounds which may be asserted in this motion are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Ziska v.Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d (1985). "[S]ervice of process on a party in accordance with . . . statutory requirements is a prerequisite to a court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over that party." General MotorsAcceptance Corp v. Pumphrey, 13 Conn. App. 223, 227, 535 A.2d 396 CT Page 8194 (1988). In addition, insufficiency of process deprives the court of personal jurisdiction. Asen v. Butler Bill Associates, Inc.,5 Conn. L. Rptr. 253 (November 12, 1991, McGrath, J.).

I.
Service of Process as to Acun and Dundar Pursuant to§ 52-59b(c).

The defendants' arguments as to insufficiency of service of process upon Acun, who the plaintiff alleges is an agent, servant and employee of the defendant Hurriyet and Hurriyet TV, and upon Dundar are premised upon the plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with General Statutes § 52-59b(c) and non-compliance with the Hague Service Convention.

The defendants have argued that the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Acun and Dundar because of insufficiency of service of process pursuant to General Statutes52-59b(c).1 The defendants maintain that service was effectuated upon the Secretary of State, along with sending those documents to two addresses in New York City.2 The defendants argue, however, that General Statutes § 52-59b(c) requires the mailing of a copy of the writ summons and complaint to their individual residences which are located in Turkey. The plaintiff counters that he complied with § 52-59b(c) by mailing a copy of the writ, summons and complaint to the defendants' business address(es) in New York.

In Tek-Motive, Inc. v. AFB, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, No. 349298 (Nov. 12, 1993, Zoarski, J.), one of the defendants, Ruskin, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as against him on the ground that service of process was improper pursuant to § 52-59b(c). The court stated that "[s]ervice of process on Ruskin was sufficient in the present case because [the address] was Ruskin's `last-known address' within the meaning of General Statutes [§] 52-59b(c). Service was sufficient . . . because notice delivered to an individual's business address, rather than his residence, is adequate. . . ."3

The sheriff's mailing of copies of the writ, summons and complaint to Hurriyet's office(s) in New York complies with §52-59b(c).4 The defendants' contention that the plaintiff has failed to comply with § 52-59b(c) is without merit and the CT Page 8195 defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

The defendants have also argued in their memorandum in support of their motion that the plaintiff's service of process does not comport with provisions of the Hague Convention relating to service of process upon parties in foreign countries. The defendants' contention, however, is premised upon an argument that § 52-59b(c) requires the plaintiff or sheriff to mail the writ, summons and complaint to Acun and Dundar at their residences in Turkey. § 52-59b(c), as discussed above, does not support the defendants' contention. Therefore, since service comported with the requirements of § 52-59b(c), the Hague Service Convention does not apply. See VolkswagenwerkAktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707, 108 S.Ct. 2104,100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988) (The Hague Service Convention did not apply when process was served on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under state law, was that foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service.) Non-compliance with the Hague Service Convention does not then provide grounds upon which to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 8192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/celik-v-dundar-no-cv95-0142921-s-jul-12-1995-connsuperct-1995.