310 Ga. 421 FINAL COPY
S20A1105. CASEY v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A Lowndes County jury found Clarence Casey guilty of felony
murder predicated on an aggravated assault and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the
shooting death of Alfred Pierre Bradley. Following the denial of his
motion for new trial, Casey appeals, alleging that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the trial
court did not apply the proper standard in evaluating Casey’s claim
for relief on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and
5-5-21, and the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence.
While there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict as a
matter of due process, we conclude that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” under OCGA §§ 5-5- 20 and 5-5-21 in ruling upon Casey’s motion for new trial.1 We
therefore vacate the trial court’s order in part and remand the case
to the trial court. We do not reach Casey’s final enumeration of error
in this appeal.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
presented at trial showed the following. In the early morning of
January 13, 2013, Bradley drove his car to a store in Lowndes
County. He exited his car and walked into the store. Casey, Radcliffe
Eady, and Michael Green were standing outside the store. When
Bradley exited the store, Eady ran toward Bradley with a .45-caliber
1 The crimes occurred on January 13, 2013. Casey was indicted by a
Lowndes County grand jury on April 26, 2013, for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Count 2); aggravated assault (Count 3); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5). A jury trial was held on January 27, 28, and 30, 2014, and the jury found Casey not guilty on Count 1 but guilty on Counts 2, 3, and 4. The trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to Count 5. Casey was sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for felony murder, and the aggravated assault count was merged into the felony murder count. Casey was also sentenced to five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Casey filed a timely motion for new trial on March 11, 2014, which he amended on May 2, 2019. The trial court entered an order denying the motion on August 20, 2019. Casey filed a timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court to the August 2020 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 pistol. The two struggled over the firearm, and Bradley eventually
obtained control of it. During this struggle, the pistol fired, and
Bradley then ran around the side of the building.
Bradley was highly agitated and returned to the front of the
building waving the gun, “screaming, and yelling.” Casey, a
convicted felon armed with a firearm, approached Bradley from
behind and shot him at close range in the back of the head. Casey,
still in possession of the gun he used to shoot Bradley, walked away.
At some point following the incident, Casey apologized to the owner
of the establishment for shooting Bradley at her store.
On January 15, 2013, during a custodial police interrogation
and after receiving Miranda warnings,2 Casey agreed to answer
questions. Casey initially said that he was not at the store at all on
the day the crime occurred. He later admitted that he was at the
store but said that he was not there when the shooting occurred, and
he denied shooting Bradley.
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966). 3 Following an autopsy, the forensic pathologist determined that
a gunshot wound to the head caused Bradley’s death and ruled the
death a homicide. The entrance wound, located on the left side of the
back of Bradley’s head, had a partial muzzle imprint, meaning that
the gun’s muzzle was in contact with the skin at the time it was
fired.
Casey argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict because, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, no rational trier of fact could have found Casey guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. We disagree.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence
in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
4 jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506
(739 SE2d 313) (2013).
Casey was convicted of felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Although the trial court properly merged the
aggravated assault count for sentencing, we must consider whether
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding
that Casey committed the alleged aggravated assault because it was
the predicate felony for the felony murder.
OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense
of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the
death of another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-
21 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the offense
of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly
weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used
offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in
serious bodily injury[.]” OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1) provides, in
5 relevant part, that “[a]ny person who shall have on or within arm’s
reach of his or her person a firearm . . . during the commission of, or
the attempt to commit[,] . . . [a]ny crime against or involving the
person of another . . . and which crime is a felony, commits a
felony[.]”
Eyewitness testimony established that Casey shot Bradley in
the head at close range. Forensic evidence supported this testimony
by showing that Bradley was fatally shot in the back of the head by
a gun in contact with his scalp. Moreover, Casey later apologized to
the shop owner for shooting Bradley, and he gave inconsistent
accounts to the police. This evidence was sufficient as a matter of
due process to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Casey guilty
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310 Ga. 421 FINAL COPY
S20A1105. CASEY v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A Lowndes County jury found Clarence Casey guilty of felony
murder predicated on an aggravated assault and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the
shooting death of Alfred Pierre Bradley. Following the denial of his
motion for new trial, Casey appeals, alleging that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the trial
court did not apply the proper standard in evaluating Casey’s claim
for relief on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and
5-5-21, and the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence.
While there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict as a
matter of due process, we conclude that the trial court failed to
exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” under OCGA §§ 5-5- 20 and 5-5-21 in ruling upon Casey’s motion for new trial.1 We
therefore vacate the trial court’s order in part and remand the case
to the trial court. We do not reach Casey’s final enumeration of error
in this appeal.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
presented at trial showed the following. In the early morning of
January 13, 2013, Bradley drove his car to a store in Lowndes
County. He exited his car and walked into the store. Casey, Radcliffe
Eady, and Michael Green were standing outside the store. When
Bradley exited the store, Eady ran toward Bradley with a .45-caliber
1 The crimes occurred on January 13, 2013. Casey was indicted by a
Lowndes County grand jury on April 26, 2013, for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Count 2); aggravated assault (Count 3); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5). A jury trial was held on January 27, 28, and 30, 2014, and the jury found Casey not guilty on Count 1 but guilty on Counts 2, 3, and 4. The trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to Count 5. Casey was sentenced to serve life in prison without parole for felony murder, and the aggravated assault count was merged into the felony murder count. Casey was also sentenced to five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Casey filed a timely motion for new trial on March 11, 2014, which he amended on May 2, 2019. The trial court entered an order denying the motion on August 20, 2019. Casey filed a timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court to the August 2020 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 pistol. The two struggled over the firearm, and Bradley eventually
obtained control of it. During this struggle, the pistol fired, and
Bradley then ran around the side of the building.
Bradley was highly agitated and returned to the front of the
building waving the gun, “screaming, and yelling.” Casey, a
convicted felon armed with a firearm, approached Bradley from
behind and shot him at close range in the back of the head. Casey,
still in possession of the gun he used to shoot Bradley, walked away.
At some point following the incident, Casey apologized to the owner
of the establishment for shooting Bradley at her store.
On January 15, 2013, during a custodial police interrogation
and after receiving Miranda warnings,2 Casey agreed to answer
questions. Casey initially said that he was not at the store at all on
the day the crime occurred. He later admitted that he was at the
store but said that he was not there when the shooting occurred, and
he denied shooting Bradley.
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966). 3 Following an autopsy, the forensic pathologist determined that
a gunshot wound to the head caused Bradley’s death and ruled the
death a homicide. The entrance wound, located on the left side of the
back of Bradley’s head, had a partial muzzle imprint, meaning that
the gun’s muzzle was in contact with the skin at the time it was
fired.
Casey argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict because, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, no rational trier of fact could have found Casey guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. We disagree.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III)
(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence
in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the
4 jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506
(739 SE2d 313) (2013).
Casey was convicted of felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Although the trial court properly merged the
aggravated assault count for sentencing, we must consider whether
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding
that Casey committed the alleged aggravated assault because it was
the predicate felony for the felony murder.
OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides that “[a] person commits the offense
of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the
death of another human being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-
21 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits the offense
of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly
weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used
offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in
serious bodily injury[.]” OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1) provides, in
5 relevant part, that “[a]ny person who shall have on or within arm’s
reach of his or her person a firearm . . . during the commission of, or
the attempt to commit[,] . . . [a]ny crime against or involving the
person of another . . . and which crime is a felony, commits a
felony[.]”
Eyewitness testimony established that Casey shot Bradley in
the head at close range. Forensic evidence supported this testimony
by showing that Bradley was fatally shot in the back of the head by
a gun in contact with his scalp. Moreover, Casey later apologized to
the shop owner for shooting Bradley, and he gave inconsistent
accounts to the police. This evidence was sufficient as a matter of
due process to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Casey guilty
of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony. See Jackson, 443 U. S.
at 319 (III) (B). See also Dunbar v. State, 263 Ga. 769, 769 (1) (438
SE2d 356) (1994). 3
3 Because we remand this case on the thirteenth juror issue, we note that
the evidence featured contradictory testimony, testimony that conflicted with
6 2. Casey also argues that the trial court failed to properly
exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” in ruling upon his
motion for new trial. The trial court’s order denying Casey’s motion
for new trial includes the following:
[OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21] afford the trial court broad discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror” and weigh the evidence on a motion for new trial alleging these general grounds. Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262 [(737 SE2d 311)] (2013). However, “[t]he . . . verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Barber v. State, 235 Ga. App. 170 [(509 SE2d 93)] (1998). “When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 24[ (709 SE2d 44)] (2011)
prior statements, and other reasons to either credit or doubt much of the testimony the jury heard. For instance, after the shooting, Dorothy Brinson, the store owner at the time of the shooting, told police officers that Casey apologized for shooting Bradley in the store and that he shot Bradley to protect others behind the store counter. But, at trial, she testified that Casey had not admitted shooting Bradley and had only stated that he was “sorry for what happened.” Another witness, Martavius Smith, told police officers after the shooting that he saw Casey walk up to Bradley with the gun, put the gun to the back of Bradley’s head, and shoot Bradley. Smith told police officers that Casey calmly walked away with the gun. But, at trial, Smith testified that Bradley shot himself. Consistent with our sufficiency review, we have presented and reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 7 [(quoting Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B))].
Casey contends that while the trial court’s order mentions the
discretion given to the trial court by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, it
shows that the trial court failed to actually exercise this discretion.
Casey contends that the order must be vacated and this case
remanded to the trial court so that it can apply the correct legal
standard under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. We agree.
When the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction
as a matter of due process, as the evidence was in this case, a trial
judge may, nevertheless, grant a new trial if the verdict of the jury
is “contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-
20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of
the evidence[.]” OCGA § 5-5-21. See also White v. State, 293 Ga. 523,
524 (2) (753 SE2d 115) (2013). These grounds for a new trial,
commonly known as the “general grounds,” require the trial judge
“to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’” and conduct a review more expansive
than that required for legal sufficiency of the evidence by
considering any testimonial conflicts, the witnesses’ credibility, and
8 the weight of the evidence. Walker, 292 Ga. at 264 (2). See also
Choisnet v. State, 292 Ga. 860, 861 (742 SE2d 476) (2013).
Here, Casey properly raised the general grounds in a timely
motion for new trial and argued that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction under Jackson. These are two distinct legal
arguments that require the trial court to apply distinct legal
standards. The trial court’s order, however, indicates that the court
failed to exercise its discretion in its consideration of the general
grounds and only applied the Jackson standard, by which a court
assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of due
process. Further, the trial court’s use of the word “[h]owever”
following the outline of its role as the thirteenth juror and its
immediate reference to the sufficiency standard “denote[ ] that the
trial court failed to apply its discretion, as the determination if there
is sufficient evidence to support the verdict is a matter of law, not
discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manuel v. State,
289 Ga. 383, 386 (2) (711 SE2d 676) (2011); Walker, 292 Ga. at 264
(2). “[W]hen the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the
9 motion for new trial only for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the
trial court has failed to exercise” its discretion under the general
grounds. (Emphasis supplied.) Holmes v. State, 306 Ga. 524, 528 (2)
(832 SE2d 392) (2019).
We conclude that the trial court failed to conduct the proper
general grounds analysis as requested by Casey in his motion for
new trial. See Manuel, 289 Ga. at 385 (2). Accordingly, we vacate the
denial of Casey’s motion for new trial, and we remand this case so
that the trial court can apply the proper standard in exercising its
discretion pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21.
3. Lastly, Casey argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the trial court improperly overruled his objection to the
admission of a witness’ pre-trial statement. Because this case must
be remanded in any event, “it is unnecessary for us to address the
remaining enumeration of error at this time.” Manuel, 289 Ga. at
387 (2). If the trial court concludes on remand that a new trial is
unnecessary and Casey decides to appeal, Casey may present this
enumeration of error along with any other potential errors that may
10 occur on remand.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Warren, J., not participating.
Decided November 16, 2020.
Murder. Lowndes Superior Court. Before Judge Cowart. Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant. Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, Michelle T. Harrison, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Leslie A. Coots, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.