HODGES, Justice.
The plaintiff, Laura L. Catron, instituted this suit against the defendant, The First National Bank & Trust Co., Tulsa, Oklahoma, the Executor of the will and estate of J. M. Catron, and the defendants, Le-Roy Earl Catron, Donald Jesse Catron, Fred Charles Catron and Marvin Clay Ca-tron, all the sons of J. M. Catron, to establish a trust by operation of law for her benefit in one half of the estate of her deceased husband, J. M. Catron.
The plaintiff and Mr. Catron established a common law marriage in 1937. They went through a ceremonial wedding in Arkansas in 1952. Both parties had been married previously. Mr. Catron had four sons by his first marriage, defendants in this action. Mrs. Catron had one son by her first marriage, not involved in this dispute. Mr. and Mrs. Catron had no children from their union. Mr. Catron was 65 years of age at his death, on December 29, 1959, and Mrs. Catron was 53.
At the time of their marriage in 1937, neither Mr. Catron nor the plaintiff possessed any substantial assets, but during the period of the marriage a sizable estate was accumulated. The estate was valued at $286,821.76 by the appraisal of the executor bank, and has subsequently appreciated in value to more than $400,000.00. Record title to all property forming the estate was in the name of Mr. Catron except the homestead which was in joint tenancy with the plaintiff. It is clear that Mr. Catron possessed keen business judgment, an aptitude for investment, and a talent for making money. Mrsi Catron was not gainfully employed during the marriage, and contributed little, if any, direct service to the business endeavors of her husband, but it is not disputed that she fulfilled her marital duties [267]*267and responsibilities as a wife to the deceased.
Under his will, Mr. Catron left one third of his estate in trust to his wife, the plaintiff, and two thirds of his estate to be divided equally among his four sons, the defendants. Ownership of the homestead, valued at over $25,000.00, vested in the plaintiff by virtue of the joint tenancy arrangement. The will provided that the plaintiff should receive $1,000.00 per month for life from the portion of the estate held in trust for her. The plaintiff elected to take the property devised to her under the provisions of the will rather than her statutory share which would also have been one third of the estate (free of the trust). The plaintiff approved the general inventory and appraisement of the estate by the Executor and the estate tax returns. Later the plaintiff concluded that her share of the estate would probably be insufficient to provide her an income of $1,000.00 per month for the remainder of her life. She then instituted this suit asserting that one half of the estate was being held in trust for her by operation of law and should be set aside to her as the owner thereof. She further contends that the half of the estate belonging to her husband should be charged with $80,000.00 lost in useless oil ventures and with $12,000.00 in gifts made by the deceased to his sons without her consent.
In addition to the claims of one-half ownership and that Mr. Catron’s portion of the estate should be charged with $92,000.00 expended in oil ventures and gifts, the plaintiff continues to assert the right to receive one third of the remainder of the estate, in trust, under the terms of Mr. Catron’s will. The net effect of the plaintiff’s claims is that she should receive approximately three fourths of the property of the estate in addition to the homestead. The defendants contend that the plaintiff’s entitlement is limited to one third of the estate and the homestead, as provided in Mr. Catron’s will. Assuming the present value of the estate to be approximately $400,000.-00, the plaintiff’s position is that she is entitled to about $300,000.00 and the four defendants are entitled to about $25,000.00 each; while, under the terms of the will, her share would be about $133,333.00, and each of the defendants would receive abortt $66,667.00.
The trial of this case consumed seventeen days. Both parties presented numerous witnesses including friends and relatives of Mr. and Mrs. Catron, and business associates of Mr. Catron. Both the plaintiff and the defendants introduced testimony 'of, and exhibits compiled by, certified public accountants in an attempt to determine the sources of income and to trace the use'of funds from various individual and joint bank accounts of Mr. and Mrs.' Catron. Because of a lack of records, either .lost or destroyed, including bank statements and cancelled checks, particularly for the years from 1945 through 1949, the ■conclusions of the accountants for both parties is to a considerable extent based -on conjecture and speculation. The evi'dence'pr.e-sented was in conflict to a significant! extent and the inferences drawn by the parties from the evidence not in' conflict'are irreconcilable. ■ • ■ ' ¡"J V: ' : = >'•!
The trial court concluded , (jie' evidence was insufficient to establish’⅝ by operation of law as alleged by the plaintiff, that the ownership of tti'e property comprising the estate was vested in the'deceased, and that judgment should be rendered for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals to this court from- that judgment and the order of the trial court overruling her motion for a new trial. . ■ . , . . :
On appeal the plaintiff contends that she is the beneficiary of ¿. trust arising by operation of law for an undivided óne-half interest ‘ in all property acquired by her husband in his name by virtue’ of the fact that this property was purchased by her husband with their joint assets. 60 O.S. 1961, § 136(3). According to th.e plaintiff, this trust for her benefit may be considered to be either a resulting,¡trust or a constructive trust.
[268]*268A resulting trust was defined in Gammel v. Enochs, Okl., 353 P.2d 1106:
“A resulting trust arises where the legal estate in property is disposed of, conveyed, or transferred, hut the intent appears or is inferred from the terms of the disposition, or from accompanying facts and circumstances, that the beneficial interest is not to go to or be enjoyed with the legal title. In such a case a trust is implied or results in favor of the grantor whom equity deems to be the real owner.”
The foundation of a resulting trust is consideration. Both under the common law and under the provisions of 60 O.S.1961, § 137, a trust is presumed to result in favor of a person by or for whom payment is made when title to real property is taken in the name of another. This court has held in a number of cases where property was conveyed to a husband in consideration of money or assets furnished by, or belonging to, his wife, that a trust results in favor of the wife, absent evidence of circumstances showing a contrary intention. Mendenhall v. Walters, 53 Okl. 598, 157 P. 732; First Nat'l Bank v. Sanders, 169 Okl. 192, 35 P.2d 889; Guyer v. London, 187 Okl. 326, 102 P.2d 875; Wilhelm v. Pfinning, 191 Okl. 321, 129 P.2d 580.
A constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment where the party holding title to property acquired it in some unconscionable manner. In Dike v. Martin, 85 Okl. 103, 204 P. 1106, this court said: “ * * * All instances of constructive
trusts may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, including acts or omissions in violation of fiduciary obligations. If one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity carries out its theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in equity as the beneficial owner. * *
See to the same effect Cassidy v. Hornor, 86 Okl. 220, 208 P. 775; Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okl. 93, 233 P. 477; Peyton v. McCaslin, Okl., 417 P.2d 316.
The plaintiff concedes that she has the burden of establishing the facts giving rise to the trust, whether it is a constructive trust or a resulting trust, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and decisive. Boles v. Akers, 116 Okl. 266, 244 P. 182; Staton v. Moody, 208 Okl. 372, 256 P.2d 409; Davis v. National Bank, Okl., 353 P.2d 482. In reviewing the decision of the trial court in this case of equitable cognizance, we will examine the record and weigh the evidence to determine if the proof presented by the plaintiff conforms to this required standard, but we will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless it is clearly against the weight of evidence. See Gaines v. Gaines, 207 Okl. 619, 251 P.2d 1044; McCrory v. Evans, 192 Okl. 649, 138 P.2d 823.
Review of the record fails to disclose any basis for imposing a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff. There is no evidence of fraud, duress, abuse of confidence, or other misconduct by Mr. Catron in his dealing with the plaintiff and the trial court so found. The basis of the plaintiff’s claim is that one half of all funds invested by Mr. Catron in property comprising the present estate belonged to her. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the plaintiff had no assets of her own, and furnished none of the consideration for this property. It is readily apparent that to prevail, the plaintiff must establish by clear and unequivocal evidence that she did in fact furnish a portion (she alleges one half) of the consideration for the property comprising the estate of the deceased. As seen above, such evidence would support a resulting trust, rather than a constructive trust.
[269]*269We turn now to an examination of the facts relied upon by the plaintiff to establish a resulting trust in her behalf.
Mr. Catron began to prosper in 1941 when he started a business known as J. M. Catron Laboratory, which produced syrups and flavor concentrates used in soft drinks. During this period Mr. Catron was also employed as the assistant manager and plant foreman of the General Beverage Company, owned by Charles R. Flexner and Marion G. Flexner, husband and wife. Prior to 1941 neither Mr. Catron nor the plaintiff possessed any substantial assets, but by August, 1942, Mr. Catron had accumulated over $26,000.00 in cash. On August 15, 1942, Mr. Catron and Mr. Flexner agreed to merge their separate companies into a business that they operated under the name of C-F Beverage Company, which bottled and sold soft drinks at wholesale. Mr. Catron continued in this business until 1945 and it too operated profitably.
The plaintiff contends that she was an equal partner with her husband in both companies and introduced copies of partnership agreements to that effect. Defendants contend that there was no actual partnership but that Mr. Catron assigned the plaintiff an interest on paper in order to secure the advantage of reduced federal income tax gained by splitting income because there was no provision in the Internal Revenue Code at that time allowing a husband and wife to divide income on a joint return. Despite the partnership agreement, the Internal Revenue Service refused to recognize the plaintiff as an equal partner and reduced her interest to one third. Defendants further established' that plaintiff performed little, if any, service for either company and made no capital contribution for her alleged interest.
Both parties presented additional conflicting evidence on the issue of plaintiff’s alleged partnership interest. However, we need not decide whether the purported partnership was valid or was a mere sham for tax purposes. In either event the plaintiff cannot prevail in this action.
The interest of Mr. Catron and Mrs. Cat-ron, if any, in C-F Beverage Company was sold on January 2, 1945, to a third party for $80,000.00. Plaintiff alleges that, at that time, the net worth of Mr. Catron and herself was in excess of $50,000.00 each, and was approximately equal. The defendants assert that the value of the estate exceeded $100,000.00 and was solely owned by Mr. Catron. Subsequent to the sale of the beverage company, Mr. Catron began to explore the possibility of real estate investment in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The petition of plaintiff alleges that in 1946, plaintiff, having full confidence in the business ability of Mr. Catron, transferred most of her funds to him to invest for their mutual benefit. It is apparent, therefore, that both the plaintiff and the defendants agree that Mr. Catron possessed full control and discretion over the funds and assets of the estate from early in 1946. The great increase in value of the estate came in the years 1946, 1947, and 1948 and to a lesser extent in 1949. By fall, 1949, the value of the estate exceeded $300,000.00. This great increase in wealth coincided with the period when the law of community property prevailed in this state. The effect of this law and the subsequent repealing statute govern the disposition of this case.
The mandatory Community Property Act of this state 'was approved April 28, 1945, and became effective 90 days after April 26, 1945, the date of adjournment of the enacting Legislature. See Okl.Sess. Laws 1945, p. 118, §§ 1-18, 32 Okl.St.Ann., §§ 51-82 note. The Act was repealed on June 2, 1949. Okl.Sess.Laws 1949, p. 229, § 1. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act classify separate property as that property owned separately by either the husband or the wife prior to adoption of the Act and all property acquired thereafter either by gift, devise, or descent, or as compensation for personal injuries. Section 3 of the Act then provides :
“All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage and after the effective date of this Act, except that [270]*270■which is the separate property of either as hereinabove defined, shall be deemed the community or common property of the husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest therein; and all the effects which the husband and wife possess at the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be regarded as common effects or gains unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved.”
Previous judicial decisions have concluded that, except as specified in Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, all income and profits from whatever source, including the separate property of either spouse, became community assets with ownership vested equally in the husband and the wife. Page v. Sherman, Okl., 341 P.2d 270; Turner v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., Okl., 292 P.2d 1012; Swanda v. Swanda, 207 Okl. 186, 248 P.2d 575; Crane v. Howard, 206 Okl. 278, 243 P.2d 998. In the Swanda case, this court cited with approval the following definition of community property:
“In the absence of a statute to the contrary, community property includes all property acquired by either spouse, during marriage, by toil, talent, energy or productive faculty and the fruits and profits of the separate property of either spouse. Logan v. Logan, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 515.”
. Most of the identifiable income of the Catrons from 1946 through 1949 was from rentals and profits on the sale of real property in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The only other identifiable source of income was a small amount from partnership interests of Mr. Catron and the plaintiff of short duration in the Tulsa Reo Company and the Terrell Bottling Company, There can be no doubt, in view of the above cited decisions, that all this income was community property. There was also approximately $150,000.00 in income from unidentified sources during this period of time. While the source of this income is uncertain, it must be attributed to- Mr. Catron inasmuch' as it is undisputed that Mrs.- Catron had' very little income and received no compensation for injuries and no gifts, devises, or inheritance from any source (including her first husband) during her marriage to Mr. Catron. These unidentified earnings of Mr. Catron became assets of the community, along with the rental income, profits from the sale of realty, and any other income received by the Catrons during this period.
Accounts for both plaintiff and defendants attempted to trace income and expenditures from various bank accounts of the Catrons during the period of community property without success. The rental income, the profits from the sale of realty, the income from unidentified sources, the separate property of Mr. Catron and the alleged separate property of plaintiff were combined and commingled to such an extent that none of this property could be traced through its various changes and mutations in form. However, the plaintiff did attempt to trace her purported separate funds into seventeen nonhomestead property acquisitions by Mr. Catron. She was able to show only a small portion of the consideration for the purchase or improvement of the property involved in four of the transactions. She established no pecuniary interest in the remaining thirteen transactions. Accepting this evidence,- her .total investment was less than $7,500.00, while the amount attributable to Mr. Catron or unknown sources was more than $250,-000.00. The evidence further established that each of the four parcels purchased or improved, in part, with the plaintiff’s purported separate funds had subsequently been sold and that the proceeds could not now be identified. The numerous realty transactions, the intermingling of funds in various bank accounts, the lost or missing records, coupled with the indiscriminate use of funds without regard to source by Mr. Catron in acquiring and improving real estate, make the task of tracing and resegre-gating assets a manifest impossibility in this case. It is pertinent to observe that'there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever ob[271]*271jected to the commingling of assets in this manner by her husband, or that she attempted to hold her alleged separate property apart from the community.
Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff and Mr. Catron separately owned approximately $50,000.00 in assets in 1945, these assets became so merged and amalgamated with community property of considerably greater value, that the separate property lost its identity. See Colvin v. Colvin, 207 Okl. 12, 246 P.2d 744. Under such circumstances, all of the assets must be considered to be community property. This rule is expressed as follows in 41 C. J.S. Husband and Wife § 490:
“A separate consideration must be traced into the property acquired to overcome the presumption in favor of the community. Where separate and community property have become confused, blended, or commingled, the whole will be presumed to be community property unless the community component is comparatively small. * * * ”
And in 15 Am.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 21, it is stated:
“If separate property is so intermingled with community property that its identity is lost, the entire mass ordinarily becomes community property, unless the community interest is inconsiderable.”
See to the same effect: Tarver v. Tarver, Tex.Civ.App., 378 S.W.2d 381, aff’d, Sup., 394 S.W.2d 780; Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 301 P.2d 90; Lawson v. Ridgeway, 72 Ariz, 253, 233 P.2d 459, 29 A.L.R.2d 518; Mumm v. Mumm, 63 Wash. 2d 349, 387 P.2d 547; de Funiak, Principles of Community Property, § 61; 4A Thompson, Real Property, § 1952, p. 328 (1961 ed.). Upon the date of the repeal ■of the Community Property Act, the separate assets of Mr. Catron and the purported separate assets of the plaintiff had lost their identity among the greater assets of the community and the aggregate became •community property. At that time, title to all properties, except the homestead and a small joint bank account of less than $300.-00, was in Mr. Catron’s name as was title' to all property acquired thereafter until the date of his death.
The repealing statute, 32 O.S.1961, § 83, provided that a husband and wife could enter into a recordable agreement, specifying the rights of each acquired under the repealed Community Property Act, or that either could bring an action for determination of these rights if they were unable to reach an agreement. The statute then provided:
“ * * * The failure to make and record such an agreement, or to file such an action within one (1) year and record the judgment in due course thereafter, and in any event within three (3) years from the effective date of this Act, shall bar the husband or wife whose title or interest does not appear of record, or who is not separately in possession of the property, from any claim or interest in the property as against third (3rd) persons acquiring any interest therein. After three (3) years from the effective date of this Act, no action or proceeding of any character shall be brought to establish or recover an interest in property based upon the terms of the Act repealed, unless the interest has previously been established of record, as hereinabove provided. Laws 1949, p. 229, § 2.”
The plaintiff did -not comply with the mandatory provisions of the statute to protect and preserve her interest in the community property. In fact, she had taken no action of any sort to establish her property rights prior to this suit, filed on January 16, 1961. This suit was commenced more than eight years beyond the statutory period specified by our Legislature in the repealing statute for instituting actions to determine property rights in community property. The plaintiff is therefore barred from recovering any interest in the community property and ownership thereof vested exclusively in Mr. Catron, the owner of record. Page v. Sherman, Okl., 341 P. 2d 270 (majority and dissenting opinions); Hiskett v. Wells, Okl., 351 P.2d 300.
[272]*272The plaintiff has asserted no basis for ownership of property acquired subsequent to 1949 other than the fact that this property was acquired with assets owned jointly by herself and Mr. Catron. Having determined that she has forfeited such joint ownership, she is left without any basis to establish that she has furnished one half of the consideration for property purchased after 1949. As seen above, such consideration is essential to the existence of a trust in her favor.
The plaintiff attempts to escape application of the repealing statute by asserting that Mr. Catron orally agreed that she would be an equal partner in the Tulsa real estate venture. She then argues that one half of the profits from the partnership were her separate property, not community assets, and were therefore not subject to the terms of the repealing statute. We cannot agree. Even if there were such a partnership, the income and earnings therefrom would be deemed community assets absent an agreement to the contrary. Community Property Act, § 3, supra. The record contains no evidence that the plaintiff and Mr. Catron agreed that the community property laws should not apply to income earned from real estate investments and that each would hold one half of the earnings as separate property. On the contrary, income tax returns of the Catrons, commencing in 1946, reflected property rentals and profits on sales as belonging to the community. In any event, the evidence of a partnership between the Catrons to invest in real estate is not convincing. There was no written evidence of such an arrangement. There is testimony from friends and relatives of the plaintiff that Mr. Catron referred to the property on various occasions as '“ours” or stated that “it belongs to Louise (plaintiff) and me.” Counterbalancing such comments were statements to other persons that the property is “mine” or “I own it.” These statements are not conclusive. In evaluating the plaintiff’s proof in support of the partnership allegations, we must recognize the rule that oral testimony of alleged oral statements against interest made by deceased persons is the weakest sort of evidence. In re Fullerton’s Estate, Okl., 375 P.2d 933; Ward v. Ward, 197 Okl. 551, 172 P. 2d 978. Furthermore, the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given to conflicting or inconsistent testimony are matters primarily for determination by the trial court. Thompson v. Smith, Okl., 420 P.2d 526; C. I. T. Corp. v. Edwards, Okl., 418 P.2d 685. There is considerable evidence to refute the existence of the alleged partnership. In wills executed in 1947, 1949, 1951, and 1954, Mr. Cat-ron expressly declared that ownership of property acquired during the marriage was vested exclusively in him. These declarations in such significant documents would seem to be the most compelling type of proof that Mr. Catron had not agreed to. a general partnership arrangement to acquire real estate for the joint benefit of the plaintiff. It is also clear that Mr. Cat-ron continued to assert exclusive ownership of the property until the date of his death. In several conversations with a trust officer of the executor bank commencing approximately eight months prior to his. death, Mr. Catron stated that all of the property, other than the homestead, belonged to him and should be included in his estate. Further, the fact that, prior to instituting this suit, the plaintiff approved the general inventory and appraisement of the estate and the estate tax returns, reflecting ownership of the property solely in the deceased, must be considered admissions, against her position in this litigation and the trial court so found.
We conclude (1) that the determination of the trial court that there was-no partnership between the plaintiff and Mr. Catron to acquire realty is not against the clear weight of the evidence and (2) that the statute repealing the Community Property Act bars the plaintiff from claiming an interest in the property comprising the estate of the deceased.
[273]*273The plaintiff is also harred from recovery by virtue of the application of the general five year statute of limitations to this action to establish a trust by implication of law. 12 O.S.1961, § 95(7).
The plaintiff admitted that in 1947, Mr. Catron showed her his will, prepared in November of that year, and that she read the following clause:
“ * * * in truth and in fact, all properties standing in the name of Lora Louise Catron, my wife, and all property jointly acquired or standing in our joint names is my property, and my said wife has no interest therein, whether it has been purchased prior to or has been purchased subsequent to the enactment of the Community Law of this State; save and except the homestead which is held jointly by survivorship and which shall pass to my wife should my death occur prior to the death of my wife; it being the further intention of this Will that the total amount that my wife shall receive under this Will shall not in any manner exceed the aggregate amount of the value of all property standing in her name and the difference between such amounts and one-third of my property, and all property that may be standing in the name of my wife on the books and records, or in any other manner shall be administered by my Executor in the same manner and to the same extent, with full power of disposition by him as though no property was in the name of my wife. * * *»
There was a proviso to this will by which the plaintiff was to acknowledge, by affixing her signature, that she had read and agreed with the provisions contained in the will. The plaintiff testified that she refused to sign her name to the proviso because she disagreed with the clause stating that exclusive ownership was vested in her husband. Upon reading the foregoing clause in her husband’s will, the statute of limitations commenced to run against her.
The plaintiff correctly contends that to set the statute in motion against her there must be a clear repudiation of the trust and the repudiation must be brought to her knowledge. McGann v. McGann, 169 Okl. 515, 37 P.2d 939; Guyer v. London, 187 Okl. 326, 102 P.2d 875. However we are unable to agree that the repudiation in the instant case does not meet these two requirements. First, the repudiation of the purported trust relationship was clear and definite. It is difficult to imagine a more-positive repudiation of a trust than a written declaration by the trustee that all of the property belongs to him and that the beneficiary has no interest therein. Second, it is clear that the plaintiff was fully aware of the repudiation. Her express reason for refusing to sign the proviso to the will was that she disagreed with the clause stating that her husband owned all the property. In Wilhelm v. Pfinning, 191 Okl. 321, 129 P.2d 580, this court stated:
“The statute of limitations did not commence to run until plaintiff became aware of a violation of the trust relationship. Guyer v. London, 187 Okl. 326, 102 P.2d 875. The attempted devise of the beneficial interest in the land would ordinarily constitute a breach of the trust, and notice of such breach would start the statute. But the devise in this case was not sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied).
As seen, there can be no doubt in the instant case that the plaintiff was put on notice of the repudiation of her purported interest by her husband’s will.
Next the plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations should not run in favor of a husband against a wife for “all she (plaintiff) could have done was sue him for a divorce.” On the contrary, the common law disabilities of married women have been removed in this state and a wife is fully competent to sue her husband for injuries either to her person or to her property. 32 O.S.1961, § 15; 12 O.S.1961, § 224; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okl. 395, 87 P.2d 660; Moore v. Moore, 59 Okl. 83, 158 P. 578. As the marriage rela[274]*274tionship provides no defense to the husband, the better view is that the statute of' limitations will run to bar a wife’s claim against her husband during coverture. See In re Crawford’s Estate, 155 Kan. 388, 125 P.2d 354; Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998, Ann.Cas.1914C, 565; Dunning v. Dunning, 300 N.Y. 341, 90 N.E.2d 884; Cassas v. Cassas, 73 Wyo. 147, 276 P.2d 456, 464, 69 A.L.R.2d 187, 197. We believe this conclusion finds support in the reasoning expressed in two previous decisions of this court, Wilhelm v. Pfinning, supra, and Guyer v. London, supra. While it was determined in both cases that the action of the husband did not amount to a clear repudiation of his wife’s interest in the property, the clear implication of these decisions is that the statute of limitations would have run against the wife had the repudiation of her interest been effective.
Finally the plaintiff asserts that the statute was tolled by the subsequent conduct of Mr. Catron in requesting her signature on leases and deeds of sale which caused her to be “lulled into inaction.” The evidence failed to show that the repudiation of the plaintiff’s interest was ever withdrawn or qualified, but reflects that the conduct of Mr. Catron was consistent with his declaration that the plaintiff had no rights of ownership in the property. Sub-sijquent wills of the deceased contained similar exclusive ownership provisions; and title to all property purchased afer 1947, other than the homestead, was taken solely in Mr. Catron’s name. It was also conclusively established that it was the widely accepted custom for the wife to join with her husband in executing leases and deeds of sale regardless of whether she actually possessed any rights of ownership in the property. The purpose of this joinder of the wife was to facilitate property transactions by eliminating questions as to homestead rights and title examination problems. See 2 Patton, Titles, §§ 397, 398 (2d ed.); 1 Powell, Real'Property, para. 121; 2 Flick, Abstract & Title Practice, § 1072 (2d ed.). In these circumstances, the fact that plaintiff joined in leases and conveyances, as she had done prior to 1947, should not have caused her to believe that her husband recognized her as an owner of the property. Cf., Leidig v. Hoopes, Okl., 288 P.2d 402.
As no action to establish a trust was commenced within five years of the date that the plaintiff was clearly informed by Mr. Catron that she had no rights of ownership, her recovery is barred by 12 O.S.1961, § 95(7).
An additional contention of the plaintiff is that the trial court erroneously excluded her testimony concerning transactions with the deceased under the terms of the dead man’s statute, 12 O.S.1961, § 384. According to the plaintiff, the defendant waived the restrictions of the statute by failing to object to portions of her testimony about certain transactions with the deceased and by eliciting certain testimony from her on cross examination. Avis v. Hopping, 184 Okl. 527, 88 P.2d 622; In re Dearborn’s Estate, 151 Okl. 58, 2 P.2d 93. In reply, the defendants assert that they had a continuing objection to the plaintiff’s testimony and that the specified testimony of the plaintiff upon cross examination was not responsive and was stricken from the record. The record supports the position of the defendants. Further, we have examined the offer of proof in the instances where the statute was allegedly waived and conclude that the excluded evidence would not have materially affected the result in this case. Therefore, the action of the trial court in excluding this testimony would not be reversible error even if it is assumed that the testimony should have been admitted. Byrd v. McKoy, 183 Okl. 209, 81 P.2d 315; Bedwell v. Williams, Okl., 330 P.2d 359.
The plaintiff also argues that the fact that she signed certain notes and mortgages gives her an ownership interest in the property. Again we cannot agree. Expert testimony was introduced to show that it was the universal practice of lending institutions in that area to require the sig[275]*275nature of the wife upon these instruments as upon leases and deeds of sale. One of these experts, a vice-president of the executor bank, testified that he had had a number of business dealings with Mr. Catron including the negotiation of loans on real estate. He stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the plaintiff had not been present during the negotiations for these loans, that he had not considered her to be an owner of the property, and that he had required her signature, in accordance with the practice of the banking industry, because she was Mr. Catron’s wife. It is clear that the real estate loans in question were made without active participation by the plaintiff and without reliance on her credit, and that she has never been required to pay anything on any of the loans. All of the notes have been paid in full by Mr. Catron or by his estate. Such evidence provides no basis for decreeing a trust on the property in favor of the plaintiff. Phelps v. Davies, 126 Cal.App. 419, 14 P.2d 922; Serota v. Serota, 20 Misc.2d 455, 189 N.Y.S.2d 260; Cassas v. Cassas, 73 Wyo. 147, 276 P.2d 456, 69 A.L.R.2d 187. As to the point under consideration the cited case of Phelps v. Davies is factually similar to the instant controversy, except that the position of the husband and the wife is reversed. The language employed by that court’ well summarizes our conclusion in this case:
“In the case before us, not only did the husband pay no part of the consideration for the land, but he had nothing with which to have paid it, and no facts appear that would justify the inference or conclusion that his wife gave him or intended to give him any interest in the land, or that his credit was relied upon in any way in making the purchase. The entire capital which enabled the purchase to be made was furnished by the wife from her separate funds, and the facts * * * that he lived with her upon the property, and that he-signed the mortgage covering a part of-the purchase price, are not controlling. *■*'*.”
During her marriage to Mr. Catron, the plaintiff was not gainfully employed, and did not accumulate separate earnings or acquire property in her own name as she had a right to do under our married women’s statutes. 32 O.S.1961, §§ 4, 5, 9(3), 15. But in addition to the legislation removing the common law disabilities of married women, the statutes of this state make good provision for a wife who chooses to fulfill the more traditional role of the homemaker. The husband has the primary duty to provide for her support throughout the continuation of the marriage. 32 O.S.1961, §§ 3, 10. If there are marital troubles, and they live apart, the statutes make provision for her separate maintenance. 12 O.S. 1961, § 1284; and see, 32 O.S.1961, § 11. In case there is a divorce, the court has the power to divide and distribute the property as may be just and equitable. 12 O.S. 1961, § 1278. If the husband should predecease her, she is entitled to a definite portion of his estate and to the homestead whether he makes a will or dies intestate. 84 O.S.1961, § 44; 58 O.S.1961, § 311. Mrs. Catron, the plaintiff, has received her entitlements as a spouse. While having no assets in 1937, she was well-supported throughout her marriage and received one third of a sizable estate (in trust) by the terms of her husband’s will. In addition she has received the homestead and furnishings valued at more than $25,000.00 and an expensive automobile.
It is not asserted that the plaintiff did not capably perform her household duties and her responsibilities as a wife during her marriage to Mr. Catron. But this does not ordinarily entitle her to joint ownership of the property acquired during coverture. The rule is aptly expressed in the following quotation from In re Marsh’s Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459:
“The common law rule that a wife owes a duty to her husband to attend to her household duties and to work for the advancement of her husband’s interests was not changed by the Married Women’s Act. * ⅜ ' * Those services which ‘a [276]*276wife owes her husband do not create for her a joint interest in his estate. * *”
See, in addition, Johnson v. Johnson, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 610; Cox v. Cox, Miss., 183 So.2d 921; Ciufo v. Ciufo, 186 Misc. 1000, 60 N.Y.S.2d 848; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Purcell, 286 Pa. 114, 133 A. 31; Wilcoxon v. Carrier, 132 W.Va. 637, 53 S.E.2d 620. This rule is in harmony with previous decisions of this court holding that services rendered by a wife to her husband are presumed to be gratuitous and without expectation of consideration, absent an express agreement to the contrary. Andrews v. English, 200 Okl. 667, 199 P.2d 202; Payne v. Gilmore, Okl., 382 P.2d 140.
We recognize that in divorce proceedings and certain cases of intestate succession a wife, by virtue of statutory enactment, becomes entitled to certain rights in property acquired by joint industry during coverture. 12 O.S.1961, § 1278; 84 O.S.1961, § 213(2). In circumstances in which the cited statutes are applicable, the performance of a wife’s customary duties during coverture is sufficient to entitle her to the benefits provided by these statutes. In re Stone’s Estate, 86 Okl. 33, 206 P. 246; Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Okl. 12, 213 P. 884. However, these statutes are not applicable in this case as this dispute involves neither divorce nor intestate succession. See Jones v. Farris, 180 Okl. 341, 69 P.2d 344. The question presented here is whether, in the absence of legislation, a wife is entitled to joint ownership of property acquired during coverture by virtue of performing those duties that she owes to her husband as a result of the marital relationship. We hold that she is not. To hold otherwise would be to return this state to the law of community property by judicial fiat. This we decline to do. There is no rightful power in this court to incorporate into the laws of this state features of a property system heretofore abolished by our Legislature and involving far-reaching considerations of public policy.
By virtue of our disposition of this case, we need not consider the allegations of the petition that the $80,000.00 lost in oil ventures and the gifts to the defendant sons should be charged to Mr. Catron’s interest in the property. The plaintiff concedes that if the property belonged totally to the deceased, her rights have not been infringed by the oil ventures or by the gifts to the sons.
We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of a trust by operation of law as alleged, but that the evidence presented and the law of this state fully sustain the judgment of the trial court. Judgment affirmed.
JACKSON, C. J., IRWIN, V. C. J., and DAVISON, LAVENDER and McIN-ERNEY, JJ., concur.
BLACKBIRD, WILLIAMS and BERRY, JJ., dissent.