Cash v. Simmons

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 23-3325
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN CASH, No. 23-3325 D.C. No. 3:22-cv-02065-AGS-DEB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

JAMES E. SIMMONS, Jr.; MICHAEL D. WASHINGTON; DAVID BERRY; WENDY BEHAN; SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a San Diego County Police Department; SAN DIEGO COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, the District Attorney Office for the County of San Diego; SAN DIEGO COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, a County Department providing criminal legal defense; COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a County Public Entity; DOES, 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Andrew George Schopler, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted June 18, 2025**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Steven Cash appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and remanding the action to state court. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.

2017). We affirm.

Contrary to Cash’s contentions, the district court properly exercised removal

jurisdiction over Cash’s action because the operative complaint alleged federal

civil rights violations, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); 28

U.S.C. § 1441(a) (allowing removal if the district court has original jurisdiction);

and defendants satisfied the procedural requirements for removal, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(a), (b) (setting forth procedure for removal, including joinder or consent by

“all defendants who have been properly joined and served”); Sharma v. HSI Asset

Loan Obligation Tr. 2007-1 by Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 23 F.4th 1167, 1169

(9th Cir. 2022) (standard of review).

The district court properly dismissed Cash’s § 1983 claims because they

were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, judicial immunity, or Cash otherwise

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 23-3325 failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Horton by Horton v.

City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing

requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir.

2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; explaining

that “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision

by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that

decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal court”);

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing

factors relevant to whether an act is judicial in nature and subject to absolute

judicial immunity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to

file a second amended complaint because amendment would be futile. See

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)

(setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to

amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit Cash’s contention that the district court erred by

ordering Cash to redact the Judicial Defendants’ home addresses in his motion to

remand.

AFFIRMED.

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