SWYGERT, Chief Judge.
This is a review of an order of deportation.
Pursuant to a petition filed under provisions of section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § [192]*1921105a(a), we review an order of deportation issued against the petitioner by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Petitioner Catalina Montano De Figueroa, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in March 1970 at Chicago as a visitor for pleasure and was authorized to remain in the United States until September 21, 1970. Having remained in the United States beyond that date, she was served with an order to show cause in a deportation proceeding and given notice of a hearing scheduled for February 25, 1972. The hearing did not occur. After posting bond petitioner was given a voluntary departure letter requiring her to depart the United States on March 22, 1972.
On March 10, 1972 petitioner married Jose Ramon Figueroa, a United States citizen. Thereafter, on March 29 Jose Figueroa as petitioner’s spouse filed a petition with the Immigration Service to accord her the status of a nonquota immigrant under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154, and thereby qualify her for an immigrant visa under the provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(A). The Attorney General through the Immigration Service approved the petition and sent it to the American Consulate in Toronto, Canada, the port of entry where petitioner indicated she intended to apply for an immigrant visa.
On May 11, 1972 two Immigration Service investigators arrested Jose Figueroa in Chicago and obtained his signed statement in which he made the following representations. After telling him she had no immigration papers, petitioner offered him $500 if he would marry her “so she could obtain a visa.” He accepted the offer and received $500. He was paid an additional $500, but, after petitioner explained that “the Immigration was looking for her,” he returned the second sum because it was to be used “in case of a bond.” Thereafter, on March 10, 1972 they wére married, but never lived together “as man and wife.”
On June 8, 1972 the surety on the bond was notified to surrender petitioner at the Immigration office in Chicago on August 1. On that date a hearing was conducted by a special inquiry officer. Shortly thereafter the special inquiry officer rendered his decision. He found from “believable testimony” that petitioner’s marriage had been entered into “merely for the purpose of circumventing the immigration laws” and that she had given false testimony at the hearing about her marital relationship with Jose Figueroa. The officer decided that petitioner, having failed to establish a good moral character as required by statute, did not qualify for the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The petitioner was ordered deported from the United States to Mexico. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals affirmed and this petition to' review followed.
I
The show cause order issued in February 1972 charged the petitioner as de-portable pursuant to section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), in that after admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a) (15) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15), she remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted. At the deportation hearing, counsel for petitioner admitted “for the sake of the record” her deportability on the “charges specified,” and then asked that she be given the privilege of voluntary departure at her own expense in lieu of deportation. Although this was the apparent issue, the real issue, as stated by the special inquiry officer, was whether petitioner was subject to deportation under the laws of the United States.
Petitioner contends it was error to decide she was deportable since a petition to accord her the status of a non-quota immigrant under section 205 had been approved by the Attorney General. Although this circuit has not previously spoken on the question, we are persuaded to hold that an approval of a petition [193]*193under this statutory provision does not alone give the beneficiary of the petition an immediate right to an immigrant visa. See Amarante v. Rosenberg, 326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964) and Scalzo v. Hurney, 225 F.Supp. 560 (E.D.Pa.1963). The beneficiary is required if out of the country to request an immigrant visa from a United States consular officer at the port of entry. The approved petition is merely prima facie evidence of qualification for issuance of the visa. The visa may be issued only if the consular officer concludes that the alien is fully qualified under the immigration laws for the visa. The immigration officer who inspects the alien upon his arrival must be satisfied that the alien is admissible for permanent residence. If the alien is already living in the United States, he may under certain circumstances, apply under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, for adjustment of his status to that of a permanent resident and avoid the necessity of leaving the country to apply for a visa. Such adjustment, however, also requires an inspection process before the application may be approved. Since no immigrant visa had been issued to petitioner at the time of her hearing, it is clear that the mere petition for a visa in her behalf did not affect her deportability.
II
Petitioner attempts to avoid the foregoing conclusion by contending that even though no immigrant visa had been issued, her husband’s petition under section 205 mooted the charge contained in the order to show cause. An additional fact must be noted in order to consider this contention. On August 1, 1972, while being held by the Immigration Service agents, Jose Figueroa signed a withdrawal of the petition he had filed on March 29, 1972. Accordingly, at the time of the deportation hearing the order to show cause had not been superseded, as petitioner argues, by an approved petition to accord her the status of a nonquota immigrant.
Petitioner argues, however, that the withdrawal of the petition was accomplished by the agents after subjecting her husband to duress by virtue of his arrest and that in any event, the provisions of the immigration regulations were not followed with respect to the withdrawal of the petition.1
[194]*194The circumstances underlying the withdrawal of the petition are not properly before us for consideration. Those circumstances raised a collateral issue which is not subject to our review of the order of deportation. We say collateral because the matter relating to the approval and withdrawal of visa petitions is not within the scope of a deportation proceeding under section 242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and therefore not reviewable by a court of appeals under section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
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SWYGERT, Chief Judge.
This is a review of an order of deportation.
Pursuant to a petition filed under provisions of section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § [192]*1921105a(a), we review an order of deportation issued against the petitioner by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Petitioner Catalina Montano De Figueroa, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in March 1970 at Chicago as a visitor for pleasure and was authorized to remain in the United States until September 21, 1970. Having remained in the United States beyond that date, she was served with an order to show cause in a deportation proceeding and given notice of a hearing scheduled for February 25, 1972. The hearing did not occur. After posting bond petitioner was given a voluntary departure letter requiring her to depart the United States on March 22, 1972.
On March 10, 1972 petitioner married Jose Ramon Figueroa, a United States citizen. Thereafter, on March 29 Jose Figueroa as petitioner’s spouse filed a petition with the Immigration Service to accord her the status of a nonquota immigrant under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154, and thereby qualify her for an immigrant visa under the provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(A). The Attorney General through the Immigration Service approved the petition and sent it to the American Consulate in Toronto, Canada, the port of entry where petitioner indicated she intended to apply for an immigrant visa.
On May 11, 1972 two Immigration Service investigators arrested Jose Figueroa in Chicago and obtained his signed statement in which he made the following representations. After telling him she had no immigration papers, petitioner offered him $500 if he would marry her “so she could obtain a visa.” He accepted the offer and received $500. He was paid an additional $500, but, after petitioner explained that “the Immigration was looking for her,” he returned the second sum because it was to be used “in case of a bond.” Thereafter, on March 10, 1972 they wére married, but never lived together “as man and wife.”
On June 8, 1972 the surety on the bond was notified to surrender petitioner at the Immigration office in Chicago on August 1. On that date a hearing was conducted by a special inquiry officer. Shortly thereafter the special inquiry officer rendered his decision. He found from “believable testimony” that petitioner’s marriage had been entered into “merely for the purpose of circumventing the immigration laws” and that she had given false testimony at the hearing about her marital relationship with Jose Figueroa. The officer decided that petitioner, having failed to establish a good moral character as required by statute, did not qualify for the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The petitioner was ordered deported from the United States to Mexico. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals affirmed and this petition to' review followed.
I
The show cause order issued in February 1972 charged the petitioner as de-portable pursuant to section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), in that after admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a) (15) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15), she remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted. At the deportation hearing, counsel for petitioner admitted “for the sake of the record” her deportability on the “charges specified,” and then asked that she be given the privilege of voluntary departure at her own expense in lieu of deportation. Although this was the apparent issue, the real issue, as stated by the special inquiry officer, was whether petitioner was subject to deportation under the laws of the United States.
Petitioner contends it was error to decide she was deportable since a petition to accord her the status of a non-quota immigrant under section 205 had been approved by the Attorney General. Although this circuit has not previously spoken on the question, we are persuaded to hold that an approval of a petition [193]*193under this statutory provision does not alone give the beneficiary of the petition an immediate right to an immigrant visa. See Amarante v. Rosenberg, 326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964) and Scalzo v. Hurney, 225 F.Supp. 560 (E.D.Pa.1963). The beneficiary is required if out of the country to request an immigrant visa from a United States consular officer at the port of entry. The approved petition is merely prima facie evidence of qualification for issuance of the visa. The visa may be issued only if the consular officer concludes that the alien is fully qualified under the immigration laws for the visa. The immigration officer who inspects the alien upon his arrival must be satisfied that the alien is admissible for permanent residence. If the alien is already living in the United States, he may under certain circumstances, apply under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255, for adjustment of his status to that of a permanent resident and avoid the necessity of leaving the country to apply for a visa. Such adjustment, however, also requires an inspection process before the application may be approved. Since no immigrant visa had been issued to petitioner at the time of her hearing, it is clear that the mere petition for a visa in her behalf did not affect her deportability.
II
Petitioner attempts to avoid the foregoing conclusion by contending that even though no immigrant visa had been issued, her husband’s petition under section 205 mooted the charge contained in the order to show cause. An additional fact must be noted in order to consider this contention. On August 1, 1972, while being held by the Immigration Service agents, Jose Figueroa signed a withdrawal of the petition he had filed on March 29, 1972. Accordingly, at the time of the deportation hearing the order to show cause had not been superseded, as petitioner argues, by an approved petition to accord her the status of a nonquota immigrant.
Petitioner argues, however, that the withdrawal of the petition was accomplished by the agents after subjecting her husband to duress by virtue of his arrest and that in any event, the provisions of the immigration regulations were not followed with respect to the withdrawal of the petition.1
[194]*194The circumstances underlying the withdrawal of the petition are not properly before us for consideration. Those circumstances raised a collateral issue which is not subject to our review of the order of deportation. We say collateral because the matter relating to the approval and withdrawal of visa petitions is not within the scope of a deportation proceeding under section 242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and therefore not reviewable by a court of appeals under section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 88 S.Ct. 1970, 20 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1968). On this aspect of the case, we agree with the Government’s statement in its brief: “The withdrawal of the visa petition is pertinent to this proceeding only in that, under the circumstances . . , it is additional evidence that the marriage was not bona fide.”
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the withdrawal did not comport with the regulations, a more troublesome question would be presented if we were ‘free to consider it. The Government says that the notice of withdrawal was “duly” signed by Jose Figueroa before an officer of the Immigration Service at the same office which had approved the petition and that this “obviously” meets the requirements of 8 C.F.R. 205.-1(a)(1). We are not as sanguine as Government counsel. The regulation requires that a formal notice of withdrawal be filed with the officer “who approved the petition.” A reading of the regulation indicates that the action here [195]*195taken did not literally comport with the provision. However, we do not think this case should turn on the point in light of what we have said about its re-viewability.
Ill
Finally, petitioner contends that her marriage is valid under the laws of Illinois and that the marriage, in some unspecified manner, bars her deportation. The contention is not relevant since a valid marriage to a United States citizen does not of itself exempt an alien from deportation. Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1667, 29 L.Ed.2d 149 (1971). Swartz v. Rogers, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 254 F.2d 338 cert. denied, 357 U.S. 982, 78 S.Ct. 1373, 2 L.Ed.2d 1372 (1958).
In summary, we think that the contentions advanced by petitioner to vacate the order of deportation are legalisms which blink the real issue, whether her marriage was in bad faith and undertaken solely to circumvent the immigration laws of the United States. On that issue we hold that subtantial evidence supports the finding of the special inquiry officer and that the Board of Immigration Appeals was correct in ruling that the marriage was a subterfuge designed to prevent deportation.
The petition for review is denied.