Carvalho Dos Reis v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-7719
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TAINAN SANTOS CARVALHO DOS No. 24-7719 REIS; ODIRLEI CANDIDO DOS REIS; E. Agency Nos. S. D. R., A220-894-906 A220-894-905 Petitioners, A220-894-907 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 9, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Tainan Santos-Carvalho Dos Reis (“Tainan”), her husband

Odirlei Candido-Dos Reis (“Odirlei”) (together, “Petitioners”), and their minor

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). child E.S.D.R.1 are citizens of Brazil. They seek review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying

their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioners also assert that the IJ

erroneously made an adverse credibility determination. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that

reasoning with its own analysis, this Court may review both decisions to the extent

the BIA, in reaching its decision, relied on the grounds considered by the IJ. See

Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016); Santiago-Rodriguez v.

Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court reviews the BIA’s factual

findings under the highly deferential substantial evidence standard and reviews de

novo both purely legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact. See

Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 2012). When reviewing

factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, this Court “must

accept ‘administrative findings’ as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S.

1 E.S.D.R. seeks asylum as a derivative beneficiary—i.e., she does not seek relief separate from her parents’ applications and is not entitled to assert a derivative claim for withholding of removal or CAT protection. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

2 24-7719 357, 365 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); see also Mukulumbutu v.

Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020).

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination, and Petitioners have not identified any evidence in the record that

compels a contrary conclusion. Specifically, the IJ cited numerous specific and

cogent reasons to support the adverse credibility determination, such as (1)

Tainan’s difficulty recalling dates and numbers during her testimony; (2) the lack

of evidence corroborating any of the harms Petitioners allegedly suffered; (3)

inconsistencies between Tainan’s declarations and her testimony at the merits

hearing; and (4) inconsistences between Tainan’s and Odirlei’s testimonies. See

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that

substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility finding where the petitioner

provided inconsistent testimony regarding where he lived before entering the

United States and where his testimony regarding his alleged persecution

contradicted his declaration).

Critically, besides their testimonies, Petitioners only submitted evidence

regarding Brazil’s general conditions. However, these materials did not mention

Petitioners and, as such, failed to rehabilitate their testimonies. See Mukulumbutu,

977 F.3d at 927 (holding that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof

where an adverse credibility determination was made and where the petitioner

3 24-7719 failed to submit sufficient corroborating evidence); Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d

1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[w]ithout Wang’s testimony, the

remaining evidence in the record is insufficient to carry her burden of establishing

eligibility for relief” or protection). Accordingly, the IJ, as affirmed by the BIA,

properly considered the totality of the circumstances when making the adverse

credibility determination, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that

Petitioners’ testimonies were not credible.

2. “Without credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence,

[Petitioners] cannot show that [they] ha[ve] a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’

based on a protected ground.” Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927. As such, we deny

the petition with respect to Petitioners’ claims for asylum. See id. (holding same).

3. Because Petitioners have not met the standard for asylum, they cannot

meet the higher burden of demonstrating the clear probability of persecution

required for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §

1208.16(b); Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927 (holding same and citing Ramirez-

Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016)).

4. As noted by the BIA, Petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s findings

related to CAT protection on administrative appeal. Nor did Petitioners raise any

arguments related to CAT protection in their brief to this Court. Accordingly,

Petitioners have abandoned any challenge related to CAT protection. See

4 24-7719 Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1996) (noncitizen’s

failure to argue issue on appeal deemed abandonment).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Removal, Dkt. No. 10, is DENIED effective upon issuance of the mandate from this Court.

5 24-7719