Ceaser v. Walton

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3723
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OSCAR CEASER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03723 (UNA) ) REGGIE B. WALTON, ) ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants

Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and as explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Woodland, California, sues a federal judge of this district court. See

Compl. at 1–2. The Complaint is vague and difficult to follow. As best understood, Plaintiff takes

issue with the dismissal of one or more matters that he filed in this district; more specifically, he

contends that, when a litigant is granted a fee waiver, a case cannot be “closed” until summonses

are issued. See id. at 4; see Compl. Memorandum (“Compl. Memo”), ECF No. 1-1, at 1. He

demands that a “settlement of 21 billon dollar[s], from his lawyer Barack Obama.” Compl. Memo

at 1.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977). As here, a confused narrative of charges and conclusions does not comply with

the requirements of Rule 8, Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C.

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and the Complaint neither provides adequate

notice of a claim nor establishes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Second, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, even if that claim was better pleaded. A district

court may, under many different circumstances, dismiss a case sua sponte, and it is not required to

issue summons following the submission or grant of an IFP application; indeed, when an IFP

application is filed, the Court must preliminarily “screen” a case for potential defects, and if

defective, dismiss the case, as statutorily required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Haba v. Arthur,

851 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[S]ervice was not required before dismissing

the action for failure to state a claim [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).”); Chow v. United States, No.

23-2842, 2024 WL 5220899, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024) (“Contrary to Chow’s contention, the

district court was not required to issue summons following Chow’s submission of a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915), cert. denied, --- S.Ct. ----, No. 25-5380,

2025 WL 2906579 (Oct. 14, 2025).

Finally, and assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had stated a claim, judges are absolutely

immune from suits for money damages for “all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless

these actions are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d

1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that

a long line of Supreme Court precedents have found that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute

immunity for any actions taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). And “a judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); see also Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”). Because the

actions alleged by Plaintiff––i.e., dismissals of his cases––are undisputably judicial acts,

Defendant is thus immune from suit.

Accordingly, and for these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January 2, 2026 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge