Opinion
ROGERS, C. J.
The plaintiff, Christopher Caruso, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a (a),1 claiming, inter alia, that the defendant Santa Ayala, the Democratic registrar of voters for the city of [796]*796Bridgeport (city), had violated certain election statutes before, during and after the September 11, 2007 Democratic primary for the office of the mayor of the city.2 After an expedited hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff then brought an appeal.3 At the same time, the plaintiff filed in this [797]*797court a motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11,4 requesting postponement of the city’s general election scheduled for November 6, 2007, pending resolution of the appeal. We denied the motion and indicated that a full opinion explaining our decision would be released at a later date. This is that opinion. We conclude that the motion to stay should be denied because the automatic stay provision of § 61-11 did not apply to the city’s general election for mayor, this court has no authority to order postjudgment injunctive relief that was not requested in the underlying complaint and, even if this court had such authority, it has no authority to postpone a general election in an action pursuant to § 9-329a under any circumstances.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff was a candidate for the office of mayor in the city’s September 11, 2007 Democratic primary. The defendant William Finch, another Democratic candidate for the office of mayor, won the primary election by 270 votes. Fourteen days after the primary, on September 25, 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that, before, during and after the primary, Ayala had engaged in conduct that violated various election statutes. In [798]*798his original complaint, the plaintiff stated that he was bringing the action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328, but he later clarified in his second amended complaint that he was bringing the action pursuant to § 9-329a.5 In each complaint, the plaintiff sought orders that (1) all of the voting machines used in the Democratic primary election be impounded beyond the automatic fourteen day impoundment period provided for in General Statutes § 9-310, (2) no Democratic nominee for mayor be recognized before the case was resolved, (3) the plaintiff be declared the winner of the Democratic primary for the office of mayor, (4) a new primary election be held and (5) the ballots cast in the primary election not be examined, unlocked or otherwise inspected except by order of the court.
The trial court ordered an expedited hearing on the matter to be held beginning on October 3, 2007. The trial court also issued an ex parte order that all of the voting machines used in the primary, as well as certain other materials related to the election, be impounded, pending further order by the court.
The expedited hearing concluded on October 15, 2007, and, on October 24, 2007, the trial court issued [799]*799its decision. The trial court determined that many of the alleged statutory violations by Ayala did not constitute “ ‘ruling[s]’ ” of an election official, as specified by § 9-329a, and, therefore, did not come within the scope of an action pursuant to § 9-329a. With respect to the actions by Ayala that colorably constituted rulings by an election official, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove: (1) that the rulings were improper; (2) that the results of the primary might have been different if the rulings had been different; or (3) what the outcome would have been if the rulings had been different. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and, pursuant to § 9-329a (b), certified his decision to the secretary of the state.
On October 26, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s impoundment order so that the voting machines could be prepared for the city’s general election on November 6, 2007. The plaintiff objected to the motion and requested that the trial court certify the question of whether the impoundment order should be vacated to the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325. After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to vacate the impoundment order and denied the plaintiffs request to certify the question to the Chief Justice.
On October 30, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion to postpone the general election “during the pendency of [his] appeal to the Supreme Court.”6 In the motion, he also requested that the question of whether the election should be postponed be certified to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325. The trial court denied the motion.
On November 1, 2007, the plaintiff filed an appeal, citing General Statutes §§ 51-199 (b) (5) and 9-325 as the statutory bases for the Supreme Court’s appellate [800]*800jurisdiction over the matter. See footnote 3 of this opinion. In his preliminary statement of issues, the plaintiff raised numerous claims relating to the merits of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, the vacating of the impoundment order, the denial of the motion to postpone the election and the denials of the plaintiffs requests to certify the questions of whether the impoundment order should be vacated and the election should be postponed to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325. The plaintiff also filed a motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 in which he requested that the city’s general election for mayor, scheduled for November 6, 2007, be postponed “pending the appeal.” After the plaintiff filed his appeal and motion to stay, the trial court certified to the Chief Justice the question of whether the trial court was required to grant the plaintiffs motion to postpone the city’s general election for mayor pending the plaintiffs appeal.7
Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the certified appeal; see footnote 8 of this opinion; and an opposition to the plaintiffs motion to stay. With respect to the motion to stay, the defendants argued that the motion went to the merits of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants and required this court to make de novo factual findings on the basis of evidence produced at the hearing. On the same day that the defendants filed their motion to dismiss and opposition to the motion to stay, the secretary of the state filed, and this court granted, a motion to intervene in the case for the purpose of opposing the plaintiff’s motion to stay. In her memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay, the secretary of the state contended that, under the standard set forth in Griffin Hospital [801]*801v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 456, 493 A.2d 229 (1985), the motion should be denied. Id. (in ruling on motion to stay order of administrative agency, trial court considers “[1] the likelihood that the appellant will prevail; [2] the irreparability of the injury to be suffered from immediate implementation of the . . . order [under review]; [3] the effect of a stay upon other parties to the proceeding; and [4] the public interest involved”).
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Opinion
ROGERS, C. J.
The plaintiff, Christopher Caruso, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a (a),1 claiming, inter alia, that the defendant Santa Ayala, the Democratic registrar of voters for the city of [796]*796Bridgeport (city), had violated certain election statutes before, during and after the September 11, 2007 Democratic primary for the office of the mayor of the city.2 After an expedited hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff then brought an appeal.3 At the same time, the plaintiff filed in this [797]*797court a motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11,4 requesting postponement of the city’s general election scheduled for November 6, 2007, pending resolution of the appeal. We denied the motion and indicated that a full opinion explaining our decision would be released at a later date. This is that opinion. We conclude that the motion to stay should be denied because the automatic stay provision of § 61-11 did not apply to the city’s general election for mayor, this court has no authority to order postjudgment injunctive relief that was not requested in the underlying complaint and, even if this court had such authority, it has no authority to postpone a general election in an action pursuant to § 9-329a under any circumstances.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff was a candidate for the office of mayor in the city’s September 11, 2007 Democratic primary. The defendant William Finch, another Democratic candidate for the office of mayor, won the primary election by 270 votes. Fourteen days after the primary, on September 25, 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that, before, during and after the primary, Ayala had engaged in conduct that violated various election statutes. In [798]*798his original complaint, the plaintiff stated that he was bringing the action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328, but he later clarified in his second amended complaint that he was bringing the action pursuant to § 9-329a.5 In each complaint, the plaintiff sought orders that (1) all of the voting machines used in the Democratic primary election be impounded beyond the automatic fourteen day impoundment period provided for in General Statutes § 9-310, (2) no Democratic nominee for mayor be recognized before the case was resolved, (3) the plaintiff be declared the winner of the Democratic primary for the office of mayor, (4) a new primary election be held and (5) the ballots cast in the primary election not be examined, unlocked or otherwise inspected except by order of the court.
The trial court ordered an expedited hearing on the matter to be held beginning on October 3, 2007. The trial court also issued an ex parte order that all of the voting machines used in the primary, as well as certain other materials related to the election, be impounded, pending further order by the court.
The expedited hearing concluded on October 15, 2007, and, on October 24, 2007, the trial court issued [799]*799its decision. The trial court determined that many of the alleged statutory violations by Ayala did not constitute “ ‘ruling[s]’ ” of an election official, as specified by § 9-329a, and, therefore, did not come within the scope of an action pursuant to § 9-329a. With respect to the actions by Ayala that colorably constituted rulings by an election official, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove: (1) that the rulings were improper; (2) that the results of the primary might have been different if the rulings had been different; or (3) what the outcome would have been if the rulings had been different. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and, pursuant to § 9-329a (b), certified his decision to the secretary of the state.
On October 26, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s impoundment order so that the voting machines could be prepared for the city’s general election on November 6, 2007. The plaintiff objected to the motion and requested that the trial court certify the question of whether the impoundment order should be vacated to the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325. After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to vacate the impoundment order and denied the plaintiffs request to certify the question to the Chief Justice.
On October 30, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion to postpone the general election “during the pendency of [his] appeal to the Supreme Court.”6 In the motion, he also requested that the question of whether the election should be postponed be certified to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325. The trial court denied the motion.
On November 1, 2007, the plaintiff filed an appeal, citing General Statutes §§ 51-199 (b) (5) and 9-325 as the statutory bases for the Supreme Court’s appellate [800]*800jurisdiction over the matter. See footnote 3 of this opinion. In his preliminary statement of issues, the plaintiff raised numerous claims relating to the merits of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, the vacating of the impoundment order, the denial of the motion to postpone the election and the denials of the plaintiffs requests to certify the questions of whether the impoundment order should be vacated and the election should be postponed to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325. The plaintiff also filed a motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 in which he requested that the city’s general election for mayor, scheduled for November 6, 2007, be postponed “pending the appeal.” After the plaintiff filed his appeal and motion to stay, the trial court certified to the Chief Justice the question of whether the trial court was required to grant the plaintiffs motion to postpone the city’s general election for mayor pending the plaintiffs appeal.7
Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the certified appeal; see footnote 8 of this opinion; and an opposition to the plaintiffs motion to stay. With respect to the motion to stay, the defendants argued that the motion went to the merits of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants and required this court to make de novo factual findings on the basis of evidence produced at the hearing. On the same day that the defendants filed their motion to dismiss and opposition to the motion to stay, the secretary of the state filed, and this court granted, a motion to intervene in the case for the purpose of opposing the plaintiff’s motion to stay. In her memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay, the secretary of the state contended that, under the standard set forth in Griffin Hospital [801]*801v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 456, 493 A.2d 229 (1985), the motion should be denied. Id. (in ruling on motion to stay order of administrative agency, trial court considers “[1] the likelihood that the appellant will prevail; [2] the irreparability of the injury to be suffered from immediate implementation of the . . . order [under review]; [3] the effect of a stay upon other parties to the proceeding; and [4] the public interest involved”). Specifically, the secretary of the state argued that postponing the election veiy likely would result in suppressed voter turnout, increased inconvenience and expense to the other candidates and increased expense and administrative burden for the municipal elections officials and for the secretary of the state. In addition, she argued that the likelihood of the plaintiffs success in the appeal was small and that, even if he prevailed, he would not suffer irreparable harm because the court could order a new general election.
On November 2, 2007, the Chief Justice ordered, pursuant to § 9-325, that a special session of this court be held on November 5, 2007, for the purpose of hearing the plaintiffs appeal. Before and during the hearing, the plaintiff clarified that he had intended to bring both an ordinary appeal from the final judgment of the trial court and a certified appeal pursuant to § 9-325. He further clarified at the hearing that the only issue in the certified appeal was the certified question of whether the trial court was required to postpone the election pending resolution of the substantive issues raised in the ordinary appeal. Accordingly, this court limited the hearing to the certified question of whether the trial court was required to postpone the city’s general election for mayor pending the plaintiffs appeal and to the motion to stay, which involved essentially the same issue.
[802]*802Immediately after the hearing, this court bifurcated the plaintiffs appeal into: (1) a certified appeal, brought pursuant to § 9-325, and limited to the certified question of whether the trial court was required to postpone the city’s general election for mayor pending appeal;8 and (2) an ordinary appeal from the final judgment of the trial court. We further ordered that the ordinary appeal be accepted for filing in this court.9 See footnote 3 of this opinion. We then denied the plaintiffs motion to stay in the ordinary appeal. The sole purpose of this opinion is to explain our reasons for denying the motion to stay.
The plaintiff filed his motion to stay pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (a), which provides in relevant part that, “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to take an appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause. ...” The plaintiff argued at the hearing on the motion that there was no need for him to file the motion to stay in this court, or the motion for postponement of the general election in the trial court, because § 61-11 automatically had stayed the city’s general election for mayor. The plaintiffs motion to stay more accurately is described, therefore, as a motion to enforce the automatic stay provision of § 61-11.10
[803]*803We conclude, however, that the automatic stay provision of Practice Book § 61-11 did not operate to postpone the city’s general election for mayor. Because the plaintiff did not request in his second amended complaint an order temporarily enjoining the election pending final resolution of his claims, nothing in the proceedings before the trial court or in the trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants affirmatively provided relief ordering the city to hold the election as scheduled or, indeed, affected the election in any manner. Accordingly, the election was not a “[proceeding] to enforce or carry out the judgment” of the trial court. Practice Book § 61-11 (a) (“proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed . . . until the final determination of the cause”).
It is clear, therefore, that rather than seeking enforcement of the automatic stay provision in his motion to stay, the plaintiff actually was seeking an original order of injunctive relief from this court. Whether an election should be enjoined pending appeal of a matter potentially affecting the election, however, involves questions of fact that this court is not competent to address in the first instance. See Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 259 Conn. 563, 571, 790 A.2d 1167 (2002) (“[a] party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Miller v. Westport, 268 Conn. 207, 221, 842 A.2d 558 (2004) (finding facts is function of trial court, not this court). More fundamentally, the plaintiff has provided no authority for the proposition that this court or, indeed, any court, may, postjudgment, order a form of relief that was not requested in the [804]*804underlying complaint.11 Such authority is especially doubtful when the requested relief is not required to prevent the appeal from becoming moot.
Finally, even if this court has the general authority to grant a postjudgment request for injunctive relief pending appeal, § 9-329a does not authorize the courts under any circumstances to order the postponement of a general election in an action brought pursuant to that statute. See General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (in proceeding under § 9-329a [a], “judge may [1] determine the result of such primary; [2] order a change in the existing primary schedule; or [3] order a new primary”). Where the procedure used by the plaintiff is of a special statutory nature, and by its use a judge is called upon to exercise a judicial power in an original matter; see In the Matter of Gilhuly’s Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 276, 199 A. 436 (1938); not only must the plaintiff pursue his remedy in strict conformity with the statute but the judge may go no further in extending relief than that outlined in the statute. See Salter v. Kaplowitz, 28 Conn. Sup. 85, 88, 250 A.2d 327 (1968); see also Washington v. Hill, 960 So. 2d 643, 646 (Ala. 2006) (statutory provisions governing election contest must be strictly observed and construed); Bohart v. Hanna, 213 Ariz. 480, 482, 143 P.3d 1021 (2006) (same); Kinzel v. North Miami, 212 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. App. 1968) (same); Davis v. Plainfield, 389 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 913 A.2d 166 (2006) (same). Accordingly, neither this court nor the trial court had the power in an action brought pursuant to § 9-329a to grant the specific relief requested by the plaintiff.
The motion to stay is denied.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.