CATANZANO BY CATANZANO v. Dowling

900 F. Supp. 650, 1995 WL 616615
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 20, 1995
Docket89-CV-1127L
StatusPublished

This text of 900 F. Supp. 650 (CATANZANO BY CATANZANO v. Dowling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CATANZANO BY CATANZANO v. Dowling, 900 F. Supp. 650, 1995 WL 616615 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).

Opinion

900 F.Supp. 650 (1995)

Michelle CATANZANO, by her parent and next friend, Sam CATANZANO, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Michael DOWLING, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services and Richard Schauseil, as Acting Director of the Monroe County Department of Social Services, Andrew Doniger, M.D., as Director of the Monroe County Department of Health, Defendants.
Richard SCHAUSEIL, as Acting Director of the Monroe County Department of Social Services, and Andrew Doniger, M.D., as Director of the Monroe County Department of Health, Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Michael DOWLING, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, and Mark Chassin, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, Third-Party Defendants.

No. 89-CV-1127L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

September 20, 1995.

Elizabeth L. Schneider, Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Rochester, NY, for plaintiffs Michele Catanzano, Francine Catanzano, Sam Catanzano, Sarah Trafton, and intervenors-plaintiffs Jannie Wilson, Mary Jane Smith and Charles Smith.

John P. Costello, Rochester, NY, for defendants W. Burton Richardson, Joel Nitzken, Mary Jo Bane, as Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services, Richard F. Schauseil, Andrew Doniger, as Director of the Monroe County Department of Health, Richard F. Schauseil as Acting Director of Monroe County Department of Social Services, Andrew Doniger.

*651 James L. Gelormini, Office of New York State, Attorney General, Rochester, NY, for defendant Gregory D. Kaladjian, Acting Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services and third-party defendants Cesar A. Perales, David Axelrod, Mark Chassin, M.D., as Com'r of New York State Dept. of Health, Gregory M. Kaladjian, as Acting Com'r of New York State Dept. of Social Services.

John P. Costello, Rochester, NY, James L. Gelormini, Office of New York State, Attorney General, Rochester, NY, for third-party defendant Mary Jo Bane, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services.

Mark T. Walsh, Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany, NY, for amicus curiae Home Care Association.

LARIMER, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 1995, this Court issued a Decision and Order directing the parties to work together to prepare a final plan to implement the Court's preliminary injunction, which was entered on March 31, 1994. The parties were further directed to submit to the Court their plan or, if they could not agree on one, their areas of dispute.

Defendant Dowling ("the State") submitted the State's proposed plan and supporting materials on August 25, 1995. On August 31, plaintiffs submitted their plan, which differs from the State's in several respects.

The parties were able to agree on many areas, and to a great extent both their plans are the same. Plaintiffs' plan, in fact, is simply a copy of the State's with certain portions changed to reflect the differences of opinion between the parties about certain issues.

The disputed matters fall into two categories: one concerning the right of Certified Home Health Agencies ("CHHAs") to refuse to accept patients, and the other concerning the necessity of obtaining written physician's orders before a CHHA may reduce or terminate a recipient's care. Since the parties have been unable to resolve these remaining areas of dispute, the Court must determine what provisions should be adopted to effectuate the preliminary injunction. The following Decision and Order contains my findings on these issues; the exact language to be incorporated into the final plan is set forth in the plan attached as Appendix A to this Decision and Order. The Court has utilized the plaintiff's proposed plan and has modified it as necessary to reflect those matters resolved in this decision.[1]

CHHAs' REFUSAL TO TAKE PATIENTS

The State's plan would allow a CHHA to refuse to accept a patient even after a professional director or fair-hearing decision has determined that the recipient should receive home health services. The State's plan would also allow CHHAs not to provide aid-continuing to recipients who have requested a fair hearing to dispute a proposed reduction or elimination of services. Plaintiffs would require CHHAs to provide services in both those instances.

In my June 22, 1995 decision, I deferred deciding this issue, noting that it had not been fully addressed as part of the preliminary-injunction motion, and that the issue concerning the extent to which CHHAs are state actors was then before the Second Circuit on appeal from my prior decision. I therefore stated that my ruling on this matter would await "further guidance from the Court of Appeals ..." Decision and Order, June 22, 1995, at 9.

The Court of Appeals' decision on July 13, 1995 has provided that guidance. The court expressly "reject[ed] the State's argument that the CHHA's determinations should not be deemed state action." 60 F.3d 113, 119. The court noted that CHHAs "are deeply integrated into the regulatory scheme" of New York's Medicaid system. Id. The Court of Appeals' holding that "CHHA action is state action," 60 F.3d at 118, compels the conclusion that CHHAs may *652 not refuse unilaterally to accept patients as provided in the State's plan.

I am not persuaded by the State's contention that the Court of Appeals' decision has no effect on the issue of whether a CHHA may refuse to accept or provide aid-continuing to a qualifying patient. While it is true that the Court of Appeals did not directly address this question, the implications of its reasoning are clear, and support plaintiffs' position.[2]

In its decision, the Second Circuit emphasized that CHHAs are in effect arms of the State whenever they are carrying out the State's statutorily mandated obligations. The court stated that it found "persuasive" the statement in my July 28, 1994 decision that it would be "patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would permit a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its obligations to a private entity." 60 F.3d at 118 (quoting July 28, 1994 decision at 18). Thus, the court held, "CHHAs are not `independent actors doing business with the state,' but are entities that have assumed the `responsibility for [the State's] mandated health care duties.'" Id. at 120 (quoting J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F.Supp. 694, 697-98 (D.Ariz.1993)).

By the same token, then, the State cannot relieve itself of the obligation to provide home health care to eligible applicants merely because a CHHA does not wish to provide care. The State's position that the "Court of Appeals holding simply means that the State is responsible for certain CHHA decisions to deny, reduce, or discontinue home care," State's Report at 3, would be made meaningless if CHHAs could refuse to provide care even when the State itself is obligated to provide care. The State's "responsibility" would provide cold comfort to the applicant if that responsibility could be evaded simply by delegating these decisions to CHHAs. As the Court of Appeals held, that delegation of duty transforms CHHAs into state actors, and therefore the State's position on this issue is untenable.

WRITTEN DECISIONS

In my June 22, 1995 decision, I held that when the treating physician approves a reduction or elimination of services for a patient, the CHHA cannot reduce or eliminate those services without first obtaining a written order from the physician. The State now asks the court to reconsider this ruling.

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