RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0410P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0410p.06 Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HOOD, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which _________________ MOORE, J., joined. ROGERS, J. (pp. 22-23), delivered a separate concurring opinion. ROBERT LEE CAVER , X Petitioner-Appellee, - _________________ - - No. 01-2649 OPINION v. - _________________ > , HOOD, District Judge. Robert Lee Caver was convicted DENNIS M. STRAUB, Warden, - for violating Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.89, assault with Respondent-Appellant. - intent to rob being armed. After exhausting his direct and N state-collateral appeals, Caver filed a federal petition for a Appeal from the United States District Court writ of habeas corpus, alleging the ineffectiveness of his trial for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. and appellate counsel. The district court below found that No. 00-70903—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge. Caver had demonstrated cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of Argued: May 2, 2003 trial counsel claim by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel. Accordingly, the district court granted Decided and Filed: November 19, 2003 Caver’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Michigan Attorney General appeals from the Before: MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; HOOD, district court decision, arguing that (1) the ineffective District Judge.* assistance of appellate counsel claim was procedurally defaulted, and (2) assuming that the ineffective assistance of _________________ appellate counsel claim was not procedurally defaulted, the district court erred in finding that the state collateral courts COUNSEL had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. ARGUED: Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. I. Factual and Procedural History On October 1, 1992, Robert Lee Caver was convicted in the Detroit Recorder’s Court of assault with intent to commit * The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the armed robbery and two counts of attempted assault with Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
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intent to commit armed robbery. Caver was prosecuted for (11) Failed to remain with Defendant immediately after entering and looting a local drug house with two other men jury retired to deliberate, where within minutes the Jury while impersonating federal law enforcement agents. Caver sent a note requesting to see evidence etc.. [sic] and is currently imprisoned only for assault with intent to commit Counsel was not present.... armed robbery, as he has completed his sentences on the remaining convictions. Caver based his claim of ineffective appellate counsel on his appellate attorney’s failure to raise these issues of ineffective Caver directly appealed his convictions, asserting that the trial counsel. The trial court denied Caver’s motion, finding trial court erred in instructing the jury and that there was that Caver had not demonstrated the “good cause” or insufficient evidence regarding assault to support the verdict. prejudice required under M.C.R. 6.508(D)1 to excuse his The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Caver’s convictions. failure to present the issues on his direct appeal. The court Caver then filed a delayed, pro se application for leave to also concluded that Caver’s ineffective assistance of trial appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. Caver’s application counsel claim was without merit and could not satisfy the reasserted the earlier-alleged errors plus two new issues. One “good cause” requirement of M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) “because claim asserted that Caver’s appellate counsel, Neil Leithauser, appellate counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous had failed to investigate certain allegedly meritorious issues. issue on appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 795 (1983). The While he did generally state that he had wished to pursue an Michigan Court of Appeal denied Caver’s delayed appeal and ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, Caver did not his motion for rehearing, which was, in substance, identical allege that Leithauser failed to investigate or pursue the to his brief before the district court. The appellate court absence of Caver’s trial counsel, Samuel Simon, during the concluded that Caver had failed to meet the burden of court’s response to the jury note or during the subsequent jury establishing entitlement to relief under M.C.R. 6.508(D). re-instruction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Caver’s delayed application for leave to appeal. 1 “Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules establishes the Next, Caver filed a motion for relief from judgment in the procedures for pursuing post-appeal relief from criminal convictions. The trial court, alleging, inter alia, the ineffectiveness of his trial subchapter is the exclusive means to challenge a conviction in Michigan and appellate counsel. The motion referred to two instances once a defendant has exhausted the normal appellate process.” People v. of trial counsel ineffectiveness relevant to this appeal: Reed, 499 N .W.2d 441, 443 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993 ), aff’d 535 N.W.2d 496 (1995). Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) limits the co urt’s ability to grant relief. See M.C.R. 6.50 8(D ). The rule reads, in p ertinent part, Defendant Caver’s Trial Counsel ... The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion: (9) Failed to be present during Open Court proceeding’s ... [sic] (during Jury Instructions), Counsel wasn’t present (3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, and Defendant was placed back in [sic] bullpen, and which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and Defendant nor Counsel [sic] present during open court sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates proceedings of his trial; (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and ... (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that supp ort the claim for relief. Id. No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 5 6 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
Caver then filed an application for leave to appeal to the errors. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Michigan Supreme Court. This application was notably Caver’s petition. The district court found that Caver’s different from Caver’s earlier briefs in that Caver separated appellate counsel had been ineffective in failing to raise the the presentation of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel ineffectiveness of Caver’s trial counsel on direct appeal, thus claims and his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel establishing both a separate constitutional defect and cause claims. In treating his trial counsel claims, Caver again and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default of presented paragraphs nine and eleven, which alleged the Caver’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The absence of trial counsel when the court received a note back Attorney General now appeals the decision of the district from the jury and again when the court went on to re-instruct court. the jury. Caver’s treatment of his appellate counsel claims, however differed from his earlier applications. In Caver’s II. Standard of Review application to the Michigan Supreme Court, unlike his earlier claims, he failed to argue that appellate counsel was Appellate courts, in reviewing federal habeas corpus ineffective for failing to present the ineffectiveness of Caver’s proceedings, examine the district court's legal conclusions de trial counsel for being absent during critical stages of the trial. novo and its factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" Instead, Caver asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective standard. Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1999). in not alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to object to certain testimony, failing to cross-examine The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 witnesses, and failing to investigate the illegality of Caver’s (“AEDPA”) was enacted on April 24, 1996. Antiterrorism arrest and his alibi. Caver also asserted appellate counsel’s and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- ineffectiveness in failing to assert error respecting the trial 132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (relevant portions codified as court’s refusal to allow the testimony of res gestae witnesses. amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Caver filed his petition for Caver’s application did also provide general statements of his relief on February 17, 2000. Caver’s petition, therefore, is appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness,2 but these general governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA. statements appear to be in connection with his specifically- See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402 (2000). Under the alleged instances of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. The amended statute, a writ of habeas corpus Michigan Supreme Court denied Caver’s application for leave to appeal, concluding that Caver had failed to meet his burden may issue only if ... the state-court adjudication resulted under M.C.R. 6.508(D). in a decision that either (1) “was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme On February 17, 2000, Caver filed a petition for a writ of Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal Eastern District of Michigan, alleging ineffective assistance law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United of trial and appellate counsel, among other constitutional States. Id. at 412 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 2 For example, Caver did argue tha t “defendant was de nied his Sixth Amendm ent right to effective assistance of appellate counsel when his attorne y failed to adeq uately and compe tently represent him.” No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 7 8 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
III. Discussion B. Caver Did Not Procedurally Default His Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claim A. The Court Need Not Reach Whether or Not Caver Procedurally Defaulted His Ineffective Assistance of The Attorney General also argues that Caver procedurally Appellate Counsel Claims Because the State Failed to defaulted his trial counsel claim. As described above, Raise the Issue in Proceedings Before the District exhaustion occurs where a petitioner gives the state courts a Court fair and full opportunity to rule on his claims by fairly presenting all claims to the highest court in the state in which The Attorney General asserts that Caver did not fairly the petitioner was convicted. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, present, in the state court collateral proceeding, the ineffective 160 (6th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement is also assistance of appellate counsel claim upon which the district satisfied if it is clear that a claim is procedurally barred under court relied in granting Caver’s petition and that the claim state law. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996). was, thus, procedurally defaulted. It is true that before In such a case, however, the habeas petitioner must overcome seeking federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must the procedural default, an independent and adequate state-law exhaust his available state remedies by fairly presenting all ground for the conviction and sentence that prevents federal claims to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Hannah habeas corpus review, by demonstrating cause and prejudice v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). The for the default. Id. at 162. This court has previously exhaustion requirement is satisfied after the petitioner fairly announced a four part test to determine whether a claim has presents all claims to the highest court in the state in which been procedurally defaulted: the petitioner was convicted, thus giving it a fair and full opportunity to rule on his claims. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d First, the court must determine that there is a state 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). The petitioner bears the burden of procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim proving that he has exhausted these remedies. See id. and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule.... Second, the court must decide whether the state courts Caver, however, counters the Attorney General’s actually enforced the state procedural sanction. ... Third, procedural default argument by noting that issues “raised for the court must decide whether the state procedural the first time on appeal are not properly before the court.” forfeiture is an "adequate and independent" state ground J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a F.2d 1474, 1488 (6th Cir. 1991). A review of the record federal constitutional claim.... [Fourth,] the petitioner shows that Respondent did not raise the issue of default must demonstrate under [Wainwright v.] Sykes, [433 U.S. before the district court, instead attempting to meet the 72 (1977)] that there was "cause" for him not to follow ineffective assistance of appellate counsel arguments on the the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced merits of the issue. Accordingly, the Court need not address by the alleged constitutional error. Caver’s alleged procedural default because Respondent did not, in fact, raise the issue in the proceedings before the Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). district court. M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) governs the procedures for collateral appeals and denies relief if the defendant alleges claims that could have been raised in the direct appeal from the No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 9 10 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
conviction. See People v. Jackson, 633 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. General’s argument in this regard must fail. Given the less 2001). Specifically, the Attorney General asserts that the stringent standards and active interpretation that are afforded issue of denial of counsel during a “critical stage” of the trial to the filings of pro se litigants, Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d was not presented to the state courts. 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001), these aspects of Caver’s application support a finding that Caver “fairly presented” the trial Ultimately, then, the issue is whether Caver fairly presented counsel ineffectiveness claim. the claim to the Michigan courts in his one and only motion for relief from judgment. Fair presentation of an issue C. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding That requires that a petitioner give state courts a full opportunity to the State Court Unreasonably Applied Clearly resolve any constitutional issues by invoking “one complete Established Federal Law round” of the state’s appellate review system. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (finding that “one The Attorney General makes two arguments in support of complete round” includes discretionary appeal to state the contention that the district court erred by finding that the supreme court). Fair presentation also requires that “the same state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal claim under the same theory be presented” for the state law. First, the Attorney General maintains that the state court court’s consideration. Palette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494, 497 (6th reasonably applied clearly established federal law in Cir. 1987). Thus, to the extent that an ineffective assistance determining that Caver’s appellate counsel did not fall below of counsel claim is based upon a different allegedly the required standard of professional competence. Next, the ineffective action than the claim presented to the state courts, Attorney General asserts that the district court erroneously the claim has not been fairly presented to the state courts. Id. presumed prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), instead of conducting an individualized inquiry.4 Certainly, the issue was not raised in his direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. He did, however, raise the issue As noted above, a habeas petition may issue only if the in his pro se appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, asserting state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable that he had wanted to present an ineffective assistance of trial application of clearly established federal law as determined counsel claim in his intermediate appeal, but that appellate by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. counsel had denied him that opportunity.3 Thus, the Attorney § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta” of the 3 Even if he had not, we believe that he has demonstrated by virtue of Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel, as discussed below, “that there was ‘cause’ for him not to follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.” Ma upin v. Sm ith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ). receipt of the note is sufficient to cover the subsequent events leading up For this reaso n, the Court also rejects the Attorney General’s more to and including jury re-instruction. Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 nuanced argum ent; that is, that C aver in his state co llateral proceedings (6th C ir. 200 1). did not state that trial counsel was absent during the actual re-instruction 4 of the jury, only th at counsel was absent when the trial judge received a In this sense, the Attorney General objects to the district court’s note from the jury. Looking again to the less stringent standards and findings respecting both the performance and prejud ice components of active interpretation that are afforded to the filings of pro se litigants, we Caver’s ineffective assistance claim. See Strickland v. Wa shing ton, 466 are satisfied that Caver’s reference to trial counsel’s absence during U.S. 668 (1984). No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 11 12 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
(2000). As the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]t is past (quoting Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751-752). As the Supreme question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as Court has recently observed, it is difficult to demonstrate that ‘clearly established Federal law’” for ineffective assistance of an appellate attorney has violated the performance prong counsel claims. Id. at 391. Under the oft-stated Strickland where the attorney presents one argument on appeal rather v. Washington test, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of than another. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2002). In counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that such cases, the petitioner must demonstrate that the issue not (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard presented “was clearly stronger than issues that counsel did of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability present.” Id. at 289. that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. In the instant case, there can be little doubt but that the Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For Caver to succeed, omitted issue - trial counsel’s alleged absence during jury re- however: instruction - was much stronger than the issues Caver’s appellate counsel presented.5 As Caver notes, the first issue [H]e must do more than show that he would have presented to the Michigan courts on appeal (whether the court satisfied Strickland’s test ..., because under §2254(d)(1), erred in its aiding and abetting instruction) was subject to it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, “plain error” review - a highly deferential standard, to put it in its independent judgment, the state-court decision mildly. Moreover, the second argument presented on direct applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he must show that appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence, was dependent upon the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case the success of the first issue. (Absent liability as an in an objectively unreasonable manner. aider/abettor, there could be no evidence to support a finding of the requisite intent.) Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted). In contrast, because re-instruction of the jury is a critical 1. Strickland’s Performance Component stage of a proceeding, see discussion infra Part III.C.2, Caver would have had a far better chance of succeeding on his The Supreme Court has made clear that in reviewing a ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, the largest obstacle to lawyer’s performance, a court’s “scrutiny . . . must be highly such a claim would have been the vagueness of the trial deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A fair assessment of record with regard to trial counsel’s presence or absence attorney performance requires that every effort be made “to during the actual re-instruction of the jury. See discussion eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the infra Part III.D. While such second-guessing of appellate circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to counsel’s evaluation of the facts may seem like the forbidden evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” product of the “distorting effect[] of hindsight,” even Id. In relation to appellate counsel, the Strickland performance standard does not require an attorney to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 5 This is not surprising, given that some courts have suggested that the U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Indeed, the process of “‘winnowing out Strickland performance and prejudice prongs tend to blur when weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on’ those more considering the performance of appellate counsel, as the prejudice inquiry likely to prevail ... is the hallmark of effective appellate will generally inform whethe r app ellate counsel met the standard of advocacy.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) professional competence. See United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 13 14 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
assuming that counsel was absent only for the receipt of the standard, we must assess whether this performance prejudiced jury note the resulting argument would still appear much Caver. The question presented here is whether an appellate stronger than a sufficiency of the evidence claim.6 counsel prejudices a client where the attorney fails to raise on appeal a claim that the trial counsel’s representation was per 2. Strickland’s Prejudice Component se prejudicial because the trial counsel was absent during a critical stage of the proceedings, namely jury re-instruction. Having determined that the representation of Caver’s We answer in the affirmative, because but for the appellate appellate counsel fell below an objectively reasonable counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the state appeal may have been different.
6 On the same day that the Supreme Court in Strickland The only explanation for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the outlined the requirements for an ineffective assistance of ineffective assistance of counsel claim may b e found in the transcript of the evidentiary hea ring at the district co urt. Petitioner’s counsel broached counsel claim, it also determined that where counsel is absent the subject of trial counsel’s presence during the jury re-instruction with at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding the trial will be appellate counsel as follows: deemed unfair and prejudice under Strickland presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.26 (1984). Q. ...[C]an you tell us why you d id not raise the denial of the The Attorney General challenges the district court’s right to counsel during the supplemental instruction issue? conclusion that jury re-instruction is a “critical stage” such A. W ell, you have to be more specific. that prejudice is presumed and no individual analysis is required. Q. There came a time when the jury wanted to be instructed on certain elements of the offense after they had deliberated. A critical stage of a criminal proceeding is “a step of a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that h[olds] A. Uh-hum. significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v. Cone, 535 Q. And the transcript reflects that Mr. Caver’s attorney was not U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002). Where counsel is absent or denied present during that time period. in such instances, “the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry [of prejudice to the A. I don’t see the merit in the issue, I gue ss would be... defendant] is unnecessary.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, At that point, Petitioner’s counsel interrupted the response by stating, “I 166 (2002) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59 & 659 n.26). have no further questions.” The Attorney G enera l, prom pted by the court, The “individual inquiry into whether counsel's inadequate stated, “I have no questions for this witness.” Accordingly, we are left to performance undermined the reliability of the verdict” is wonder why Petitioner’s appellate counsel did not pursue this claim on forgone only in such cases. Id. direct appeal - whether because appellate counsel did not appreciate the merit of the claim or because he understood that Petitioner’s counsel was Is jury re-instruction a “critical stage” under Cronic? While prese nt. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s counsel’s interruption of the response, the state was left with an opportunity to explore the reasons for the Supreme Court has not expressly considered whether jury his failure to pursue the claim, an opportunity which the Attorney General reinstruction, as it is understood in this matter, is a critical permitted to slip away. As further discussed infra, at footnote 10, we are stage, this court recently determined - in a decision squarely concerned with the state’s failure to take up its residual burden of on-point and founded on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision rebutting that evidence presented on behalf of the petitioner when it was necessary to do so. No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 15 16 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
in Cronic - that it is.7 French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. habeas corpus could be properly granted on this ground.8 2003). On remand from the Supreme Court, which had Any conclusion otherwise would be an unreasonable vacated the original appellate opinion in French and application of clearly established federal law as stated in remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s Cronic. decision in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002), this court reiterated its previous decision holding that jury re-instruction Because prejudice is presumed and because, as outlined was indeed a “critical stage” as described in Cronic and that above, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise prejudice could be presumed. French, 332 F.3d at 438-39. the absence of trial counsel issue, the district court was Again, we note that the Supreme Court has "uniformly found correct in finding that the state court’s application of constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when Strickland (that is, the state court’s conclusion that appellate counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting counsel was not ineffective) was an unreasonable application the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." of clearly established federal law. French, 332 F.3d at 436 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984)). This is to say, under Cronic, that D. The District Court’s Factual Finding That Caver’s if Petitioner’s trial counsel was, indeed, absent during the re- Trial Attorney Was Absent During Jury Re- instruction, a structural error occurred in the trial court instruction Was Not Clearly Erroneous proceeding, and either relief from judgment or a writ of The Attorney General challenges not only the district court’s legal conclusions - conclusions which we validate above - but also the district court’s central factual determination standing as the linchpin of Caver’s habeas petition. That determination is the district court’s finding that Caver’s trial counsel was absent during jury re-instruction. 7 The record, the Attorney General argues, is devoid of support Anticipating concerns about whether or not this properly constitutes “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of for such a finding. the United States,” we note that the Cronic court has only carved out a broad rule, a rule that must be applied in the many factually distinct Our review of the district court’s factual findings is highly situations that will come before the lower courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). deferential. We start from the premise that a district court’s “[R]ules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when factual findings in a habeas proceeding are reviewed for clear they are expressed in terms of a generalized stand ard rather than as a bright-line rule.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 , 382 (2000). Accordingly, such a rule o f law can “tolerate a num ber o f specific applications without saying that those applications themselves create a 8 new rule....” Id. (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has rejected a W e note that the panel in French v. Jones, while holding that jury requirement that the facts of prior cases be “fundamentally similar” or re-instruction is a critical stag e and that prejudice may be presum ed if trial “materially similar” in order to constitute “clearly established law.” Hope counsel is absent, did not place any limits on what types of jury re- v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (fair warning of unconstitutional instruction would be considered “critical.” Frenc h v. Jones, 332 F.3d conduct required where o fficials seek qualified immunity from su it in 430, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2003). As the re-instruction in the instant matter cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For this reason, we believe that our focus involved new and supplemental information conveyed to the jury, similar on the absence per se of trial counsel during jury reinstruction makes this to that jury re-instruction in French, we express no opinion on whether or a “tolerable ap plicatio n” of Cronic within the requirements of not a jury re-instruction that does not convey new and supplemental § 2254 (d)(1). information is sim ilarly a “critical” stage in a trial. No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 17 18 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
error. Lucas v. O’Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1999). that are unclear, trial counsel was not questioned respecting “‘Clear error’ occurs only when [the panel is] left with the his alleged absence during jury re-instruction. Without any definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been testimony on the matter, the district court was left with the committed. If there are two permissible views of the evidence, following excerpt of the trial record: the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Kellams, 26 F.3d 646, 648 (6th (Back on the record at about 3:59 p.m.) Cir. 1994). We are also mindful that in a habeas proceeding the petitioner “has the burden of establishing his right to THE COURT: I’m not really certain about this. federal habeas relief and of proving all facts necessary to show a constitutional violation.” Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d I’m not quite certain about what this note from the jury 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, the panel must determine means. It says definitions of Assault, and False whether or not the district court erred in determining that Pretenses. And I’m not quite certain, so I’m going to ask petitioner met the burden of establishing his right to federal them if they would be kind enough to write down exactly habeas relief and of proving all facts necessary to show a what is on the verdict form. constitutional violation on the record presented. (Brief pause.) The collateral trial court opinion was the last reasoned opinion before the district court, and the opinion did not THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have written a note. contain any findings of fact.9 The district court held an Where is Mr. Simon? evidentiary hearing, in which the petitioner and both trial and appellate counsel were questioned. The petitioner was not [Attorney for Caver’s co-defendant]: I just asked the asked by his counsel about his claim that his trial attorney same question. was not present when the jury was re-instructed. For reasons THE COURT: Nevertheless, I am writing this note:
9 “Dear Jurors, I don’t quite understand your question. The entire trial court opinion for the state collateral proceed ing Would you please mark on the verdict form the exact reads: charge or charges that you want”. Defendant has filed a Motion of Relief from Judgm ent, in which he raises several issues that were not raised in his prior And I’m going to send them a form in there so they can app eal. Upon review of the M otion, this Court is satisfied that write on here exactly what they want to hear. the defendant has not shown “go od cau se” for failure to raise these issues in his prior appeal, nor actual prejud ice from these After this exchange, the attorney for Caver’s co-defendant alleged errors. MCR 6.50 8(D)(3). stated that he believed that the court should define assault and Defendant’s claim o f ineffective a ssistance of appellate false pretenses, rather than making an inquiry. A note was counsel does not satisfy the “good cause” requirem ent because then sent to the jury at 4:03 p.m. The court reconvened from app ellate counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous 4:06 p.m. to 4:08 p.m. to clarify that the juror requests were issue on ap peal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 795; 103 S. Ct. 3308; required to be in writing. From 4:19 p.m. to 4:27 p.m. the 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983). Defendant’s Mo tion for Relief from Judgment is hereby Denied. trial court responded to the jury’s request and re-read the No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 19 20 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
requested instruction. After the jury was excused to indication that Simon was not present at the re-instruction of deliberate, Mr. Ernst, counsel for one of Caver’s co- the jury, such as another inquiry into or an explanation defendants, objected to the court’s aiding and abetting re- offered for his absence. This is to say that the record is instruction, and the court overruled the objection. The trial susceptible to two permissible interpretations -- either transcript does not reflect Mr. Simon’s presence in the Simon’s presence was not remarked upon or his continued courtroom from the time of the court’s initial question absence was not remarked upon by those present. Thus, the “Where is Mr. Simon?” to the conclusion of the proceeding district court judge could not have committed clear error in that day at 4:29 p.m. determining that petitioner’s trial counsel was absent, and we must defer to the interpretation adopted by the district court The Attorney General argues that the judge’s question, judge in his decision to grant the request for a writ of habeas “Where is Mr. Simon?” does not demonstrate that trial corpus.10 counsel was not present at the subsequent re-instruction, but merely reflects his absence at the time of the judge’s statement in response to the jury’s question. The Attorney General also cites the fact that the court went on and off the 10 record twice after the judge’s question, arguing that “it must Even though we ha ve de termined that the district jud ge’s be presumed that the judge would have pursued [counsel’s determination to grant Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus based on the record was not clearly erroneous, we remark that it would have been absence] if counsel had remained absent.” Therefore, the helpful for either counsel or the court to have inquired of Petitioner’s trial Attorney General maintains, Caver has not met his burden of counsel regarding his presence or absence at the jury re-instruction during proof on this point. the evidentiary hearing. Nonetheless, their failure to do so does not mean that the record is therefore devoid of any evidence regarding S imon’s We disagree. While we must find clear error where the presence or absence. Rather, it leaves a suggestive record by which record is thoroughly devoid of evidence to support a district Petitioner has borne his burden of proof in the eyes of the district court and as described above. Such a sparse record may be p roperly construed court’s finding, a district court’s factual finding may survive in this manner, considering the critical nature of the re-instruction of the appellate scrutiny where there is some supporting evidence. jury under Cronic and French and in the absence of further evidence of Naturally, the trial court judge’s inquiry, “Where is Mr. Simo n’s presence, particularly in light of the state’s op portunity to elicit Simon?”, raises the question of the trial attorney’s testimony from Simon at the evidentiary hearing before the district court. whereabouts, particularly when coupled with the subsequent Our determination is bolstered when considered alongside those decisions that impugn the state’s care for a criminal d efendant’s constitutional rights concern expressed by Caver’s co-defendant’s trial counsel. where the record is silent regarding the d etails of certain procee dings. Thus, it can be understood to confirm Simon’s absence from See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U .S. 238 (1969 ) (reversible error where the courtroom at the time of the statement. There is no guilty plea accepted but record does not disclose that a plea was entered indication that Simon returned to the courtroom in the period voluntarily and knowingly); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 of time after the statement was made and before the close of (1962) (holding that “[p ]resum ing waiver [of the Sixth Amendm ent right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, proceedings for the day, including the re-instruction of the or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused jury. This interpretation of the evidence is buttressed by the was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the fact that Simon neither commented on nor objected to the offer. Anything less is not waiver.”). This is not to say that we are proceedings so as to appear in the record in the nearly thirty shifting the burden to be borne by a habeas petitioner by our decision minute period following the trial judge’s query about Simon’s today. Rather, we are concerned about the state’s failure to take up its residual burden of rebutting that evidence presented on behalf of the whereabouts. Of course, neither is there any further petitioner when it was necessary to do so. No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 21 22 Caver v. Straub No. 01-2649
IV. Conclusion ___________________ Caver’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim CONCURRENCE was not procedurally defaulted, and because jury re- ___________________ instruction is a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding, the district court properly presumed prejudice under Cronic. ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring. Further, the district court’s factual finding that Caver’s trial counsel was absent during jury re-instruction is supported by I concur in the result, and in the majority opinion to the the record and, thus, not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the extent that it does not preclude a future panel from upholding decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. as reasonable, under the deferential AEDPA standard, a reasoned state court opinion to the effect that a jury reinstruction might not amount to a critical stage under the reasoning of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 & n.25 (1984). Several factors make this a poor case in which to preclude such a holding in the future. First, only the most generous accommodation accorded pro se filings permits us even to conclude that petitioner adequately pursued in the state courts the issue of counsel’s absence at jury reinstruction. Second, the state court rejected the argument in the most cursory terms, leaving us with the slimmest of indications of its reasoning on the issue. Third, the district court’s factual finding that counsel was indeed absent at the time of jury reinstruction can be upheld only on the basis of a generous application of deference under the court’s clearly erroneous standard, as the record is remarkably opaque on the question. Fourth, it is not even clear that the state in its brief to this court did not waive any argument that jury reinstruction is a critical stage under Cronic. Given this state of the record, I concur in the majority’s result. This case should not be read, however, to resolve the issue of whether it is ever possible to uphold, under the AEDPA standard, a reasoned state court holding that a defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of counsel at jury reinstruction. French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003), relied upon by the majority, does not necessarily require a negative answer to this question, because the state court decision in that case No. 01-2649 Caver v. Straub 23
assumed that the jury reinstruction at issue was a critical stage. French, 332 F.3d at 436. Our holding in French thus does not require the conclusion that a state court could not reasonably (even if erroneously in our view) hold the contrary. Moreover, Supreme Court cases dealing with jury reinstruction do not require a negative answer, as those cases could reasonably be read to state a rule that is not of constitutional stature. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1975) (analyzing giving of supplemental instructions to jury when defendant’s counsel was absent as violation of Rule 43 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1927) (observing that rule of orderly conduct of jury trial entitles defendant to be present from time jury is impaneled until it renders its verdict); cf. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 n.2 (1983) (declining to decide whether trial judge’s ex parte communication with juror was error of constitutional dimension). But see Rushen, 464 U.S. at 118 (arguably citing Rogers as case involving constitutional deprivation). To be sure, the Supreme Court has indicated that a “critical stage” denotes “a step of a criminal proceeding, such as an arraignment, that h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v.Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002). If we assume that responding to a jury request to amplify a jury instruction inherently “holds significant consequences for the accused, ” then it would arguably be unreasonable for a state court to conclude, where the defendant’s attorney was absent at that time, that the Constitution did not require a new trial. I would leave resolution of the issue, however, to a case in which the state court more clearly made such a determination, and where the state more clearly defended it.