Cazet v. . Hubbell

New York Court of Appeals

Cazet v. . Hubbell

36 N.Y. 677, 3 Trans. App. 333

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 5, 1867

StatusPublished

Cited by27 cases

This text of 36 N.Y. 677 (Cazet v. . Hubbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cazet v. . Hubbell, 36 N.Y. 677, 3 Trans. App. 333 (N.Y. 1867).

Pincite

Opinion

Porter, J.

The Appellant acquired his title to the mortgaged premises under a judgment which directed that the surplus moneys should be paid into court. He took the benefit of the purchase, but by a secret and collusive arrangement with the sheriff' he retained the surplus, amounting to $6,362.55, with interest from the 14th of July, 1849. That officer had no authority to remit the payment of any portion of the price, or to accept a note to himself in extinguishment of the Appellant’s obligation. By becoming the purchaser, Alrick Hubbell, though not named as a party in the action, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court in the foreclosure suit; and the appropriate remedy, to compel him to pay over the surplus money, was the motion made by the Respondents (Requa v. Rea, 2 Paige, 339; Brasher v. Cortland, 2 Johns. Ch. 505; Casamajor v. Strode, 1 Simons & Stuart, 381; Lansdown v. Elderton, 14 Vesey, 512).

It was urged with great force and ability, on the argument, that the obligation to complete the purchase was extinguished by the lapse of time. In this view we cannot concur. The Appellant retains the benefit of the title he acquired through the judgment of foreclosure; and nothing has occurred since which gives him a better right, now than then, to disregard the directions of the tribunal by which that judgment was pronounced. For all the purposes of this proceeding, the action is to be deemed still pending; and there is no statute of limitations ousting the Court of jurisdiction to enforce the execution of its decree. It is no answer to the motion, that such a defence might have prevailed if the parties aggrieved had sought a concurrent remedy, by action against the sheriff for breach of duty. The Respondents have been guilty of no laches. The right to the surplus moneys was presumptively in the assignees until the assignment was adjudged to be fraudulent; and when its inva *337 lidity was legally ascertained, the Respondents promptly resorted, to their motion. It is urged, with much force, that Cazet and Astoin were not even then in a position to move, as their action was still undetermined; but this furnishes no ground for reversing the order, as other parties united in the application, who were entitled to the precise relief demanded.

We think there is no force in the objection, that the motion was made without first bringing in, as parties, the representatives of Alfred Hubbell, who was one of the Defendants in the foreclosure suit. Their substitution was unnecessary for the purpose of compelling the Appellant to complete his purchase by bringing the money into court, and their rights are unaffected by the order, which simply secures the fund by placing it in the custody of the law, without awarding- it to either of the claimants (Lynde v. O’Donnell, 21 How. 36-39; Brown v. Andrews, 1 Barb. 227; McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 238; Hancock v. Hancock, 22 id. 570).

By mistake in entitling the cause, Alriek Hubbell is named in the motion papers as one of the Defendants in the foreclosiu'e suit. The error is one which we are bound to disregard, as it prejudiced neither of the parties, and affected none of their substantial rights (Code, §§ 173, 176; Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 360).

We think the other points urged in support of the appeal untenable ; but as the rights of the parties claiming interests in the fund are not yet finally determined, the order should be modified by allowing the Appellant, if he should so elect, to give a bond to the people, with two sufficient sureties, to be approved by a Justice of the Supreme Court, and to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county of Monroe, securing the payment of the amount named in the order, with interest, as that Court may direct, and the observance of such orders as may be made from time to time in the premises.

■ With this modification, the order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.

*338 All the Judges concurring except Davies, Ch. J., and Bookes, J.,

Ordered accordingly.

Bookes, J.,

read an opinion for reversal, holding — -first, that Oazet and Astoin had no standing in court to make or join in the application against Hubbell; and second, that as regards the other parties, their right to move was lost to them by a lapse of time.

JOEL TIFFANY,

State Reporter.

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Porter, J.

The Appellant acquired his title to the mortgaged premises under a judgment which directed that the surplus moneys should be paid into court. He took the benefit of the purchase, but by a secret and collusive arrangement with the sheriff' he retained the surplus, amounting to $6,362.55, with interest from the 14th of July, 1849. That officer had no authority to remit the payment of any portion of the price, or to accept a note to himself in extinguishment of the Appellant’s obligation. By becoming the purchaser, Alrick Hubbell, though not named as a party in the action, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court in the foreclosure suit; and the appropriate remedy, to compel him to pay over the surplus money, was the motion made by the Respondents (Requa v. Rea, 2 Paige, 339; Brasher v. Cortland, 2 Johns. Ch. 505; Casamajor v. Strode, 1 Simons & Stuart, 381; Lansdown v. Elderton, 14 Vesey, 512).

It was urged with great force and ability, on the argument, that the obligation to complete the purchase was extinguished by the lapse of time. In this view we cannot concur. The Appellant retains the benefit of the title he acquired through the judgment of foreclosure; and nothing has occurred since which gives him a better right, now than then, to disregard the directions of the tribunal by which that judgment was pronounced. For all the purposes of this proceeding, the action is to be deemed still pending; and there is no statute of limitations ousting the Court of jurisdiction to enforce the execution of its decree. It is no answer to the motion, that such a defence might have prevailed if the parties aggrieved had sought a concurrent remedy, by action against the sheriff for breach of duty. The Respondents have been guilty of no laches. The right to the surplus moneys was presumptively in the assignees until the assignment was adjudged to be fraudulent; and when its inva *337 lidity was legally ascertained, the Respondents promptly resorted, to their motion. It is urged, with much force, that Cazet and Astoin were not even then in a position to move, as their action was still undetermined; but this furnishes no ground for reversing the order, as other parties united in the application, who were entitled to the precise relief demanded.

We think there is no force in the objection, that the motion was made without first bringing in, as parties, the representatives of Alfred Hubbell, who was one of the Defendants in the foreclosure suit. Their substitution was unnecessary for the purpose of compelling the Appellant to complete his purchase by bringing the money into court, and their rights are unaffected by the order, which simply secures the fund by placing it in the custody of the law, without awarding- it to either of the claimants (Lynde v. O’Donnell, 21 How. 36-39; Brown v. Andrews, 1 Barb. 227; McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N. Y. 238; Hancock v. Hancock, 22 id. 570).

By mistake in entitling the cause, Alriek Hubbell is named in the motion papers as one of the Defendants in the foreclosiu'e suit. The error is one which we are bound to disregard, as it prejudiced neither of the parties, and affected none of their substantial rights (Code, §§ 173, 176; Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 360).

We think the other points urged in support of the appeal untenable ; but as the rights of the parties claiming interests in the fund are not yet finally determined, the order should be modified by allowing the Appellant, if he should so elect, to give a bond to the people, with two sufficient sureties, to be approved by a Justice of the Supreme Court, and to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county of Monroe, securing the payment of the amount named in the order, with interest, as that Court may direct, and the observance of such orders as may be made from time to time in the premises.

■ With this modification, the order of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.

*338 All the Judges concurring except Davies, Ch. J., and Bookes, J.,

Ordered accordingly.

Bookes, J.,

read an opinion for reversal, holding — -first, that Oazet and Astoin had no standing in court to make or join in the application against Hubbell; and second, that as regards the other parties, their right to move was lost to them by a lapse of time.

JOEL TIFFANY,

State Reporter.

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36 N.Y. 677, 3 Trans. App. 333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cazet-v-hubbell-ny-1867.

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