Case v. Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc.

Opinion

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************

KATHLEEN CASE, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF SCOTT CASE) v. THE CONNECTICUT INSTITUTE FOR THE BLIND, INC., ET AL. (AC 47664)

Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant C Co. appealed from the trial court’s judgment, following a jury trial, for the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of her son, the decedent, in connection with C Co.’s alleged negligence that led to the decedent ’s wrongful death. C Co. claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Held:

This court declined to review C Co.’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency because it failed to properly preserve those claims for appellate review, as it did not file a motion to set aside the verdict asking to have judgment rendered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, which, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 16-37), had been deemed denied when the trial court reserved its decision on it and ultimately submitted the case to the jury.

C Co.’s claim that the plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness and request for punitive damages should not have been permitted because they were raised beyond the statute of limitations was not properly preserved for this court’s review, as the trial court never addressed the merits of C Co.’s statute of limitations defense because C Co. did not raise it by the proper procedural vehicle in a timely manner.

This court declined to review C Co.’s claims that the plaintiff’s claim under the patients’ bill of rights statute (§ 19a-550) was barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute (§ 52-555), that the trial court should have stricken the plaintiff’s claims of recklessness and her associated claim for punitive damages because they constituted an improper claim for vicarious liability, and that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiff to file an amended revised complaint, as C Co.’s claims were inadequately briefed.

Argued March 12—officially released September 15, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants ’ alleged negligence in connection with the wrongful death of the plaintiff’s decedent, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court, Bellis, J., granted the

*

The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

named defendant’s motion to strike; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., denied the named defendant’s motion to strike; subsequently, the case was transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, where the case was withdrawn as to the defendant Lincare, Inc.; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury before Pierson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and David G. Hill, for the appellant (named defendant).

James J. Healy, with whom were Shivangi Bhatia and, on the brief, John W. Mills and Maria A. Cahill, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. In this wrongful death action, the defendant, the Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc., doing business as Oak Hill,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Kathleen Case, the administrator of the estate of her son, Scott Case (decedent). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and (2) “[t]he plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages based on [the defendant’s] alleged recklessness should not have been permitted to stand” because (a) it was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations; (b) it was based on alleged violations of the patients’ bill of rights, General Statutes § 19a-550 et seq., and was barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute, General Statutes § 52-555; (c) the plaintiff’s claim for recklessness “constitute[d] an improper respondeat superior claim”; and (d) the court improperly permitted the plaintiff to file the operative revised amended complaint without seeking the court’s 1 Lincare, Inc., also was named as a defendant in this action. On March 22, 2024, the plaintiff withdrew the action as to Lincare, Inc. Accordingly , any reference herein to the defendant is to the Connecticut Institute for the Blind, Inc., doing business as Oak Hill.

permission to do so under Practice Book § 10-60. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the claims on appeal. The defendant is a community service provider for individuals with disabilities and maintains several intermediate care facilities throughout the state, including the facility at which the decedent resided from September 2015 until the date of his death, May 23, 2016. The decedent required nighttime use of a bilevel positive airway pressure (BiPAP) noninvasive respiratory breathing machine to manage his sleep apnea. The BiPAP machine was provided and maintained by Lincare, Inc. (Lincare). According to the guidelines established by the defendant for the decedent’s care, dated September 7, 2015, the decedent was to be checked “throughout the night at least every half hour to make sure the [BiPAP] mask is on his face and he is breathing okay [and] also that the tubing is free.” (Emphasis in original.) The decedent was discovered unresponsive in his bed at approximately 4 a.m. on May 23, 2016, and was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.

The plaintiff commenced this action and, thereafter, by way of the operative amended revised complaint filed on October 2, 2023, alleged that the defendant’s negligence and reckless disregard of the decedent’s rights, under § 19a-550 (e),2 proximately caused his death. In 2 General Statutes § 19a-550 (e) provides: “Any nursing home facility , residential care home or chronic disease hospital that negligently deprives a patient of any right or benefit created or established for the well-being of the patient by the provisions of this section shall be liable to such patient in a private cause of action for injuries suffered as a result of such deprivation. Upon a finding that a patient has been deprived of such a right or benefit, and that the patient has been injured as a result of such deprivation, damages shall be assessed in the amount sufficient to compensate such patient for such injury. The rights or benefits specified in subsections (b) to (d), inclusive, of this section may not be reduced, rescinded or abrogated by contract. In addition, where the deprivation of any such right or benefit is found to have been wilful or in reckless disregard of the rights of the patient, punitive damages may be assessed. A patient may also maintain an action pursuant to this section support of those claims, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s BiPAP machine had not been functioning properly since April 15, 2016, and, after an inspection on May 19, 2016, Lincare opined that the machine would need to be replaced within the week. The BiPAP machine was not replaced prior to the decedent’s death. The plaintiff further alleged that, on May 22, 2016, the decedent was equipped, with the assistance of an employee of the defendant, with the BiPAP mask at approximately 9 p.m. The plaintiff asserted that the decedent was not checked every half hour that night, as required by the defendant’s guidelines, and “[a]ny checks that were made between the hours of 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. consisted of looking into the [decedent’s] room from the doorway and did not include checking to ensure that [the decedent] was breathing, that he showed no signs of blue in his face or fingers and [that his] BiPAP mask was secure [and] that the tubing was free.” When the decedent was found unresponsive at 4 a.m. on May 23, 2016, the employee who found him did not initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or call for an ambulance. Instead, that employee sought the assistance of another employee, who, at 4:21 a.m. removed the decedent’s BiPAP mask and called the police. Between that time and 4:29 a.m., when paramedics arrived, the two employees moved the decedent to the floor and initiated CPR. The decedent was pronounced dead at 4:38 a.m.

The plaintiff alleged that, contrary to prior nights, the “chip in the BiPAP machine did not record any data” from the time the decedent went to bed on May 22, 2016, to the time that he was pronounced dead on May 23, 2016, and that indicated that the BiPAP machine was not working properly that night. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had failed to properly train its employees as to the decedent’s need for the BiPAP machine and for any other type of relief, including injunctive and declaratory relief, permitted by law. Exhaustion of any available administrative remedies shall not be required prior to commencement of suit under this section.”

“how to operate and understand the functioning of the machine . . . .”

Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict, on March 20, 2024, in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendant ’s negligence and reckless disregard of the decedent’s rights proximately caused his death. The jury awarded the plaintiff $4 million in noneconomic damages and $6 million in punitive damages. On that same day, the trial court accepted and recorded the verdict. On April 8, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment asking that the court enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. In support of that motion, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had not filed a motion to set aside or to reduce the verdict and that the ten day time period for filing such motion had expired. The defendant filed its objection on May 3, 2024. On May 8, 2024, on the plaintiff’s motion, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.3 The court awarded offer of compromise interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a in the amount of $3,364,383.20. The court also awarded postjudgment interest at a rate of 10 percent per year pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 3 The court explained, inter alia: “In this case, while [the defendant] moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiff rested, it failed to file with the clerk a written motion to set aside the verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or any other motion listed in Practice Book § 16-35, within the ten day period mandated by § 16-35, which ten day period expired on April 1, 2024 (March 30, 2024, being a Saturday; see Practice Book § 7-17). Moreover, the defendant did not move for an extension of the ten day period, prior to the expiration of that period, for good cause shown. On the present record, and in light of the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for permission to file a late motion and renewed motion for directed verdict . . . the plaintiff is entitled to the entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict in the amount of $10,000,000. See Practice Book § 17-2.” (Citation omitted.)

Specifically, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove (a) that its negligence caused the decedent’s death, (b) that it acted wilfully or recklessly, and (c) the decedent’s life expectancy.4 In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency were not properly preserved for our review because the defendant failed to file a motion to set aside the verdict in accordance with Practice Book § 16-37.5 We agree with the plaintiff.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. The plaintiff rested her 4 Specifically, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant’s conduct caused the death of the decedent because the testimony of the plaintiff’s causation expert was based on speculation and conjecture and was not supported by subordinate facts. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence of wilful or reckless conduct in support of her claim for punitive damages under § 19a-550 (e) and failed to prove the decedent’s life expectancy for purposes of her claim for loss of life’s enjoyment. Because we conclude that these issues were not preserved, we do not address them.

5 Practice Book § 16-37 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at any time after the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. After the acceptance of a verdict and within the time stated in Section 16-35 for filing a motion to set a verdict aside, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . . If a verdict was returned, the judicial authority may allow the judgment to stand or may set the verdict aside and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. . . .”

Practice Book § 16-35 provides: “Motions in arrest of judgment, whether for extrinsic causes or causes apparent on the record, motions to set aside a verdict, motions for remittitur, motions for additur, motions for new trials, unless brought by petition served on the adverse party or parties, and motions pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225a for reduction of the verdict due to collateral source payments must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted; provided that for good cause the judicial authority may extend this time.

case on March 12, 2024, after which the defendant’s counsel orally moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the decedent’s death and that it acted “wilfully with the intention of killing or causing [the decedent’s] death.”6 After hearing argument on the defendant’s oral motion for a directed verdict, the court held: “The court is going to reserve decision on all of the legal issues raised in the motions for a directed verdict to a later time in the proceedings pursuant to § 16-37 of the Practice Book. . . . But the court is going to take those issues up after the jury has rendered its verdict.” 7 The trial then proceeded with the defendant’s presentation of evidence.

On March 20, 2024, after the court accepted and recorded the jury’s verdict, counsel for the defendant reminded the court, on the record, of its earlier motion for a directed verdict. The court declined to take up the motion at the time and stated that it would “advise [counsel] as to when [it would address it].”8 After the court accepted the jury’s verdict on March 20, 2024, no motions were filed until April 8, 2024, when the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment pursuant The clerk shall notify the trial judge of such filing. Such motions shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies.”

6 The defendant did not file a written motion for a directed verdict. 7 Lincare also orally moved for a directed verdict and filed a written motion. The court’s reference to more than one motion included the motions for a directed verdict by Lincare and the defendant. As noted in footnote 1 of this opinion, the plaintiff withdrew her action as to Lincare.

8 Specifically, the following colloquy occurred after the court accepted the verdict:

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor obviously reserved judgment on several motions and I wasn’t sure if the court wants to take them up at this point in time or wants to.

“The Court: I do not. “[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. I took it as much, I figured everything ’s a little bit fresh in people’s minds, but I did want to remind the court of something I probably don’t need to but obviously I’ll defer to the court as to when the court may want to take those motions up.

“The Court: Attorney Hill, I have not forgotten. . . . And I will advise you as to when.”

to Practice Book § 17-2,9 wherein she asked the court to render judgment on the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff, in her motion, also sought statutory interest, offer of compromise interest and statutory costs. In support of her motion, the plaintiff noted the defendant’s March 12, 2024 oral motion for a directed verdict, but recounted that, “[a]t no time after the defendant rested did [the defendant’s] counsel renew his motion for a directed verdict, nor did he do so after final arguments or before the exhibits were submitted to the jury and the jury began its deliberations.” She further recounted that the defendant had not filed any postverdict motions pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35 or § 16-37. Although the defendant had not filed any postverdict motions that would have precluded the entry of judgment , the plaintiff noted on the request for adjudication of her motion for judgment that the defendant did not consent to the entry of judgment,10 which caused the court to hold a status conference with the parties on April 12, 2024, for the purpose of setting a briefing schedule on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. At that status conference, counsel for the defendant reminded the court that the defendant “still has a pending . . . motion for directed verdict that . . . the court has not ruled on” and 9 Practice Book § 17-2 provides: “The judicial authority shall render judgment on all verdicts of the jury, according to the jury’s finding, subject to statutory adjustments, with costs, unless the verdict is set aside; and in all cases where judgment is rendered otherwise than on a verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall assess the damages which the plaintiff shall recover. If no motions under Section 16-35 or 17-2A are filed, upon the expiration of the time provided for the filing of such motions, judgment on the verdict shall be rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the date of the judgment shall be the date the verdict was accepted. If motions are filed pursuant to Section 16-35 or 17-2A, judgment shall be rendered at the time of and in accordance with the decision on such motions. Whenever a judgment is rendered in a civil jury case, the clerk shall send notice of such judgment to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record. (See General Statutes § 52-225 and annotations.)”

10 The plaintiff filed the request for adjudication on April 9, 2024. The first question on that form is: “May the motion or objection be granted or sustained by agreement or consent?” In response to that question, the plaintiff checked the “[n]o” box.

asked if the court intended “to do anything relative to that motion.” In response, the court explained to counsel that the motion for a directed verdict was deemed to have been denied when the court initially reserved judgment on it and thereafter submitted the action to the jury and accepted the jury’s verdict.11 The court further explained that the only way for the defendant to have resurrected its arguments on the motion for a directed verdict was 11 The following colloquy ensued: “The Court: I’m aware that you made a motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case. I’m fully aware of that, and as I believe I said to you, I know that you made that motion. . . . But that motion is . . . as a matter of law . . . that motion’s deemed—if I reserved judgment on a motion for directed verdict, for purposes of all subsequent proceeding[s], that motion is deemed denied.

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: You’re correct, Your Honor. . . . “The Court: The only way to revive a motion for directed verdict is to file a motion to set aside or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in accordance with the Practice Book. And I assume [that counsel for the plaintiff] are going to say, ‘well, that wasn’t done here, so they’re entitled to judgment.’

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, Your Honor . . . I understand what Your Honor is saying about the motion for directed verdict, but typically , what happens is even when the decision is reserved, the parties are allowed to brief that motion. That’s all I’m looking to do. So, I mention this because Your Honor asked a question about the objection to the motion for judgment. I do want to file an objection, but what I was looking for was some kind of briefing schedule on the motion for directed verdict.

“The Court: In my view . . . there will be no briefing schedule for the motion for directed verdict because it’s deemed denied. It’s deemed denied, so if a motion to set aside where for [a judgment notwithstanding the verdict] had been filed [within] the ten day period, obviously I would set a briefing schedule for that motion. But that wasn’t done, and there will be no briefing schedule on a motion to set aside, but I am going to allow [you], obviously, to oppose the motion for judgment if you wish to do so.

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yeah, no. I appreciate that Your Honor. I could tell you. If the court recalls, at the close of the case, shortly after the jury verdict—and I understand what Your Honor’s saying about the motion being denied, but at the close of evidence, I asked the court and I renewed the motion, and the court said, ‘we’re going to get to that at some point.’ I don’t know exactly what the court’s verbiage was, but ‘we’ll deal with that at some point.’ All I’m doing at this point, Your Honor, is asking the court to allow me to brief that motion, so that we can preserve—the issues are already before the court, such that I think they’re preserved for the Appellate Court, but I just want to be to have filed a motion to set aside the verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict within the ten day period prescribed by Practice Book §16-35, which the defendant failed to do. The court then ordered the parties to file briefs with respect to the motion for judgment by May 3, 2024.12 On May 3, 2024, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, a motion for permission to file a late motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Practice Book §§ 16-35 and 16-37, and a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to § 16-37. In its motion for permission to file a late motion for a directed verdict, the defendant argued, inter alia, that, “[r]egardless of the able to brief it just so we make sure the record is clean before we take this verdict up.

“The Court: “Right, but see, in my view, absent a filing of a motion to set aside and/or a motion for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict], there’s nothing for the court to take up. That’s the court’s view.

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I respect that. I don’t know that I necessarily agree, so what I may do if I may, Your Honor . . . because certainly, I don’t want to do anything in violation of the court’s wishes. I would like a chance to brief that very issue, um, because—

“The Court: In connection with your objection to the motion for judgment , you could raise that issue in there because the issue of the ten days is squarely raised by [the plaintiff’s counsel] in their motion for judgment. So, in my view . . . you have carte blanche to address that issue in the context of an objection to the motion for judgment. . . . [B]ut I’m not going to set a briefing schedule on a motion for direct[ed] verdict when there’s been no motion to set aside filed. . . . I just don’t see how procedurally I can do that.

“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, I mean, as the court knows, that ten days is not jurisdictional, and so, I do think the direct[ed] verdict needs to be amplified for the court’s sake. I do think it need[s] to be amplified and clarified for purposes of the record, so I’ll probably be filing—[it] sounds like the plaintiff will be objecting to it—is an extension to file a motion [to] set aside [the verdict] if the court thinks that’s the prerequisite to renewing the issue in the directed verdict. I don’t know. My initial position is that it should not be necessary, but in light of the court’s comments . . . I feel like I should just notify the court that we’re probably going to file that request for an extension.

“The Court: [Y]ou [file] whatever you feel is necessary to be filed. I’m just saying, on the current record, that’s my view of where we are.”

12 Following that status conference, on the same day, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for judgment on the basis of the court’s explanation of its position on the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

court’s intent on March 20, 2024, the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed that the court considered the motion for directed verdict to be renewed and would subsequently enter a briefing and/or hearing schedule in order to address the issues raised in that motion.”

By written order dated May 8, 2024, the court denied the defendant’s request to file a late motion for a directed verdict. In so doing, the court first noted that the ten day time period for filing postverdict motions set forth in Practice Book § 16-35 is mandatory and the plaintiff had not waived it. The court next noted that any request for an extension of time to file such a motion should have been filed within the ten day time period as provided by § 16-35. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that good cause existed to allow it to file an untimely motion because it “believe[d] that its motion for directed verdict was properly renewed following the jury verdict on March 20, 2024,” because, after accepting the verdict, the court told counsel for the defendant that it would “advise [counsel] as to when” it would take up his motion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court explained: “To begin, postverdict motions governed by § 16-35 cannot be made orally. Even if the court considered the defendant’s verbal ‘reminder’ that the court had reserved judgment on ‘several motions’ as a renewal of those motions—which is a generous interpretation of counsel’s statement, to say the least—the renewal was made orally. This fails to comply with the express requirement of Practice Book § 16-35 that the postverdict motions encompassed by the rule ‘MUST BE FILED WITH THE CLERK within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted . . . .’ . . . To be filed with the clerk, such motions must be written, and the rule does not contemplate the making of oral motions. Given the language of the rule, the defendant’s belief that it had renewed the motion by means of an oral ‘reminder,’ following the acceptance of the jury’s verdict, does not amount to good cause.

“Moreover, as to the court’s statement at the end of proceedings on March 20, 2024—‘I will advise you as to when’—the remark does not suggest, either directly or by implication, that the court was excusing the defendant from its obligation to file a written postverdict motion within the time limits provided by Practice Book § 16-35. Courts do not take up previously denied motions for directed verdict, suo motu, following the acceptance of a verdict. Rather, it is the moving party’s obligation to renew the motion for directed verdict by filing a timely motion to set aside and/or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as provided by Practice Book § 16-37, in accordance with the time limitation established by . . . § 16-35. See, e.g., Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 400–401, 766 A.2d 416 (2001) (observing that ‘a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a new motion, but the renewal of a motion for directed verdict’). As observed by our Supreme Court, ‘[i]n the event that the jury . . . returns a verdict for the plaintiff, [§ 16-37] provides what steps the unsuccessful defendant may take to renew any legal claim previously raised in its motion for a directed verdict . . . .’ (Citation omitted.) Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., [333 Conn. 60, 72–73, 214 A.3d 345 (2019)].

“[The defendant] did not take these steps. As noted by the court during [the] status conference held with the parties on April 12, 2024, [because] the defendant failed to file a postverdict motion within the required time period [set forth in Practice Book § 16-35], there was nothing remaining for the court to consider or take up . . . . Good cause for allowing the untimely submission of the defendant’s motion has not been demonstrated.” (Citation omitted.)

The plaintiff argues that the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency are not properly preserved because the defendant failed to revive its motion for a directed verdict by filing a motion to set aside the verdict . Our rules of practice and our case law support the plaintiff’s argument. Our Supreme Court has explained:

“Practice Book § 16-37 expressly provides the procedure to be followed by a trial court when a motion for a directed verdict is not granted. If such a motion ‘is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.’ Practice Book § 16-37. The trial court, therefore, may grant the motion, deny the motion, or reserve decision on the motion. See Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Pagano, 79 Conn. App. 458, 466, 830 A.2d 359 (2003) (recognizing that trial court may ‘delay its decision on a motion for a directed verdict’ and need not ‘immediately deny or immediately grant the motion’); 2 R. Bollier & S. Busby, Stephenson’s Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 195 (d), p. 399 (‘[u]nder [§] 16-37 . . . the trial judge can refuse to rule on the motion for a directed verdict and submit the case to the jury’).

“Practice Book § 16-37 treats the trial court’s election to reserve decision as the equivalent of a denial of the motion for purposes of subsequent proceedings, which is why the rule states that the case is deemed to have been submitted to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion if, for any reason, ‘the motion is not granted . . . .’ Practice Book § 16-37. In the event that the jury thereafter returns a verdict for the plaintiff, the rule provides what steps the unsuccessful defendant may take to renew any legal claim previously raised in its motion for a directed verdict: ‘After the acceptance of a verdict and within the time stated in Section 16-35 for filing a motion to set a verdict aside, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment rendered thereon set aside and have judgment rendered in accordance with his or her motion for a directed verdict . . . .’ Practice Book § 16-37.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Riley v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., supra, 333 Conn. 72–73.

It is also well settled that it is necessary for a party to move to set aside a verdict to obtain appellate review of a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 205 Conn. 751, 758–59, 535 A.2d 1292 (1988); Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510, 513, 441 A.2d 163 (1981); Goral v. Kenney, 26 Conn. App. 231, 235, 600 A.2d 1031 (1991). Our Supreme Court has explained that this principle is grounded on the notion that we do not address claims on appeal that were not distinctly raised in the trial court.13 Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, supra, 515. This serves “to afford the trial court a full opportunity to redress any errors which may have occurred at trial before the appellate process is begun.” Id.

The defendant argues that Pietrorazio has been overruled by our Supreme Court’s decision in Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 682 A.2d 106 (1996), and “that a postverdict motion is no longer required in order to preserve appellate review of issues raised at trial.” In Pietrorazio, the plaintiff claimed that “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that several rulings of the court pertaining to the admissibility of testimony were erroneous.” Pietrorazio v. Santopietro , supra, 185 Conn. 511. The plaintiff failed to file a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict rendered in favor of the defendants. Id., 512. The court held that claims of insufficient evidence and claims of error that occur during trial, such as those relating to the admissibility of evidence, must be asserted in a motion to set aside the verdict in order to properly preserve such claims for appellate review. Id., 515.

In Santopietro, the court addressed the issue of whether “a motion to set aside the verdict [w]as a prerequisite for full appellate review of rulings other than those involving the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.” Santopietro v. New Haven, supra, 239 Conn. 214. The court thus focused on rulings made by the trial court and expressly noted: “We need not decide in this case 13 The court also noted that “trial counsel often file such motions as a matter of course immediately following the rendition of an adverse verdict.” Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, supra, 185 Conn. 515.

whether that understanding, namely, that a motion to set a verdict aside is essential to full appellate review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a civil verdict, is correct.” Id., 213 n.9. More recently, in Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 717 A.2d 77 (1998), our Supreme Court, citing Santopietro, noted: “We note that it is no longer generally necessary for litigants to preserve a claim both during trial and posttrial in a motion to set aside the verdict in order to obtain appellate review. . . . In Santopietro, however, we specifically reserved the question of whether, in a civil action for money damages, it would be necessary to raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence both during the trial and in a motion to set aside the verdict.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 49 n.43. Our case law requiring that a motion to set aside a verdict be filed in order to revive claims of insufficient evidence that are raised in a motion for a directed verdict therefore controls our disposition of the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency in this case.

Here, pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37, the defendant ’s motion for a directed verdict was deemed to have been denied when the court reserved its decision on it and ultimately submitted the case to the jury. Counsel for the defendant conceded that at the April 12, 2024 status conference. See footnote 11 of this opinion. Section 16-37 clearly sets forth the steps that a party must take in order for the court to consider the issues raised in that motion for a directed verdict after the jury renders a verdict, namely, file a motion to set aside the verdict within ten days.14 It is uncontested that the defendant failed to 14 With respect to the relatively short period within which parties may file postverdict motions, our Supreme Court has noted: “[A]lthough the time is short, [it] is found by experience to be on the whole for the interest of the public. We no more feel at liberty to disregard it on account of the hardship of a particular case than we do to disregard an ordinary statute of limitations for a similar reason.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, supra, 205 Conn. 758.

do so.15 Because the defendant did not file a motion to set aside the verdict asking to have judgment rendered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict in accordance with § 16-37, which had been deemed denied by the court, it failed to properly preserve for our review its claims of evidentiary insufficiency.16 We therefore decline to review them.

II

The defendant also claims that “[t]he plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages based on [the defendant’s] alleged 15 In fact, it is uncontested that the defendant did not file any motions with the court following the court’s acceptance of the verdict on March 20, 2024, until May 3, 2024. Even if the defendant’s claim of a “good faith misunderstanding” could have excused its failure to comply with Practice Book § 16-37, the defendant’s failure to file any motions with the court until May 3, 2024, when it became aware of the court’s position on the oral motion for directed verdict on April 12, 2024, is inexplicable. Although the court scheduled the filing of briefs on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment to be filed by that date, it is unclear why the defendant would not immediately have filed a motion for permission to file a late motion to set aside.

It is also noteworthy that the twenty day appeal period in this case expired on April 9, 2024, twenty days after the jury’s verdict was accepted. Practice Book § 63-1 (b). On May 23, 2024, more than sixty days after the court accepted the jury’s verdict, the defendant filed a motion for permission to file a late appeal, which was granted by this court.

Although not at issue at this point, it is equally perplexing that the defendant would not take any action with respect to its right to file an appeal with this court, the time period for the filing of which unequivocally began to run on March 20, 2024, when the court accepted the jury’s verdict.

16 The defendant argues that the court “should have ruled on [the defendant’s] motion for directed verdict or, alternatively, granted permission to file a late motion for directed verdict” and abused its discretion by failing to do so. The defendant argues: “Given that [the defendant’s] motion [for a directed verdict] was properly renewed following the verdict (and given the plaintiff’s contested motion for judgment, filed within twenty days of the verdict), [the defendant] submits that it properly renewed its motion for directed verdict and that the court should have considered the same.” In so arguing, the defendant seems to be arguing that it properly renewed its motion for a directed verdict when it contested the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. The plaintiff filed her motion for judgment on April 8, 2024, nineteen days after the court accepted the verdict, wherein she noted that the defendant had not filed any postverdict motions. Rather than file an recklessness should not have been permitted to stand.” Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) the plaintiff’s claims of reckless or wilful misconduct were filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations, (2) the plaintiff’s claim for recovery under § 19a-550 (e) was barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute, (3) the plaintiff ’s claim for recklessness “constitute[d] an improper respondeat superior claim,” and (4) the court improperly permitted the plaintiff to file the operative complaint when she failed to comply with Practice Book § 10-60. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s foregoing claims.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our consideration of these claims. In her original complaint filed on April 30, 2018, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s negligence caused the wrongful death of the decedent. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 1, 2019, wherein she again alleged that the wrongful death of the decedent was caused by the negligence of the defendant.

On March 3, 2023, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend her complaint to conform to evidence obtained during discovery. In her proposed amended complaint, the plaintiff added, inter alia, an allegation that the defendant failed to provide the decedent “with quality care and services as required by [§] 19a-550 et seq.” The plaintiff further proposed an amendment to her prayer for relief, seeking punitive damages pursuant to § 19a- 550 (e). On March 14, 2023, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend on the sole ground that it was untimely because, at that time, immediate objection to the motion or a motion for permission to file a late motion to set aside the verdict, the defendant simply indicated to the plaintiff, upon inquiry for purposes of completing the request for adjudication of that motion, that it did not consent to the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, we reject the defendant’s argument.

The defendant further contends that its counsel “repeatedly had attempted to bring the issues to the court’s attention.” As recounted herein, this contention is belied by the record.

the trial was scheduled to begin in six weeks. On March 20, 2023, the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant’s objection, arguing that “the proposed amendment does not add any new factual allegations which have not been a part of this case for the past two to three years [and] [a]mending the complaint will not cause any delay or require any additional discovery.” On March 31, 2023, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, arguing that the plaintiff’s amendment “seeks to add a different set of operative facts, which do not relate back to the prior allegation and are therefore time barred” and “the proposed amendment is prejudicial because it adds a new claim of recklessness that requires discovery to determine the basis for it, as well as dispositive motion(s) to determine if it is legally or factually sufficient.” The plaintiff filed a memorandum in reply to the defendant’s opposition, reiterating the arguments that she asserted in her reply to the defendant’s first objection, and arguing that the additional allegations related back to her original claim that the defendant provided the decedent with substandard medical care and supervision. Citing to our Supreme Court’s decision in Briere v. Greater Hartford Orthopedic Group, P.C., 325 Conn. 198, 211, 157 A.3d 70 (2017), the plaintiff argued that a multifactor analysis should be conducted on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether the proposed amendment is permissible as an expansion or amplification of the original cause of action or whether it is so different as to create a new and different cause of action that does not relate back and should be prohibited.17 Applying the factors set forth in Briere, the plaintiff contended that “[t]he amended complaint is directed at the same defendants and alleges conduct that occurred during the same period, 17 Those factors include: (1) do the new allegations involve the same actors; (2) does the amendment allege events that occurred during the same period of time; (3) did the events occur at the same location; (4) did the new conduct result in the same injury; (5) does the amendment allege substantially similar types of behavior by the defendant; and (6) will the amendment require the same type of evidence and experts. Briere v. Greater Hartford Orthopedic Group, P.C., supra, 325 Conn. 211.

at the same location, and alleges substantially similar types of behavior with respect to the substandard care and supervision afforded to [the decedent]. The plaintiff will offer the same evidence at trial and will rely upon the same experts.” On April 9, 2023, the court, Bellis, J., summarily granted the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her complaint.

On June 30, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s “claims for recklessness and/or punitive damages in . . . the plaintiff’s prayer for relief.” The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to assert in her amended complaint any allegations of recklessness and, therefore, there was “no basis to seek punitive damages for recklessness under § 19a-550 (e).” The defendant further argued that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) violated the exclusive remedy provided under § 52-555, the wrongful death statute. The defendant finally argued that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) constituted “a claim for respondeat superior against an employer for the reckless and/or intentional conduct of its staff, which is not allowed under Connecticut law.” In response, the plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum in support of her objection.

On September 25, 2023, the court, Bellis, J., granted the defendant’s motion to strike on the ground that the plaintiff had “not pleaded facts sufficient to support a claim of recklessness” and there was “therefore no basis for an award of punitive damages under § 19a-550 (e).”18 On that same day, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44, the plaintiff filed a substitute amended complaint.19 On 18 Because that conclusion was dispositive of the defendant’s motion to strike, the court did not address the defendant’s other arguments in support of its motion.

19 Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: “Within fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where an entire complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count in a complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint has been stricken, and the party whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enter judgment against said

October 2, 2023, the plaintiff filed a revised amended complaint.

On October 18, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike the claims for intentional and/or wilful conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s amended revised complaint. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had “inserted facts unilaterally without seeking leave of the court” and impermissibly had alleged “an entirely new cause of action.” The defendant also argued that the plaintiff’s claims of intentional or wilful conduct were beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The defendant also renewed its arguments that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) violated the exclusive remedy provided under § 52-555, the wrongful death statute, and constituted “a claim for respondeat superior against an employer for the intentional and/or wilful conduct of its staff, which is not allowed under Connecticut law.” The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion.

On October 28, 2023, the court, Bellis, J., denied the defendant’s motion to strike. In its written order, the court first explained that the plaintiff properly filed a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44 after the court granted the defendant’s prior motion to strike and therefore rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s new allegations were improper because they were filed without leave of the court. The court also explained that a motion to strike is not the proper vehicle by which to assert a statute of limitations defense. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s arguments that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) violated the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute and that the plaintiff improperly asserted a respondeat superior claim based on recklessness.

The defendant thereafter moved for permission to file a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims of recklessness and for punitive party on said stricken complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or count thereof. . . .”

damages were not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. The court, Pierson, J., denied that motion. The court, Pierson, J., also denied a motion in limine filed by the defendant to preclude the plaintiff from presenting evidence in support of her claims of recklessness, again on the ground that those claims were filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations.

Although the defendant has not expressly identified which of the trial court’s rulings recounted previously that it is challenging on appeal, we glean from its arguments that it is claiming that the court erred in denying its October 18, 2023 motion to strike. “Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court’s ruling . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spiotti v. Clarke, 235 Conn. App. 715, 721, 346 A.3d 562 (2025).

A

The defendant first claims that the plaintiff’s allegations of recklessness and request for punitive damages should not have been permitted because they were raised beyond the statute of limitations.20 The defendant does not acknowledge that the trial court never addressed the merits of its statute of limitations defense because the defendant did not raise it by the proper procedural vehicle in a timely manner. Instead, the defendant argues the defense on its merits. Because the court did not rule on the merits of the defendant’s statute of limitations defense, the claim has not been properly preserved for our review. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 442 n.7, 948 A.2d 982 (2008). 20 Notably, the defendant has not claimed that the court improperly denied his motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment or his motion in limine.

B

The defendant next claims that the plaintiff’s claim for recovery under § 19a-550 (e) is barred by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute. In the two paragraphs that the defendant devotes to this claim in its brief to this court, the defendant relies, as it did in the trial court, on Vassalluzzo v. Silver Hill Hospital, Inc., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2021 WL 1691893 (Conn. Super. April 1, 2021), in which the court held that, although “a plaintiff cannot sue under a different statute for damages directly resulting from the tort that caused the death, it can ‘advance alternative theories of liability under the [wrongful death] statute . . . .’ ” Id., *6. The defendant contends, in conclusory fashion, that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) was not simply an alternative theory of liability but, rather, “created a new, independent cause of action . . . .” The defendant does not address the trial court’s distinction of Vassalluzzo from the present case; nor does the defendant address its reliance on another Superior Court case, Clemente v. Cedar Lane Rehabilitation & Health Care Center, LLC, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2010 WL 1050428 (Conn. Super. February 11, 2010), in which the plaintiff’s decedent died while a patient at the defendant health care facility ; id., *1; and the court denied a motion to strike the plaintiff’s § 19a-550 claim on the ground that “it claims damages under § 19a-550 as an element of a wrongful death claim under § 52-555 as an element of permissible damages.” Id., *3.21 The defendant fails to provide any 21 Instead, the defendant cites only to Vassalluzzo, as if it is the settled law on this issue. The court’s citation to Clemente belies such a position. Indeed, in Gilbert v. Nuvance Health, Inc., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2024 WL 3422737 (Conn. Super. July 9, 2024), the court stated: “[T]his court cannot agree there is or should be a blanket prohibition against a plaintiff pursuing, on properly plead[ed] facts, both a death claim and a patient’s bill of rights claim in the same case.” Id., *3. We nevertheless note, as the plaintiff points out, that this issue was squarely addressed by our Supreme Court in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984), in which the court held that the wrongful death statute permitted an award of treble damages under General Statutes § 14-295. Id., 292.

analysis as to why the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) constituted a separate, independent cause of action versus an alternative theory of liability, or an element of permissible damages under the wrongful death statute. “[W]here the defendants have not addressed the dispositive basis for the court’s rejection of their . . . claim, we decline to review the defendants’ claim as inadequately briefed.” Metropolitan District v. Mott, 235 Conn. App. 449, 479–80, 346 A.3d 1064 (2025), citing Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 692, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024) (declining to review plaintiff’s claim as inadequately briefed when plaintiff failed to address dispositive bases of court’s decision), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).

Because the defendant failed to address the dispositive basis for the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claim under § 19a-550 (e) was not precluded by the exclusivity of the wrongful death statute, its brief is inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of this claim.

C

The defendant next claims that the court should have stricken the plaintiff’s claims of recklessness, and her associated claim for punitive damages, because they constituted an improper claim for vicarious liability. In rejecting this claim, the trial court reasoned, inter alia: “[The defendant] has provided no case law establishing that a plaintiff may not assert a claim for recklessness [and punitive damages brought against a defendant health care center pursuant to] § 19a-550 (e) . . . . A health care agency such as [the defendant] can only act through it agents. . . . Considering that plaintiffs are limited to bringing a § 19a-550 action against only an enumerated facility . . . construing § 19a-550 (e) in the manner advanced by [the defendant] would effectively preclude any plaintiff from stating a claim for recklessness pursuant to § 19a-550 (e).” (Citations omitted.) On appeal, aside from citing to case law for the proposition that an employer cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees that are not in furtherance of the employer’s business, the defendant argues: “While there was no evidence at trial that [the defendant’s] staff acted in a way that was intended to injure the decedent, had there been such evidence, the employee would not be serving [the defendant] as employer (and there was no evidence to suggest otherwise). As a result, [the defendant ] cannot be vicariously liable in this case for any intentional or reckless conduct of its employees.” These two preceding sentences constitute the entirety of the defendant’s analysis of this claim. The defendant provides no analysis of how the legal principles that it has cited apply to this case, specifically, how its employees were not acting in furtherance of its business. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 304, 327 A.3d 982 (2024) (“[t]he parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the absence of any such analysis, this claim has not been adequately briefed, and we therefore decline to review it.

D

The defendant finally claims that the court “should not have allowed [the plaintiff to file] the amended revised complaint.” Specifically, the defendant argues, as it did in its motion to strike,22 that “[w]hile amendments are within the sound discretion of the trial court, the plaintiff here did not even move to amend her complaint (with respect to the amended revised complaint), thus failing to invoke the court’s authority in the first place.” In so arguing, the defendant cites Practice Book § 10-60, which provides that a party may amend his or her pleadings only by order of the judicial authority, consent of the adverse party or filing a request for leave to amend. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, explaining that, “after the court issued its decision on September 22 Although the heading of this section of the defendant’s brief seems to indicate a challenge to the court’s granting of the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her complaint, the substance of the defendant’s argument clearly indicates that the defendant is challenging the court’s denial of its motion to strike based on this same argument.

25, 2023 . . . [granting the defendant’s] motion to strike, the plaintiff properly and timely filed a substituted complaint as permitted by Practice Book § 10-44, adding count two with more detailed allegations.” (Citation omitted.) Indeed, § 10-44 permits a party whose pleading has been stricken to file a substitute pleading. The defendant has not challenged the court’s determination that the plaintiff’s amended revised complaint was a proper substituted complaint under § 10-44. Because the defendant has not challenged the basis for the court’s rejection of this claim, it has not adequately briefed it. See Sicignano v. Pearce, supra, 228 Conn. App. 692.

The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.