Celia Litman v. Jennifer Guckin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-3125
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 23-3125 _______________

CELIA LITMAN; DONALD S. LITMAN; ARTHUR LITMAN, by his parents & natural guardian; THE ARTHUR E. LITMAN SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST; AUTISM LTD., Appellants

v.

JENNIFER GUCKIN; TOWNSHIP OF TOWAMENCIN _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01889) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 11, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 18, 2024) _______________

OPINION* _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

Injured people may sue to vindicate their rights—but only for so long. Because the

plaintiffs here waited much longer than the two-year statute of limitations, the District

Court dismissed their claims as time-barred. We agree.

Celia and Donald Litman wanted to add a room to their house for their autistic son,

Arthur. They planned to use the extra space to teach him how to live independently. But

their town, Towamencin, denied them a permit. Even so, they put a trailer on their property

without the required permit. In 2019, local zoning officer Jennifer Guckin wrote citations

warning them of fines and ordering them to remove the trailer.

When the Litmans refused, they were found guilty of violating a local zoning ordinance.

After an appeal and motion to reconsider, they got a new trial but were again convicted.

The state appellate court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.

Four years after the citations, the Litmans and others sued Guckin and the town in fed-

eral court. They brought federal and state constitutional claims and statutory claims under

the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The

District Court dismissed them all as time-barred.

All the claims here have a two-year statute of limitations. That is true of § 1983 tort

claims brought in Pennsylvania. Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d

Cir. 2015); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. It is equally true of the federal statutory claims. Dis-

abled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008) (ADA &

Rehab Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (FHA).

2 The clock starts running when the defendants’ alleged wrong causes the injury. Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185–86 (3d

Cir. 2010). As the parties agree, Guckin and Towamencin allegedly wronged the Litmans

in 2019 by citing them and ordering them to remove the trailer. That was four years before

they sued in 2023—two years too late.

To get around this time limit, the Litmans claim that they suffered continuing violations

that extended through the state-court litigation, making all their claims timely. Not so. The

Litmans’ injury arises out of “isolated” acts on August 9, 2019: the zoning citations and

order to remove the trailer. Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).

The gist of all their claims is that Towamencin forbade them to keep the trailer on their

property. When they got the citations, the Litmans had to choose either to remove the trailer

or face legal consequences. Their ensuing legal battles with the town were not one contin-

uing wrongful act or new discrete wrongs, but rather “continual ill effects” from the origi-

nal violation. Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).

For the same reason, the claims of Arthur, the Trust, and Autism Limited are time-

barred too. The citations prevented Arthur from using the trailer freely, stopped Autism

Limited from providing services to Arthur, and obligated the Trust to pay the Litmans’

fines. So their injuries also arose in 2019. Because the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred,

we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.