Cartwright v. State

950 N.E.2d 807, 2011 Ind. App. LEXIS 1154, 2011 WL 2471748

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 22, 2011
• Docket: 82A01-1005-CR-214
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Jerrme Cartwright (“Cartwright”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of attempted battery with a deadly weapon,¹ each as a Class C felony, two counts of attempted aggravated battery,² each as a Class B felony, and one count of possession of a handgun by a serious violent felon,³ a Class B felony, and was given an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years executed. He appeals, raising the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Cartwright’s objection to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike the only African-American from the jury venire; and

II. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support Cartwright’s convictions for attempted battery with a deadly weapon.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At around 11:00 p.m. on December 27, 2008, Tiffany Boyd (“Tiffany”),⁴ her husband, Jamar Boyd (“Jamar”), Michael Lockridge (“Michael”), Marcus Lockridge (“Marcus”), and a man known as Lojo went to the American Legion in Evansville, Indiana. Shaudarekkia Beattie (“Shaudarekkia”) and her sister, Linda Beattie (“Linda”), arrived at the American Legion soon after. Once inside the bar at the American Legion, Jamar and Michael spoke with Cartwright, and there did not seem to be any animosity between the men. Later, however, a fight broke out on the dance floor involving Cartwright, Michael, and Marcus. After the fight began, Tiffany was struck in the back with a chair and exited through a back door. She did not know where Jamar was, so she walked around the building and found him bleeding from a wound on the side of his head. Tiffany and Jamar got into their vehicle and drove to Linda’s house, which was just around the corner from the American Legion. Shaudarekkia and Linda were only present at the American Legion for ten minutes when the fight began. They also left and drove to Linda’s house.

When Tiffany and Jamar arrived at Linda’s house, they parked in front, and Tiffany tried to stop Jamar’s head from bleeding while he sat in the passenger seat. Shaudarekkia and Linda also arrived at Linda’s house, and Shaudarekkia stayed in the vehicle while Linda went inside the house. Tiffany was outside of her vehicle, and a crowd had gathered to see Jamar’s head. She observed Cartwright, who was wearing a button-down shirt over a white tank top, and another man walking down the street toward her. At first, Cartwright had his hand behind his back, but then Tiffany noticed that he had a handgun in his hand. She shouted, “he got a gun [sic],” and Cartwright pointed the gun toward the crowd where Tiffany was standing and began shooting. Tr. at 312. When he fired into the crowd, he was between five and ten yards from the crowd. Shaudarekkia, who was still in her vehicle, attempted to hit Cartwright with her vehicle. Tiffany observed Cartwright point and shoot at Shaudarekkia. Shauda-rekkia saw Cartwright with the gun and thought her vehicle may have been struck with a bullet. She also observed Cartwright fire some shots into the air.

The police had responded to the American Legion for the earlier fight and drove around the area to make sure the fight had not spilled out to the surrounding neighborhood. When the police drove down the street that ran in front of Linda’s house, they saw Cartwright firing a gun into the crowd and ordered him to drop the gun. Cartwright turned, pointed the gun at the two officers, and fired shots at them. He then fled the scene and ran in the direction of a local community center. Cartwright was later apprehended in the area, but was no longer wearing his button-down shirt. A shirt, which was later determined to have a DNA profile consistent with that of Cartwright, and a nine millimeter handgun, which was later determined to have fired the earlier shots, were found near the community center.

The State charged Cartwright with four counts of attempted murder, each as a Class A felony, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, each as a Class B felony, two counts of robbery, each as a Class B felony, one count of burglary as a Class A felony, two counts of criminal confinement, each as a Class B felony, one count of battery as a Class C felony, one count of pointing a firearm as a Class D felony, and one count of auto theft as a Class D felony. On March 10, 2010, a three-day jury trial began on the four counts of attempted murder and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.⁵ At the conclusion of the trial, Cartwright was found guilty of two counts of attempted battery with a deadly weapon, each as a Class C felony, which were lesser included offenses of attempted murder. He was also found guilty of two counts of attempted aggravated battery, each as a Class B felony, which were also lesser included offenses off attempted murder. He was additionally convicted of Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The trial court sentenced Cartwright to an aggregate twenty-six year sentence.⁶ Cartwright now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Batson⁷ Challenge

Cartwright, an African-American, contends that the State exercised its peremptory challenge to remove the only African-American from the jury venire in violation of his rights to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind.2008), cert. denied — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 645, 172 L.Ed.2d 626), trans. denied. On appeal, a trial court’s decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference and will be set aside only if found to be clearly erroneous. Id. When a party raises a Batson challenge, the trial court must undertake a three-step test. Jeter, 888 N.E.2d at 1263. First, it must determine whether the party making the Batson objection has made a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Id. Second, after the contesting party makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the party exercising its peremptory challenge to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror. Id. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is proffered, the trial court must then determine if the challenger has earned its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id.

Cartwright first argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that there was no prima facie showing of discrimination based on race. The State agrees. Here, during voir dire, the State used a peremptory challenge to strike the only African-American person from the jury panel. The removal of some African-American jurors by the use of peremptory challenges does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination. Highler v. State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.2006). However, the removal of the only African-American juror that could have served raises the inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind.2004). Therefore, when the State used a peremptory challenge to remove the only African-American person on the jury panel, it is clear that Cartwright made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Nonetheless, where, as here, a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination becomes moot. Id.

Cartwright further contends that the State’s justifications for its peremptory strike of the only African-American from the jury panel were baseless and pretextual because the State failed to inquire further into such reasons and develop a sufficient record to support the reasons as race-neutral.

A neutral explanation means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. Id. In the present case, the State gave the following reasons for striking the juror at issue: (1) health issues; (2) trouble listening; (3) not wanting to serve on jury; and (4) fact that a family member had a conviction for conversion. Tr. at 140. Each of these reasons was a permissible race-neutral explanation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. “ ‘The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.’” Jeter, 888 N.E.2d at 1264 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam)). At this second step of the inquiry, the issue is simply the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Id. “ ‘Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’” Id. (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769).

We thus turn to the third step of Batson. The issue here is whether Cartwright established that those facially neutral reasons were merely pretextual and a mask for purposeful discrimination. “Although the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding purposeful discrimination rests with the party opposing the strike, [t]his final step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the [proponent of the strike]....” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

As to the health issues, the prospective juror stated that he takes a medication that requires him to go to the bathroom frequently. Tr. at 127. The State asked him if the medication would cause the juror any problems with concentrating or listening, to which he responded no. Id. The juror never testified that his health issues would pose any problem with jury service, and on his juror questionnaire, the juror stated that he had no medical problems that would prevent his service on the jury. The record did not indicate that the juror had a health problem that would prevent him from serving on the jury.

As to the juror’s trouble listening and desire not to serve on the jury, the juror stated that if he had a choice, he would rather not serve on the jury and that he was not a good listener. Id. at 126-27. In response to the juror’s desire not to serve on the jury, the State reminded the juror that he did not “get to make that choice.” Id. at 126. Additionally, several other potential jurors who were not African-American, expressed the same desire not to serve on the jury. Regarding his bad listening, the State asked if the juror would try to listen to the evidence presented in the case, to which the juror responded yes. Id. at 127. Further, the juror testified that he would vote guilty if convinced the State had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and never indicated that he would be unable or unwilling to judge the case fairly and impartially. Id. at 129.

With respect to the State’s justification that a member of the juror’s family had a conviction for conversion, the juror did indicate on his juror questionnaire that a family member had either been charged with or convicted of a crime. However, the State did not ask the juror any questions regarding this response. As a result, the State did not establish who the family member was or the nature or seriousness of the crime alleged, what the relationship of the family member to the prospective juror was, whether the family member was convicted of the crime or only charged, how old such conviction or charge was or how such conviction or charge may have influenced the juror.

Here, the trial court made no express finding as to which of the State’s explanations it relied upon in denying Cartwright’s challenge; it merely approved the peremptory strike without explanation. Tr. at 141, 151. As a result, we cannot determine which of the State’s proffered explanations the trial court relied upon when it denied Cartwright’s Batson challenge. The State failed to inquire into such reasons or to develop anything beyond the most superficial of records regarding its reasons. We conclude that the State’s proffered explanations for striking the only African-American juror from the jury panel were pretextual and the result of purposeful discrimination. We, therefore, reverse Cartwright’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

II. Sufficient Evidence

Cartwright argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted battery with a deadly weapon. When, as here, reversal is required because of trial error, and a defendant presents a claim of insufficient evidence regarding some of his convictions, an acquittal instead of a new trial is required for such convictions if the proof of guilt is insufficient in light of the evidence presented at trial. Miller v. State, 916 N.E.2d 193, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied (2010). To determine whether retrial is permissible, we address Cartwright’s claim of insufficient evidence.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence apd reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.2007). It is the factfinder’s role, not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. Therefore, when confronted with conflicting evidence, we consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling, and affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. at 147. Evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id.

Cartwright contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted battery with a deadly weapon against Tiffany and Shaudarekkia. He alleges that the evidence was insufficient because there was no evidence presented that he knowingly or intentionally attempted to batter either Tiffany or Shaudarekkia. Cartwright claims this is because neither of the victims testified that he pointed his handgun at them when he fired the shots and that they both testified that they did not see him actually point the gun at them when he shot.

Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question. Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. Knowledge or intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and it may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points. Id.

In the present case, the evidence presented established that Cartwright fired shots into the crowd and that Tiffany was a member of that crowd. When the shots were fired, Tiffany was standing outside of her vehicle, assisting Jamar, and a crowd had gathered to see Jamar’s injury. Although Tiffany testified that she did not see Cartwright specifically point the gun at her, she did see him point into the crowd “toward us, into the crowd where we was [sic].” Tr. at 312. When Tiffany first saw Cartwright approaching, she shouted, “he got a gun [sic].” Id. Cartwright then began shooting toward the crowd where Tiffany was standing. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that, by shooting into the crowd toward where Tiffany was standing, Cartwright intended to harm Tiffany. This inference is further bolstered by the fact that Cartwright began shooting toward Tiffany right after she yelled that he had a gun. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction for attempted battery with a deadly weapon as to Tiffany.

As to the count with Shaudarek-kia as the victim, the evidence presented showed that Cartwright pointed his gun at Shaudarekkia while she was in her vehicle and fired. Although Shaudarekkia testified that she did not believe that Cartwright shot his gun toward her, Tiffany testified that she observed Cartwright point and shoot his gun at Shaudarekkia as Shaudarekkia drove her car. Id. at 314. A conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness or victim. Lay v. State, 933 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. Therefore, the testimony of Tiffany alone was sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer that Cartwright intended to harm Shaudarekkia. Sufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction for attempted battery with a deadly weapon with Shaudarekkia as the victim. We therefore conclude that, because there was sufficient evidence to convict Cartwright, he may be retried.

Reversed and remanded.

MATHIAS, J., concurs. VAIDIK, J., dissents with separate opinion.

1 . See Ind.Code §§ 35-42-2-l(a)(3), 35-41-5-1.

2 . See Ind.Code §§ 35-42-2-1.5, 35-41-5-1.

3 . See Ind.Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

4 .At the time of the offense, Tiffany Boyd was not yet married, and her name was Tiffany Grisby. Tr. at 300.

5 .The trial was bifurcated. The first phase of the trial dealt with the four counts of attempted murder, and the second phase dealt with the unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

6 . The State dismissed the remaining counts at the sentencing hearing.

7 . Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).