Catanzano ex rel. Catanzano v. Dowling ex rel. New York State Department of Social Services

900 F. Supp. 650, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15569
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 20, 1995
DocketNo. 89-CV-1127L
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 900 F. Supp. 650 (Catanzano ex rel. Catanzano v. Dowling ex rel. New York State Department of Social Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Catanzano ex rel. Catanzano v. Dowling ex rel. New York State Department of Social Services, 900 F. Supp. 650, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15569 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).

Opinion

LARIMER, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 1995, this Court issued a Decision and Order directing the parties to work together to prepare a final plan to implement the Court’s preliminary injunction, which was entered on March 31, 1994. The parties were further directed to submit to the Court their plan or, if they could not agree on one, their areas of dispute.

Defendant Dowling (“the State”) submitted the State’s proposed plan and supporting materials on August 25,1995. On August 31, plaintiffs submitted their plan, which differs from the State’s in several respects.

The parties were able to agree on many areas, and to a great extent both their plans are the same. Plaintiffs’ plan, in fact, is simply a copy of the State’s with certain portions changed to reflect the differences of opinion between the parties about certain issues.

The disputed matters fall into two categories: one concerning the right of Certified Home Health Agencies (“CHHAs”) to refuse to accept patients, and the other concerning the necessity of obtaining written physician’s orders before a CHHA may reduce or terminate a recipient’s care. Since the parties have been unable to resolve these remaining areas of dispute, the Court must determine what provisions should be adopted to effectuate the preliminary injunction. The following Decision and Order contains my findings on these issues; the exact language to be incorporated into the final plan is set forth in the plan attached as Appendix A to this Decision and Order. The Court has utilized the plaintiffs proposed plan and has modified it as necessary to reflect those matters resolved in this decision.1

CHHAs’ REFUSAL TO TAKE PATIENTS

The State’s plan would allow a CHHA to refuse to accept a patient even after a professional director or fair-hearing decision has determined that the recipient should receive home health services. The State’s plan would also allow CHHAs not to provide aid-continuing to recipients who have requested a fair hearing to dispute a proposed reduction or elimination of services. Plaintiffs would require CHHAs to provide services in both those instances.

In my June 22, 1995 decision, I deferred deciding this issue, noting that it had not been fully addressed as part of the preliminary-injunction motion, and that the issue concerning the extent to which CHHAs are state actors was then before the Second Circuit on appeal from my prior decision. I therefore stated that my ruling on this matter would await “further guidance from the Court of Appeals ...” Decision and Order, June 22, 1995, at 9.

The Court of Appeals’ decision on July 13, 1995 has provided that guidance. The court expressly “rejeet[ed] the State’s argument that the CHHA’s determinations should not be deemed state action.” 60 F.3d 113, 119. The court noted that CHHAs “are deeply integrated into the regulatory scheme” of New York’s Medicaid system. Id. The Court of Appeals’ holding that “CHHA action is state action,” 60 F.3d at 118, compels the conclusion that CHHAs may [652]*652not refuse unilaterally to accept patients as provided in the State’s plan.

I am not persuaded by the State’s contention that the Court of Appeals’ decision has no effect on the issue of whether a CHHA may refuse to accept or provide aid-continuing to a qualifying patient. While it is true that the Court of Appeals did not directly address this question, the implications of its reasoning are clear, and support plaintiffs’ position.2

In its decision, the Second Circuit emphasized that CHHAs are in effect arms of the State whenever they are carrying out the State’s statutorily mandated obligations. The court stated that it found “persuasive” the statement in my July 28, 1994 decision that it would be “patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would permit a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its obligations to a private entity.” 60 F.3d at 118 (quoting July 28, 1994 decision at 18). Thus, the court held, “CHHAs are not ‘independent actors doing business with the state,’ but are entities that have assumed the ‘responsibility for [the State’s] mandated health care duties.’ ” Id. at 120 (quoting J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F.Supp. 694, 697-98 (D.Ariz.1993)).

By the same token, then, the State cannot relieve itself of the obligation to provide home health care to eligible applicants merely because a CHHA does not wish to provide care. The State’s position that the “Court of Appeals holding simply means that the State is responsible for certain CHHA decisions to deny, reduce, or discontinue home care,” State’s Report at 3, would be made meaningless if CHHAs could refuse to provide care even when the State itself is obligated to provide care. The State’s “responsibility” would provide cold comfort to the applicant if that responsibility could be evaded simply by delegating these decisions to CHHAs. As the Court of Appeals held, that delegation of duty transforms CHHAs into state actors, and therefore the State’s position on this issue is untenable.

WRITTEN DECISIONS

In my June 22, 1995 decision, I held that when the treating physician approves a reduction or elimination of services for a patient, the CHHA cannot reduce or eliminate those services without first obtaining a written order from the physician. The State now asks the court to reconsider this ruling. The State contends that requiring written orders is contrary to prevailing practices within the health care industry and that it would impose severe financial and administrative burdens on CHHAs and others in the system.

After reviewing the materials submitted by the State, I remain convinced that written orders should be required for reductions or discontinuances of services, essentially for the same reasons stated in my June 22,1995 decision. The Medicaid statutes and regulations clearly show the importance of written orders in this area.

I am not convinced that a written-order requirement would be as onerous as the State maintains. This is not a matter of physicians composing extensive, intricately detailed directives every time they believe that services should be reduced. There appears to be no reason why the order could not be reduced to a relatively simple form with a few appropriate blanks or boxes so that the physician could easily and quickly indicate the action prescribed. When measured against the importance of what is at stake for the recipient, that hardly seems to be a crushing burden.

At the same time, however, I recognize that medical exigencies and administrative difficulties may make it impracticable to expect a prior written order for every reduction in services. Certainly medical personnel dealing with the day-to-day care of patients with potentially changing needs, ought to have a certain degree of flexibility in giving [653]*653and carrying out orders regarding patients’ care.

I do not find it unreasonable, therefore, to allow CHHAs to act upon oral orders when the physician orally directs the CHHA to comply immediately with the order, provided that written confirmation of that order is promptly forthcoming. Such a procedure would balance recipients’ interests in avoiding erroneous reductions or eliminations of care with the CHHAs’ interests in efficiency and flexibility in carrying out physicians’ orders.

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Related

CATANZANO BY CATANZANO v. Dowling
900 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. New York, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
900 F. Supp. 650, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/catanzano-ex-rel-catanzano-v-dowling-ex-rel-new-york-state-department-of-nywd-1995.