Castillo-Antonio v. Bueno

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 13, 2019
• Docket: 3:18-cv-04589
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 JOSE DANIEL CASTILLO-ANTONIO, Case No.18-cv-04589-JSC

6 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 7 v. FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

8 GUADALUPE ANTONIO BUENO, Re: Dkt. No. 46 Defendant. 9

10 11 Plaintiff Jose Daniel Castillo-Antonio (“Plaintiff”), a physically disabled person, and 12 Defendant Guadalupe Antonio Bueno (“Defendant Bueno”), the owner and operator of Tacos 13 Sinaloa, reached a settlement agreement after Plaintiff sued Defendant for multiple Americans 14 with Disabilities Act violations, claiming that Bueno’s business was inaccessible to Plaintiff and 15 others. (Dkt. No. 43.)1, 2 Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Dkt. 16 No. 46). After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, and having had the benefit of oral 17 argument on August 29, 2019, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees 18 because the total hours sought are not reasonable. 19 BACKGROUND 20 I. Complaint Allegations & Procedural History 21 On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Guadalupe Antonio Bueno, Anh Chan, 22 Don Chan, Judy Chan, Richard Chan, and Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 23 complaint alleged that Tacos Sinaloa, a taco truck in Oakland, California, was subject to the 24 “‘readily achievable’ barrier removal requirements of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 25

26 1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 27 2 Plaintiff and Defendant Bueno have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant 1 Act of 1990.” (Id. at ¶ 1.) The complaint also alleged several other related state code violations, 2 including violations of the California Civil Code and the California Health and Safety Code. 3 Plaintiff, who requires use of a wheelchair, alleged barriers such as improper parking spaces, 4 inaccessible routes from parking space to entry of the food service area, too high of a service 5 counter, steep ramps, and too small of a bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–5.) These barriers interfered with 6 Plaintiff’s access to the facilities at Tacos Sinaloa, depriving him of full and equal enjoyment of 7 the services, facilities and privileges, and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. (Id. at ¶ 8 5.) Defendants were parties that Plaintiff believed owned, operated, possessed, built, and kept 9 Tacos Sinaloa. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and litigation expenses. 10 (Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–8.) 11 The Clerk of Court entered default as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc., Don Chan, 12 Judy Chan, Richard Chan, and Anh Chan on September 18, 2018 for failing to appear after 13 service. (Dkt. No. 12.) The entry of default as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. was 14 subsequently vacated following the parties’ stipulation, (see Dkt. No. 26), and the Court granted 15 the parties’ stipulated dismissal with prejudice as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. on July 29, 16 2019, (see Dkt. No. 49). 17 As relevant to the instant motion, on September 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike 18 Bueno’s answer and affirmative defenses. (See Dkt. No. 13.) The Court issued an Order 19 addressing that motion on November 26, 2018, directing the parties to comply with General Order 20 56 and ordering Bueno to file an amended answer. (Dkt. No. 32.) Bueno did so on December 11, 21 2018. (Dkt. No. 35.) On June 4, 2019, the parties attended an ADR session where they partially 22 settled the case and agreed that attorney’s fees would be decided by a separate motion. (Dkt. No. 23 43.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees on July 15, 2019. (Dkt. No. 46.) The 24 motion is fully briefed, (Dkt. Nos. 50, 51, 54),3 and the Court heard oral argument on August 29, 25 2019. (Dkt. No. 55.) 26 3 On August 9, 2019, Defendant filed a sur-reply, (Dkt. No. 54), to address Plaintiff’s allegations 27 (see Docket No. 51 at ¶ 5) that Defendant had not removed two barriers named in a prior suit. 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Attorney’s Fees Under the ADA 3 Plaintiff’s claim arose under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and 4 related state laws. The ADA permits the “prevailing party” to seek attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 5 U.S.C. § 12205. A plaintiff “prevails” when he or she enters into a legally enforceable settlement 6 agreement against the defendant. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th 7 Cir. 2002). 8 To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, district courts apply “the lodestar method, 9 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ryan v. 10 Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 11 424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the prevailing market rate in the relevant 12 community.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in 14 addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing 15 in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and 16 reputation.” Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 The party requesting fees also bears “the burden of submitting billing records to establish 19 that the number of hours” requested are reasonable. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 20 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). The number of hours should not exceed the number of hours reasonably 21 competent counsel would bill for similar services. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Courts may reduce 22 the hours expended “where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed 23 and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” 24 Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 25 433-34). 26

27 (Dkt. No. 54 at ¶ 2.) Defendant’s sur-reply also clarifies that Defendant had not been sued by 1 The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors courts should consider in determining the 2 reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rate charged, including: (1) the 3 “experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney”; (2) “the outcome of the results of the 4 proceedings”; (3) “the customary fees”; and (4) “the novelty or the difficulty of the question 5 presented.” Id. (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), 6 abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)). 7 II. Amount Requested 8 Plaintiff requests $21,700.00 in attorney’s fees. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 1.) In support of the 9 requested amount, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Mac Bride, submits a declaration with exhibits, 10 including an itemized list of counsel’s activities and the corresponding hours for his work in this 11 case. (Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1.) The total amount requested constitutes 62 hours at $350 per hour; 12 that total includes the time spent on the instant motion. (Id. at 3.) Defendant opposes the amount 13 requested and asks the Court to reduce the requested fees to a “reasonable, noninflated amount.” 14 (Dkt. No. 50 at 19). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is due a fee award. Accordingly, the 15 Court addresses the reasonableness of the hours expended and the requested rate in turn, below, 16 and concludes that a reduction in the hours expended is warranted. 17 a. Reasonableness of Hours Expended 18 Defendant challenges the hours expended as “inflated” and/or unreasonable based on the 19 time spent on the following tasks: (1) drafting the complaint; (2) litigating with dismissed 20 defendant Golden Valley; (3) researching and drafting the September 2018 motion to strike 21 affirmative defenses; (4) communicating with Plaintiff; (5) reviewing the site inspection reports; 22 (6) reading emails; (7) reviewing Defendant’s amended answer; and (8) drafting the instant 23 motion. (See Dkt. No. 50 at 12-18.) The Court address each item in turn. 24 1. The Complaint 25 Mr. Mac Bride asserts that he spent 4.7 hours drafting the complaint. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, 26 Ex. 1 at 1.) Defendant argues that it could not have taken Plaintiff 4.7 hours to draft because it is 27 “basically a simple ‘cut and paste’ document” similar to “the 200 complaints that Plaintiff has 1 four recent cases in this District involving Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Dkt. Nos. 50-1 – 2 50-4, Exs. 1-4.) Defendant also cites other district court cases in the Ninth Circuit where the court 3 reduced the amount of time “frequent litigants” spent drafting “boilerplate complaint[s]” or 4 “routine and duplicative work” and asks the Court to reduce the hours expended here, accordingly. 5 (Id. at 12-13.) 6 A review of the complaint in this case in comparison to the those submitted by Defendant 7 where Plaintiff was also a party and represented by Mr. Mac Bride shows that the complaints are 8 similar and contain nearly-verbatim language in many respects, including in the discussion of 9 barriers experienced at the subject properties. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 with Dkt. Nos. 50-1 – 50-4, 10 Exs. 1-4.) Plaintiff’s reply “concede[s]” that Mr. Mac Bride does not “draft each new complaint 11 from scratch” because “to do so would be duplicative.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff asserts, 12 however, that “counsel does dedicate significant time to investigating the barriers and to tailoring 13 each complaint to those barriers.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that his “complaints are not just a 14 mindless ‘cut and paste’ operation that merely changes the names.” (Id.) 15 That may be true; however, 4.7 hours is excessive given that the complaints are not 16 materially different except for the parties, addresses of the subject properties, and other minor 17 differences. See Doran v. Corte Madera Inn Best W., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 18 2005) (reducing hours from 4.3 to 0.5 for drafting of “form pleading that is identical in all 19 substantive respects to complaints in other ADA lawsuits, including most of the 73 or so other 20 ADA cases [the plaintiff’s counsel] has brought with [the plaintiff]”). Further, Plaintiff and Mr. 21 Mac Bride are an experienced team that works together on ADA cases and drafting a complaint 22 that is similar in most material respects to their complaints in other cases would not take nearly 5 23 hours to complete. Finally, the billing records include separate time for evaluating the barriers, 24 meeting with the client, and researching ownership. (Dkt. No. 46-2 at 1.) Thus, the Court reduces 25 the hours expended and awards 1.0 hour for drafting the complaint and summons. 26 2. The Motion to Strike 27 Mr. Mac Bride’s billing summary lists 18.2 hours expended (totaling $6,370 in fees) 1 researching, reviewing Defendant’s answer and proposed amendments, and corresponding with 2 opposing counsel regarding the motion. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1.) Defendant challenges the 3 hours expended because the motion was “completely useless and unnecessary” given the Court’s 4 November 2018 Order that disposed of the motion, ordered Defendant to file an amended answer 5 within 14 days, and stated, in pertinent part: 6 The parties should thereafter follow the procedures set forth in General Order 56. If at some point Plaintiff believes he needs a ruling 7 on a motion to strike affirmative defenses in order to move the case forward, he shall file a written request with the Court that explains 8 why a ruling is needed, that is, how it will move the case forward given its current posture. Unless and until the Court rules that such a 9 motion may be filed, Plaintiffs shall not file a motion to strike any affirmative defenses. 10 11 (Dkt. No. 32.) In response to the Court’s Order, Defendant filed an amended answer on December 12 11, 2018. (Dkt. No. 35.) 13 As to fees related to Plaintiff’s motion to strike, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s 14 “eagerness” to amend its answer in response to that motion but rather argues that Plaintiff’s 15 proffered amended answer “violated the basic pleading rules, and [P]laintiff” alerted Defendant to 16 those defects “in detailed letters.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 12.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s 17 amended answer filed in response to the Court’s November 2018 Order still included non- 18 compliant defenses that Plaintiff previously sought to strike. (Id.) 19 Plaintiff is correct that the amended answer contains some of the same affirmative defenses 20 Defendant previously proffered to Plaintiff in its proposed amended answer. (Compare Dkt. No. 21 16-1 at 68-84 with Dkt. No. 35 at 11-18.) However, the total amount of time on the motion to 22 strike is excessive. Defendant proposed deleting 15 of the 34 affirmative defenses in her original 23 answer while meeting and conferring with Plaintiff regarding the motion to strike, (see Dkt. Nos. 24 16 at 3-4, 10 & 16-1 at ¶¶ 3-6), but Plaintiff refused Defendant’s proposed amendments and 25 moved to strike all 34 defenses, (see Dkt. No. 13; see also Dkt. No. 16-1 at ¶ 7). Plaintiff spent 26 time drafting a motion to strike all affirmative defenses when Defendant had already agreed to 27 remove 44% of the challenged defenses. 1 It is reasonable to reduce the hours expended on the motion by an equal percentage. Thus, 2 the Court reduces the hours expended by 8 hours, awarding a total of 10.2 hours for work related 3 to the motion to strike. 4 3. Tasks Related to Golden Valley 5 Defendant challenges the 6.1 hours Plaintiff spent litigating with Defendant Golden 6 Valley. (Dkt. No. 50 at 15.) Defendant contends that Golden Valley’s “presence in the litigation 7 was pointless” because Golden Valley merely “remodeled a food truck for Defendant Bueno,” and 8 the truck “was not listed in either Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s inspection report as being non- 9 compl[iant].” (Id.) Defendant asserts that Golden Valley should never have been named or 10 should have been dismissed once Plaintiff received the inspection report. (Id.) Plaintiff’s reply 11 counters that Plaintiff did have a “colorable claim” against Golden Valley because “[t]here are 12 legal theories under which the seller of a taco truck,” such as Golden Valley, “can be liable in an 13 ADA case.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff and Golden Valley entered into a settlement agreement and 14 stipulated to dismissal of all claims with prejudice as to Golden Valley. (See Dkt. No. 48.) 15 Regardless, any fees related to prosecuting Plaintiff’s action against Golden Valley should 16 not be a cost borne by Bueno. Where multiple defendants are present in litigation, courts will 17 either divide fees equally among principal defendants, apportion fees by degree of culpability, or 18 apportion fees by relative time spent litigating against each defendant. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. 19 Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 956-57 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d 20 Cir.1982); Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); 21 Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 1979). 22 Here, apportionment by time spent litigating against each defendant is appropriate. In 23 Cataphora Inc. v. Parker, 848 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2012), for example, the court 24 reduced the plaintiff’s claimed hours for time spent on work associated with a different defendant. 25 Similarly, in Cook Productions, LLC v. Szerlip, the court opined that “[i]t would be inequitable for 26 Defendant Szerlip to bear the litigation fees expended by Plaintiff directed toward the other 27 defendants.” 2017 WL 4883220, at *6 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2017) (emphasis added). 1 Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff compensation for the 6.1 hours spent litigating with 2 Golden Valley. For the same reason, the Court finds Bueno not responsible for the time Plaintiff 3 spent drafting the motion for entry of default of property owners, and, accordingly, also denies the 4 0.5 hours expended on this task. (Dkt. No. 46-2 Ex. 1 at 1.) 5 4. Communications with Plaintiff 6 The billing summary indicates that Mr. Mac Bride met initially with Plaintiff for less than 7 two hours to discuss the case and “[e]valuate barriers as described by him and nature of probable 8 claims.”4 Defendant argues that the amount of time “Plaintiff and Mr. Mac Bride spent in 9 communication was unreasonable” because “Plaintiff has been represented in over one hundred 10 cases by Mr. Mac Bride” and the “allegations in the complaint are the same allegations alleged in 11 every other case Plaintiff has filed.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) Defendant zeroes in on the initial 12 meeting, arguing that Mr. Mac Bride and Plaintiff “spent almost two hours discussing barriers that 13 were not present.” (Id.) 14 The billing entry in question is less than two hours and includes tasks unrelated to Mr. Mac 15 Bride’s communications with Plaintiff, including research and travel to the subject property.5 16 Although Plaintiff and Mr. Mac Bride are familiar with each other and experienced in ADA 17 litigation, considerably less than two hours to discuss an entirely new case is not unreasonable or 18 excessive. Thus, the Court does not reduce the hours expended for this task. 19 5. Conducting Site Inspection and Reviewing Site Inspection Reports 20 Defendant challenges the 5.5 hours Mr. Mac Bride expended in “conduct[ing] the site 21 inspection, review[ing] the report and issu[ing] the letter” to defense counsel regarding the 22 inspection report. (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) Defendant argues that the time is “over inflated” and 23 alleges that “a portion of this task could have been assigned to a legal assistant.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s 24 reply asserts that a lawyer was required to complete the site inspection, not a legal assistant, and 25

26 4 The entry of 1.9 hours in the billing summary is block-billed and includes other tasks; specifically, researching ownership and deed history and driving to the property “to verify prima 27 facie case.” (Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 1.) 1 that the report and letter required a “lawyer’s analysis” that a legal assistant could not provide. 2 (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 16.) 3 Given the interrelationship of the tasks, two of which required substantive legal analysis, 4 the Court finds the tasks not overstaffed. Thus, 5.5 hours is reasonable for all the tasks Mr. Mac 5 Bride completed regarding the site inspection and the Court does not reduce the hours expended 6 for these tasks. 7 6. Drafting the Rule 26 Disclosures 8 The billing summary indicates that Mr. Mac Bride spent 0.9 hours drafting the Rule 26 9 disclosures in this case. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 2.) Defendant argues that such time is 10 unreasonable because “the[ ] disclosures consisted of one page and are likely the exact disclosures 11 furnished in all 200 of Plaintiff’s ADA cases.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) However, the Court is unable 12 to determine whether the hours expended on this basis are unreasonable without having the 13 disclosures before it. Thus, the Court does not reduce the hours expended on this task. 14 7. Reading Emails 15 Defendant further takes “issue with the fact that it takes Mr. Mac Bride around fifteen 16 minutes to read every simple email communication[ ].” (Dkt. No. 50 at 18.) Defendant does not 17 specify a billing entry he takes issue with, and it is not apparent from the face of the billing 18 summary that the “email” entries are unreasonable. The Court does not reduce the hours expended 19 on this basis. 20 8. Reviewing Defendant’s Amended Answer 21 The billing summary includes an entry of one hour on December 11, 2018 for reviewing 22 Defendant’s amended answer. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 3.) Defendant challenges that hour, 23 arguing that the “first amended answer . . . was the same answer already submitted to [Mr. Mac 24 Bride] on October 1, 2018, when [Defendant sought] stipulation to file it. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18.) 25 Plaintiff counters that Defendant “exchanged several proposed amended answers, each one 26 different, and each one in violation of the pleading standards.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 17.) Thus, 27 Plaintiff asserts that it was reasonable for Mr. Mac Bride “to review the answer carefully to 1 ascertain what affirmative defenses were being pled, and whether they really constituted defenses 2 under the law.” (Id.) 3 A review of Defendant’s amended answer filed in December 2018, (see Dkt. No. 35), and 4 the first and second proposed amended answers submitted in conjunction with Defendant’s 5 opposition to Plaintiff’s September 2018 motion to strike, (see Dkt. No. 16-1 at 22-40, 58-85), 6 shows that the amended answers are not identical although they do contain some overlapping 7 affirmative defenses. Given that Plaintiff had previously rejected Defendant’s proposed amended 8 answers as insufficiently pled, and because those answers were different in material respects, the 9 Court does not find it unreasonable that Plaintiff would closely scrutinize the December 2018 10 amended answer. Thus, the Court does not reduce the requested hours on this basis. 11 9. The Instant Motion 12 Defendant also challenges the 8 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent on the instant motion, 13 saying that it would not have been necessary if Plaintiff’s hours were not already inflated. 14 Defendant further asserts that the instant fee motion was “yet another cut and paste task.” (Id. at 15 18.) While fees can be awarded for time spent on a fee motion, the time expended must be 16 reasonable. As discussed above, some of Plaintiff’s time is inflated and unreasonable, which 17 forced Bueno into defending against the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court reduces the time 18 spent on the fee motion by the same percentage of all unreasonably expended hours in relation to 19 the total hours requested (29.5%) and awards 5.64 hours for the instant motion. 20 *** 21 In sum, the Court reduces the hours expended by 20.66 for a total of 41.34 hours. This 22 total is reasonable given the complexity of the case, legal work completed, and Mr. Mac Bride’s 23 experience with ADA litigation. 24 b. Reasonableness of Rates 25 Plaintiff requests $350 per hour, citing Mr. Mac Bride’s experience, cases where attorneys 26 have been awarded similar hourly rates in the district, and other ADA cases in this district where 27 Mr. Mac Bride’s $350 rate was approved. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶¶ 12–15.) The parties do not disagree 1 Plaintiff’s counsel completed tasks at a high billing rate that could have been done by a legal 2 assistant. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18-19.) Defendant asserts that “many of Mr. Mac Bride’s hours” could 3 have been delegated to support staff. (Id. at 19.) However, Defendant does not specify which 4 tasks were “secretarial in nature and should be billed as overhead.” (See id.) Defendant asks the 5 Court to reduce the billing rates to a reasonable amount. (Id.) Plaintiff’s reply correctly observes 6 that Defendant provides no specific examples of tasks that could have been delegated. (Dkt. No. 7 51 at ¶ 21.) 8 The parties do not dispute Mr. Mac Bride’s requested hourly rate of $350, and the Court 9 finds the rate reasonable based on Mr. Mac Bride’s experience litigating “over one hundred ADA 10 cases in the Northern District since 2012.” (See Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 12.) A rate of $350 is in line 11 with prevailing rates in the Bay Area for attorney services. See Superior Consulting Servs., Inc. v. 12 Steeves-Kiss, No. 17-cv-06059-EMC, 2018 WL 2183295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) 13 (“[D]istrict courts in Northern California have found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners 14 and $300-$490 per hour for associates are reasonable.”). Indeed, Mr. Mac Bride has been 15 awarded that rate in previous ADA cases in this district. (See Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 13 (citing several 16 Northern District cases).) The issue is whether some of Mr. Mac Bride’s itemized tasks, (see Dkt. 17 No. 46-2, Ex. 1), indicate “overstaffing” as argued by Defendant, that should have been “delegated 18 to colleagues with appropriate levels of experience,” (see Dkt. No. 50 at 18). The Court does not 19 find that a reduction in rate is warranted for several reasons. 20 First, none of the tasks listed on Mr. Mac Bride’s billing summary appear “secretarial” in 21 nature such that they would not require the attention of an attorney. (See generally Dkt. No. 46-2, 22 Ex. 1.) The tasks are similar to those Mr. Mac Bride submitted in a previous ADA case, (see Dkt. 23 No. 46-5, Ex. 4), for which Mr. Mac Bride was awarded his requested fees, see Castillo-Antonio v. 24 Alvarez, No. 16-CV-00352-LHK, 2016 WL 4242241 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (order adopting 25 report and recommendation). Second, the Court cannot determine, on the briefing alone, that Mr. 26 Mac Bride could have delegated the task to a junior attorney because it is unknown whether Mr. 27 Mac Bride is a solo practitioner. Regardless, the Court does not find that this matters; the 1 Area. See Steeves-Kiss, 2018 WL 2183295, at *5 (“[D]istrict courts in Northern California have 2 || found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners and $300-$490 per hour for associates are 3 reasonable.”) Given that all the itemized tasks require the attention of an attorney, the Court does 4 || not find the case overstaffed and does not find the requested rate unreasonable. 5 In sum, the Court finds the requested rate of $350 per hour is reasonable for the itemized 6 || tasks and a reduction on that score is not warranted. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiffs motion for attorney’s 9 fees, and orders Defendant to pay Plaintiff’s fees and costs in the total amount of $14,469.00, 10 || reflecting 41.34 hours expended at $350 per hour. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: September 13, 2019

ACQUELINE SCOTT CORIZY 15 United States Magistrate Judge g g 16

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