Casavan Carrara Marble Co. v. United States

39 Cust. Ct. 97
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedAugust 27, 1957
DocketC. D. 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 39 Cust. Ct. 97 (Casavan Carrara Marble Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casavan Carrara Marble Co. v. United States, 39 Cust. Ct. 97 (cusc 1957).

Opinion

Wilson, Judge:

The parties to this action have stipulated that the involved merchandise consists of colored glass tile or tiling. The collector assessed the importation at 50 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 218 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 51802, supplemented by Presidential proclamation, T. D. 51898, as articles of colored glass, not cut or engraved. The importer claims that the merchandise is properly dutiable at 15 per centum ad valorem under the provisions of paragraph 231 of the tariff act, as modified by the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 52739, as opal glass the or thing.

The plaintiff placed in evidence samples of glass the which, with the exception of color, are identical to the imported merchandise (plaintiff’s collective illustrative exhibit 1) and, in addition, a chart illustrating the range of colors of glass the imported by the plaintiff (plaintiff’s hlustrative exhibit 2). However, neither side offered in evidence any exhibit which both parties would agree to be opal glass tile. There is, therefore, before the court no sample which can be taken as a true criterion for determining the characteristics of opal glass.

The only witness who testified in the case was Paul E,. Casa vina, president of the plaintiff corporation. While Mr. Casavina has had considerable experience in the importation and distribution of glass thes, yet his basic training was in engineering and not in the field of chemistry or glass the manufacturing. There was, therefore, considerable confusion in Mr. Casavina’s testimony as to what is and what is not opal glass and opal glass the. For example, when asked specifically “What is opal glass?” he replied:

It is an iridescent milky effect which has suspended crystals. These individual molecules or crystals throw out light. It has a consolidation in order to obtain opal glass, which is manufactured; it has fluoride, silicon, zirconium, copper, traces of these properties.
Chief Judge Oliver: Do you mean to tell the court that if you have a blue tile, a dozen different sizes or shapes of blue tile, that you can pick one tile up and say, this is an opalescent when it is simply blue in color and non-transparent?
The Witness: Yes. It is in the method of manufacture.
Chief Judge Oliver: So the color has nothing to do with it?
The Witness: No. What obtains the color are the metallic oxides in the consolidation of it, the increasing or decreasing plus the silicas. (R. 24.)

The defendant introduced in evidence samples of tile similar to that imported by the plaintiff (defendant’s collective exhibit B).. Plaintiff’s witness considered defendant’s collective exhibit B to be opal glass and not “tiles composed of transparent glass into which some material has been placed or imbedded,” but then agreed that [99]*99the samples in question could be “a transparent glass base containing some opaque or translucent particles” (R. 50-51). Mr. Casavina further testified as follows:

X Q. So then you couldn’t distinguish an opal glass from a transparent glass with particles imbedded therein unless you knew what went into the manufacture? — -A. Not particularly, no. * * *
Judge Mollison: What are the determining factors or considerations which would enable you to determine whether a thing is opal glass?
The Witness: The determining factor is number 1, it has a three-dimension effect; it has a milky effect, and an iridescent effect.
Judge Mollison: What is a milky effect?
The Witness: It is anything that is a consolidation which looks like milk. (R. 52.)

Counsel for the importer, when asked to define opal glass, stated it is “that glass which has suspended in the mass small crystalline particles so that it will reflect or refract the light as it goes through, so that it becomes a milky or translucent piece of glass. It is not transparent, and it accomplishes that translucent element because of the suspension of small bits of fluorspar or cryolite, sulfates, in them, and that colored opal glass is the same thing except that they add oxides of metal to give the coloring to the glass.” Counsel for the Government, in accepting that definition, made the following statement: “We think Mr. Glad is essentially correct, and it is a question of whether these particular items do come within that definition or description” (R. 3-5). The issue in the case, therefore, is, as the parties agree, “whether or not the imported tiles are composed of opal glass,” and, to determine this question, it is essential that we find the meaning of the term “opal glass tile,” as used in the tariff act. Apparently, this issue has never been decided either by the United States Customs Court or the court of appeals.

In the case of Joseph H. Inwald Glass Co. et al. v. United States, 48 Treas. Dec. 275, T. D. 41152, the merchandise was classified at 50 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 230 of the Tariff Act of 1922 as manufactures of glass, not specially provided for, and was claimed properly classifiable at 40 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 231 of the same act under the provision therein for “rods, opal glass in rods.” The official samples of the merchandise consisted of slender sticks or rods of white or opal-colored glass. Certain other samples were received in evidence as “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit 1.” The former was described as “a perfectly white rod of nontranslucent glass; in other words, opaque or impervious to light.” Exhibit 1 was more of a milky white or bluish white than exhibit A. The importer, in the Inwald Glass Co. case, supra, testified that both exhibit 1 and exhibit A were of a white or opaque color and that commercially “ ‘what we [100]*100call opal, Exhibit A’ costs a little more than Exhibit 1.” One of the witnesses produced a sample of merchandise from the shipment in question, marked “Exhibit 2,” which was very similar in color and translucency to exhibit 1, but more of a bluish white or skim-milk color. This witness testified that the sample in question was “opal glass cane,” but that he would not call exhibit A opal but “Enamel or chalk white * * * because opal is slightly opaque, you can look through it, chalk white you can’t.”

The court, in the Inwald Glass Co. case, supra, held the involved merchandise dutiable under paragraph 231, as claimed. In so holding, the court stated:

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39 Cust. Ct. 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casavan-carrara-marble-co-v-united-states-cusc-1957.