1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GONZALO CASTILLO, Case No. 24-cv-01245-PCP
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION, 9 v. DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART 10 EDWARD BORLA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 7 Defendants. 11
12 13 Gonzalo Castillo, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, 14 filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, the 15 Complaint is dismissed. Dismissal is with leave to amend as to some defendants. 16 I. Background 17 Mr. Castillo provided a thorough factual background to his claims, see Compl. at 15–28, 18 which the Court reviewed in full.1 For purposes of this order, only the relevant portions of that 19 background will be discussed. 20 Mr. Castillo was treated by Defendant Lauritzen, an ophthalmologist, for vision problems 21 and eye pain. See generally id. This treatment included at least three laser surgeries, which 22 occurred on May 8, 2020, June 12, 2020, and October 7, 2021. See id. at 23–24. Mr. Castillo 23 informed Defendant Lauritzen that his vision and pain were not addressed by these laser surgeries. 24 See id. at 24. 25 Defendant Lauritzen then performed five traditional surgeries on Mr. Castillo’s eye(s). See 26
27 1 The Court appreciates Mr. Castillo’s thorough and clear summary of his experience. If it would 1 Compl. at 19–24. These surgeries occurred on February 24, 2022, March 22, 2022, April 21, 2022, 2 October 13, 2022, and November 4, 2022. See id. Mr. Castillo experienced pain after and even 3 during these surgeries. See id. He explains that none of these surgeries helped his vision problems 4 and implies that his vision problems actually worsened. See id. 5 After his second traditional surgery, Mr. Castillo informed Defendant Brignell, his primary 6 care physician, that he was seeing flashes of light. Id. at 25. Mr. Castillo was informed this was 7 likely due to stress and had a follow-up appointment with Defendant Lauritzen three days later. Id. 8 Mr. Castillo informed a CTF nurse about pain, flashes of light, and blurred vision after his third 9 surgery. See id. The nurse informed Defendant Lauritzen, who told Mr. Castillo he would need a 10 fourth surgery. See id. 11 On November 8, 2022, after his fifth unsuccessful surgery, Mr. Castillo informed CTF 12 medical staff that he wanted treatment from a different ophthalmologist. See id. at 27. Mr. Castillo 13 filed a healthcare grievance regarding Defendant Lauritzen’s treatment on November 11, 2022, 14 and reiterated his position to his primary care physician on November 16, 2022. See id. The 15 Complaint implies he had no further appointments with Defendant Lauritzen after raising these 16 issues. Defendant Lauritzen was removed as the ophthalmologist of record on December 9, 2022, 17 and Mr. Castillo was evaluated by his new ophthalmologist on January 3, 2023. See id. at 28. 18 Mr. Castillo’s new ophthalmologist had to perform two more surgeries to repair the 19 damage to his eyes. See id. at 28–29. The new ophthalmologist noted that the retina in Mr. 20 Castillo’s left eye was entirely detached and was torn in multiple places. See id. 21 II. Legal Standard 22 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 23 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 24 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 25 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 26 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 27 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 III. Analysis 2 Mr. Castillo claims that multiple defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical 3 needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See generally Compl. The claim against Defendant 4 Lauritzen arises from the multiple unsuccessful surgeries before by that Defendant. The claims 5 against Defendants Bridgnell, Ottenbacher, and Posson, all CTF medical personnel, appear to arise 6 from those Defendants having allowed Defendant Lauritzen to continue treating Mr. Castillo. The 7 claim against Defendant Borla appears to arise from his supervisory position as a warden. 8 For the reasons stated below, Mr. Castillo has not met the deliberate indifference standard 9 as to any of the medical defendants. More facts may cure the defects identified, so his Complaint 10 is dismissed with leave to amend as to those defendants. 11 As explained below, as a matter of law Mr. Castillo cannot sue Defendant Borla merely 12 because he supervises other defendants. Defendant Borla is dismissed from this lawsuit without 13 leave to amend. 14 A. Defendant Lauritzen 15 Mr. Castillo identifies eight surgeries performed on his eye(s) by Dr. Lauritsen, three by 16 laser and five by traditional methods. See generally Compl. He alleges that these surgeries did not 17 help his condition, and implies they made it worse. See id. 18 “‘The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 19 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 20 (1994) (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates 21 receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and to “‘take reasonable measures to 22 guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when 23 two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, 24 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison 25 official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton, id. 26 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 27 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 1 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two 2 elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response 3 to that need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 4 grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 5 “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 6 significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 7 at 104). 8 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 9 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 10 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could 11 be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also draw the inference.” Id. If 12 a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated 13 the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GONZALO CASTILLO, Case No. 24-cv-01245-PCP
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION, 9 v. DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART 10 EDWARD BORLA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 7 Defendants. 11
12 13 Gonzalo Castillo, an inmate at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, 14 filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, the 15 Complaint is dismissed. Dismissal is with leave to amend as to some defendants. 16 I. Background 17 Mr. Castillo provided a thorough factual background to his claims, see Compl. at 15–28, 18 which the Court reviewed in full.1 For purposes of this order, only the relevant portions of that 19 background will be discussed. 20 Mr. Castillo was treated by Defendant Lauritzen, an ophthalmologist, for vision problems 21 and eye pain. See generally id. This treatment included at least three laser surgeries, which 22 occurred on May 8, 2020, June 12, 2020, and October 7, 2021. See id. at 23–24. Mr. Castillo 23 informed Defendant Lauritzen that his vision and pain were not addressed by these laser surgeries. 24 See id. at 24. 25 Defendant Lauritzen then performed five traditional surgeries on Mr. Castillo’s eye(s). See 26
27 1 The Court appreciates Mr. Castillo’s thorough and clear summary of his experience. If it would 1 Compl. at 19–24. These surgeries occurred on February 24, 2022, March 22, 2022, April 21, 2022, 2 October 13, 2022, and November 4, 2022. See id. Mr. Castillo experienced pain after and even 3 during these surgeries. See id. He explains that none of these surgeries helped his vision problems 4 and implies that his vision problems actually worsened. See id. 5 After his second traditional surgery, Mr. Castillo informed Defendant Brignell, his primary 6 care physician, that he was seeing flashes of light. Id. at 25. Mr. Castillo was informed this was 7 likely due to stress and had a follow-up appointment with Defendant Lauritzen three days later. Id. 8 Mr. Castillo informed a CTF nurse about pain, flashes of light, and blurred vision after his third 9 surgery. See id. The nurse informed Defendant Lauritzen, who told Mr. Castillo he would need a 10 fourth surgery. See id. 11 On November 8, 2022, after his fifth unsuccessful surgery, Mr. Castillo informed CTF 12 medical staff that he wanted treatment from a different ophthalmologist. See id. at 27. Mr. Castillo 13 filed a healthcare grievance regarding Defendant Lauritzen’s treatment on November 11, 2022, 14 and reiterated his position to his primary care physician on November 16, 2022. See id. The 15 Complaint implies he had no further appointments with Defendant Lauritzen after raising these 16 issues. Defendant Lauritzen was removed as the ophthalmologist of record on December 9, 2022, 17 and Mr. Castillo was evaluated by his new ophthalmologist on January 3, 2023. See id. at 28. 18 Mr. Castillo’s new ophthalmologist had to perform two more surgeries to repair the 19 damage to his eyes. See id. at 28–29. The new ophthalmologist noted that the retina in Mr. 20 Castillo’s left eye was entirely detached and was torn in multiple places. See id. 21 II. Legal Standard 22 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 23 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 24 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 25 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 26 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 27 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 III. Analysis 2 Mr. Castillo claims that multiple defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical 3 needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See generally Compl. The claim against Defendant 4 Lauritzen arises from the multiple unsuccessful surgeries before by that Defendant. The claims 5 against Defendants Bridgnell, Ottenbacher, and Posson, all CTF medical personnel, appear to arise 6 from those Defendants having allowed Defendant Lauritzen to continue treating Mr. Castillo. The 7 claim against Defendant Borla appears to arise from his supervisory position as a warden. 8 For the reasons stated below, Mr. Castillo has not met the deliberate indifference standard 9 as to any of the medical defendants. More facts may cure the defects identified, so his Complaint 10 is dismissed with leave to amend as to those defendants. 11 As explained below, as a matter of law Mr. Castillo cannot sue Defendant Borla merely 12 because he supervises other defendants. Defendant Borla is dismissed from this lawsuit without 13 leave to amend. 14 A. Defendant Lauritzen 15 Mr. Castillo identifies eight surgeries performed on his eye(s) by Dr. Lauritsen, three by 16 laser and five by traditional methods. See generally Compl. He alleges that these surgeries did not 17 help his condition, and implies they made it worse. See id. 18 “‘The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 19 are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 20 (1994) (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates 21 receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and to “‘take reasonable measures to 22 guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when 23 two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, 24 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison 25 official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton, id. 26 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 27 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 1 97, 104 (1976). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two 2 elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response 3 to that need. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 4 grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 5 “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 6 significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 7 at 104). 8 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 9 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 10 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could 11 be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also draw the inference.” Id. If 12 a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated 13 the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 14 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Consequently, for deliberate indifference to be established, there must 15 exist both a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and harm resulting 16 therefrom. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. The deliberate indifference standard does not require 17 a showing that the prison official acted with an improper motive, such as an intent to harm; it is 18 enough that the official acted or failed to act despite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious 19 harm. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 793 (9th Cir. 2019). 20 Here, Mr. Castillo specifically alleges that Defendant Lauritzen subjected him to “botched 21 operations and negligence.” Compl. at 27. A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is 22 insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 23 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).2 If Mr. Castillo wishes to state a federal civil rights claim against 24 Defendant Lauritzen, he must allege facts which meet the deliberate indifference standard. See 25 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 834. To do so, Mr. Castillo must show that Defendant Lauritzen knew of 26 and disregarded an excessive risk to Mr. Castillo’s health or safety by failing to take reasonable 27 1 steps to abate it. Id. at 837. Refusal to perform a necessary surgery, or insistence on performing a 2 surgery which was contra-indicated, might meet this standard. But see Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 3 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that summary judgment for defendants was properly granted because 4 plaintiff’s evidence that a doctor told him surgery was necessary to treat his recurring abscesses 5 showed only a difference of opinion as to proper course of care where prison medical staff treated his 6 recurring abscesses with medicines and hot packs); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (holding that to show 7 deliberate indifference rather than a difference of medical opinion, a prisoner must “show that [the 8 doctor’s] chosen course of treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was 9 chosen ‘in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health’”). A mistake during a 10 tricky surgery does not. 11 B. Defendants Brignell, Ottenbacher, and Posson 12 Mr. Castillo similarly does not provide facts to support a deliberate indifference claim 13 against Defendants Brignell, Ottenbacher, and Posson. 14 Mr. Castillo did not inform Defendant Brignell of continued vision problems until after his 15 second surgery, and Mr. Castillo had a follow-up appointment with Defendant Lauritzen only 16 three days later. See Compl. at 25. The information given to Defendant Brignell would not alert 17 him that Mr. Castillo was uncomfortable being treated by Defendant Lauritzen, and without more 18 facts it appears reasonable for Defendant Brignell to rely on an ophthalmologist to treat Mr. 19 Castillo’s eyes. Defendant Brignell thus was not deliberately indifferent for not acting on this 20 statement from Mr. Castillo. 21 Mr. Castillo did not inform Defendant Brignell until November 8, 2022, that he wanted to 22 cease treatment by Defendant Lauritzen. See Compl. at 27. The Complaint suggests that his 23 concerns were addressed, because he does not mention any additional treatment by Defendant 24 Lauritzen after that date. Indeed, Mr. Castillo states that Defendant Lauritzen was removed as his 25 ophthalmologist of record by December 9, 2022, and Mr. Castillo was appointed a new 26 ophthalmologist before January 3, 2023. See id. at 28. This does not suggest that Defendant 27 Brignell was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Castillo’s medical needs. Rather, it suggests that when 1 those concerns. 2 It is possible, however, that Mr. Castillo expressed his concerns at an earlier date and 3 simply did not mention this in the Complaint. Although Mr. Castillo has not stated an Eighth 4 Amendment claim as to Defendant Brignell, he is given leave to amend to truthfully add any facts 5 which would support such a claim. 6 The Complaint states that Defendant Ottenbacher is an ophthalmologist at CTF but does 7 not indicate that Mr. Castillo had any interactions at all with Defendant Ottenbacher. See Compl. 8 at 15, 17. Without such facts, Mr. Castillo has not stated any claim as to Defendant Ottenbacher, 9 much less one for deliberate indifference. 10 The Complaint alleges that Defendant Posson reviewed Mr. Castillo’s health care 11 grievances and denied them. These reviews appear to have occurred after Defendant Lauritzen had 12 been removed as the ophthalmologist of record and a new ophthalmologist had been appointed. 13 See id. at 18–19 (referring to reviews on January 3, 2023, January 8, 2023, and February 3, 2023). 14 Mere involvement in reviewing an inmate’s administrative grievance does not necessarily 15 demonstrate awareness of an alleged violation or contribute to the underlying violation. George v. 16 Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations 17 are responsible.” Id. “Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or 18 contribute to the violation.” Id. Similarly, any failure to properly process or investigate a grievance 19 generally does not constitute a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Ramirez v. 20 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Ramirez’s claimed loss of a liberty interest in the 21 processing of his appeals does not satisfy this standard, because inmates lack a separate 22 constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”); accord Young v. Voong, 738 23 F. App’x 509, 510 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Young ‘lack[s] a separate constitutional entitlement to a 24 specific prison grievance procedure.’”) (citation omitted).” Because there is no allegation that the 25 denial of Mr. Castillo’s grievance caused additional harm to him, and Defendant Posson’s review 26 did not even occur until after Defendant Lauritzen had been removed as ophthalmologist of 27 record, the claim against Defendant Posson is not cognizable. 1 CTF. See generally Compl. As such, it is possible that they were more involved in Mr. Castillo’s 2 treatment than the alleged facts show. Mr. Castillo is given leave to amend to truthfully add any 3 facts which would support a claim against these two defendants. 4 C. Defendant Borla 5 The Complaint’s only allegation against Defendant Borla is that he is the warden of CTF. 6 See id. at 2. 7 Mr. Castillo has not identified any way in which Defendant Borla harmed him. Rather, it 8 appears that Mr. Castillo sues Defendant Borla merely because Defendant Borla is an official in 9 supervisory positions. “In a § 1983 suit …. each Government official, his or her title 10 notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 11 677 (2009). Under no circumstances is there liability under section 1983 on the theory that one is 12 responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 13 1989) (“There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”). It is insufficient for a 14 plaintiff generally to allege that supervisors knew about a constitutional violation and that they 15 generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation. Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 16 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012). 17 Because Defendant Borla did not cause Mr. Castillo’s injury, the claim against him is 18 dismissed. Because the Court cannot discern any way in which a warden would be responsible for 19 Mr. Castillo’s vision care, this dismissal is without leave to amend. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 1. The Complaint does not state any cognizable claim. As explained above, only some 22 defects are curable. The Complaint is therefore DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN 23 PART. If he truthfully can provide facts to support a claim, Mr. Castillo may amend his claims as 24 to Defendants Lauritzen, Bridgnell, Ottenbacher, and Posson. Mr. Castillo may not amend his 25 claims as to Defendant Borla. 26 2. The AMENDED COMPLAINT shall be filed within thirty-five days from the date 27 this order is filed. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in ] consolidated amended complaint, Mr. Castillo must allege facts that demonstrate he is entitled to 2 || relief on every claim. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See London v. 3 Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action 4 |} alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint.”); Ferdik v. 5 || Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1992) (where an amended complaint did not name all 6 || the defendants to an action, they were no longer defendants). 7 3. It is Mr. Castillo’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court 8 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of 9 || Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 10 || do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 41(b). 12 4. Mr. Castillo is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for 13 || this case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 14 5. Mr. Castillo’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. See Dkt. No. 7. 3 15 The initial partial filing fee is $88.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring a court to assess an a 16 || initial filing fee of 20 percent of a prisoner’s average monthly deposits or monthly balance, 17 || whichever is greater). A copy of this order and the attached instructions will be sent to Mr. Z 18 Castillo via U.S. mail, and to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 19 || (CDCR) and the court’s financial office via email at trusthelpdesk@cdcer.ca.gov and 20 || CAND Finance@cand.uscourts.gov. 21 6. The Clerk shall amend the caption to reflect that Defendant Borla has been 22 || dismissed from this action without leave to amend. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: October 16, 2024 25 Za 26 b Cy P. Casey Pitts 27 United States District Judge 28
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER’S FILING FEE 4
5 The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a civil action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows: 7 The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the 8 prison trust account office from the prisoner’s trust account and forwarded to the clerk of the court as the first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount is twenty percent 9 of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account for the 6-month 10 period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding 11 the filing of the complaint/petition. 12 Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month’s income 13 credited to the prisoner’s trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the court each time the amount in the account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The prison trust account 14 office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been paid in full. 15 If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial 16 partial filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and 17 carry the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid. If the prisoner has filed more than one complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for each case. The trust 18 account office should make the monthly calculations and payments for each case in which it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these instructions. 19
20 The prisoner’s name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The initial partial filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. Checks should 21 be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner Accounts Receivable, 22 U.S. District Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102.
23 cc: Plaintiff/Petitioner Court’s Finance Office 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27