Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 542 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry DIVISION III Date: 2022.08.08 10:28:41 No. CV-19-407 -05'00' Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: November 13, 2019
CATHERINE HARDIMAN APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 14JV-15-81] V. HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JR., JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Counsel for appellant Catherine Hardiman brings this no-merit appeal from the
Columbia County Circuit Court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights to her sons,
D.H.1 (DOB: 02/27/05) and D.H.2 (DOB: 05/11/06). Pursuant to Linker-Flores v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services 1 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–9(i), appellant’s
counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief contending that there are no
meritorious issues that would support an appeal. The clerk of this court mailed a certified
copy of counsel’s brief and motion to be relieved to appellant, informing her of her right to
file pro se points for reversal, which she has elected to do. We affirm the termination order
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
1 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004). This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. 2 Grounds for
termination of parental rights must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is
that degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction of the allegation
sought to be established. 3 The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that
the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. 4 A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. 5 In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due regard to the
opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. 6
To terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)
the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted and (2)
the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. 7 The circuit court must also find
by clear and convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination exists.8
2 Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). 3 Tillman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii) (Supp. 2017). 8 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B).
2 Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. 9 Termination
of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of a parent’s natural rights;
however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health
and well-being of the child. 10 The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute
is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the
family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to
the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the
child’s perspective. 11
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–9(i) allows counsel for an appellant in a
termination-of-parental-rights case to file a no-merit petition and motion to withdraw if,
after studying the record and researching the law, counsel determines that the appellant has
no meritorious basis for appeal. The petition must include an argument section that lists all
adverse rulings to the appellant made by the circuit court on all objections, motions, and
requests made by the party at the hearing from which the appeal arose and explain why each
adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. 12
On October 26, 2015, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) was
contacted after a call had been made to the child-abuse hotline. Following an investigation,
DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on D.H.1 and D.H.2, removing them from the
9 Tillman, supra. 10 Id. 11 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). 12 Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6–9(i)(1)(A).
3 legal custody of their mother, appellant, and the physical custody of their paternal
grandmother, Debbie Daniels. On December 4, D.H.1 and D.H.2 were adjudicated
dependent-neglected due to physical abuse by an aunt and failure to protect by the
grandmother. The goal of the case was set as reunification. 13
Following the October 7, 2016 permanency-planning hearing, the goal of the case
was changed to authorize a plan to obtain a permanent custodian, including custody with a
fit and willing relative. The circuit court ordered DHS to work with Daniels toward
achieving the goal of permanent custody after finding appellant was not in compliance with
the case plan or orders of the court. At a second permanency-planning hearing held on
November 3, 2017, the circuit court found appellant unfit and unable to protect D.H.1 and
D.H.2’s health and safety if returned to her. The court further found that despite reasonable
efforts by DHS, appellant had not been “involved in the case plan.” Consequently, the goal
of the case was changed from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.
DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on December 12, 2018,
alleging five grounds for termination. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted DHS’s
petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights based on two of the grounds alleged in the
13 On April 13, 2016, DHS removed three siblings (K.H., J.A., and T.H.) from the custody of appellant; they were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse of K.H. by appellant’s boyfriend, Anthony Pugh. (At the December 4, 2015 adjudication hearing, Anthony Pugh was found to be the legal father of D.H.1, D.H.2, and T.H.) An agreed temporary order was entered on September 16, 2016, placing K.H. and J.A. in the temporary custody of a relative. T.H. was placed in the temporary custody of a different relative on April 12, 2017. On July 7, 2017, a review, permanent-custody, and partial- closure order was entered placing K.H., J.A., and T.H. in the permanent custody of their respective temporary custodians and closing the case as to them.
4 petition: (1) aggravated circumstances 14 and (2) abandonment. 15 A termination order was
entered on February 13, 2019.
Evidence presented at the January 18, 2019 termination hearing supports the
abandonment ground for termination. Appellant testified that she had not attended any
court hearings nor had she seen D.H.1 and D.H.2 since July 2017. 16 Although she claimed
she had no transportation, she admitted she was able to get rides to other places she wanted
to go; however, she claimed that DHS was on the other side of town, which was just too
far. Additionally, appellant claimed that she thought the case was closed despite the fact that
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Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 542 Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry DIVISION III Date: 2022.08.08 10:28:41 No. CV-19-407 -05'00' Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: November 13, 2019
CATHERINE HARDIMAN APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 14JV-15-81] V. HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JR., JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Counsel for appellant Catherine Hardiman brings this no-merit appeal from the
Columbia County Circuit Court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights to her sons,
D.H.1 (DOB: 02/27/05) and D.H.2 (DOB: 05/11/06). Pursuant to Linker-Flores v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services 1 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–9(i), appellant’s
counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief contending that there are no
meritorious issues that would support an appeal. The clerk of this court mailed a certified
copy of counsel’s brief and motion to be relieved to appellant, informing her of her right to
file pro se points for reversal, which she has elected to do. We affirm the termination order
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
1 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004). This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. 2 Grounds for
termination of parental rights must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is
that degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction of the allegation
sought to be established. 3 The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that
the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. 4 A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. 5 In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due regard to the
opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. 6
To terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)
the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted and (2)
the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. 7 The circuit court must also find
by clear and convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination exists.8
2 Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). 3 Tillman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii) (Supp. 2017). 8 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B).
2 Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. 9 Termination
of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of a parent’s natural rights;
however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health
and well-being of the child. 10 The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute
is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the
family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to
the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the
child’s perspective. 11
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–9(i) allows counsel for an appellant in a
termination-of-parental-rights case to file a no-merit petition and motion to withdraw if,
after studying the record and researching the law, counsel determines that the appellant has
no meritorious basis for appeal. The petition must include an argument section that lists all
adverse rulings to the appellant made by the circuit court on all objections, motions, and
requests made by the party at the hearing from which the appeal arose and explain why each
adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal. 12
On October 26, 2015, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) was
contacted after a call had been made to the child-abuse hotline. Following an investigation,
DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on D.H.1 and D.H.2, removing them from the
9 Tillman, supra. 10 Id. 11 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). 12 Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6–9(i)(1)(A).
3 legal custody of their mother, appellant, and the physical custody of their paternal
grandmother, Debbie Daniels. On December 4, D.H.1 and D.H.2 were adjudicated
dependent-neglected due to physical abuse by an aunt and failure to protect by the
grandmother. The goal of the case was set as reunification. 13
Following the October 7, 2016 permanency-planning hearing, the goal of the case
was changed to authorize a plan to obtain a permanent custodian, including custody with a
fit and willing relative. The circuit court ordered DHS to work with Daniels toward
achieving the goal of permanent custody after finding appellant was not in compliance with
the case plan or orders of the court. At a second permanency-planning hearing held on
November 3, 2017, the circuit court found appellant unfit and unable to protect D.H.1 and
D.H.2’s health and safety if returned to her. The court further found that despite reasonable
efforts by DHS, appellant had not been “involved in the case plan.” Consequently, the goal
of the case was changed from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.
DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on December 12, 2018,
alleging five grounds for termination. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted DHS’s
petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights based on two of the grounds alleged in the
13 On April 13, 2016, DHS removed three siblings (K.H., J.A., and T.H.) from the custody of appellant; they were adjudicated dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse of K.H. by appellant’s boyfriend, Anthony Pugh. (At the December 4, 2015 adjudication hearing, Anthony Pugh was found to be the legal father of D.H.1, D.H.2, and T.H.) An agreed temporary order was entered on September 16, 2016, placing K.H. and J.A. in the temporary custody of a relative. T.H. was placed in the temporary custody of a different relative on April 12, 2017. On July 7, 2017, a review, permanent-custody, and partial- closure order was entered placing K.H., J.A., and T.H. in the permanent custody of their respective temporary custodians and closing the case as to them.
4 petition: (1) aggravated circumstances 14 and (2) abandonment. 15 A termination order was
entered on February 13, 2019.
Evidence presented at the January 18, 2019 termination hearing supports the
abandonment ground for termination. Appellant testified that she had not attended any
court hearings nor had she seen D.H.1 and D.H.2 since July 2017. 16 Although she claimed
she had no transportation, she admitted she was able to get rides to other places she wanted
to go; however, she claimed that DHS was on the other side of town, which was just too
far. Additionally, appellant claimed that she thought the case was closed despite the fact that
she was present at the July 2017 hearing at which a future court date was set. Appellant
went more than a year without seeing her children and she contacted DHS on January 16,
2019, only two days prior to the termination hearing. Abandonment is defined as the failure
of a parent to support or maintain regular contact with a child without just cause. 17
Additionally, the termination statute does not require that the abandonment last for any
particular length of time. 18
Evidence presented at the termination hearing also supports the circuit court’s best-
interest finding. Adoption specialist Crystal Williams testified that D.H.1 and D.H.2 are
14 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3). 15 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(iv). 16 Although appellant testified that she had not seen her children since July 2017, the termination petition alleged that she had not visited them since November 2017. 17 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(2)(A)(ii). 18 Norris v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 571, 567 S.W.3d 861.
5 adoptable. She stated that the boys do not have any medical or physical barriers to adoption
and that they are a match for one-hundred-nine possible adoptive families. The testimony
of an adoption specialist is sufficient to support a circuit court’s adoptability findings. 19 As
for potential harm, appellant was noncompliant with the case plan and court orders. A
parent’s failure to comply with court orders is sufficient evidence of potential harm to a
child. 20
In her pro se points for reversal, appellant asserts that she loves her sons and asks for
another chance to be part of their lives. She submits that her other children want to see
their brothers because they are a family. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the circuit
court’s termination decision was supported by sufficient evidence, therefore her pro se
points provide no grounds for reversal.
Having carefully examined the record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that counsel
has complied with the requirements established by the Arkansas Supreme Court for no-
merit appeals in termination cases and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly,
we affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights to D.H.1 and D.H.2 and grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
GLADWIN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Katalina Wyninger, for appellant.
19 Whitaker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 61, 540 S.W.3d 719. 20 Bell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 446, 503 S.W.3d 112.
6 Andrew Firth, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor
children.