Mr. Justice Sharp
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause involves certain proceedings at the State Democratic Convention held in Fort Worth in September, 1948, whereby the State Convention seated a delegation favorable to petitioners over one favorable to respondents. The convention elected the petitioners Jack Carter and Mrs. J. W. Douglas as Democratic Executive Committeeman and Committeewoman, respectively, from the Tarrant County district. The convention also required each precinct chairman to take a pledge to support the democratic nominees for president and vice-president. Respondents Neville G. Penrose and Mrs. Bennett L. Smith, together with certain parties elected as delegates to the State Convention and certain Tarrant County precinct chairmen, brought suit for an injunction against the petitioners here. The Court of Civil Appeals at Fort Worth affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting to certain respondents a temporary injunction. The material facts of this case are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reported in 220 S. W. 2d 351, and there is no need to further burden this record with a recitation of such facts.
At the very outset we must decide if this cause presents a justiciable matter for the courts, or if the Legislature has taken such jurisdiction away from the courts and lodged the jurisdiction over contests of this character solely within the party convention and other party machinery.
This Court has heretofore passed on the power of the State Democratic Convention to manage its own affairs. Stanford et al. v. Butler et al., 142 Texas 692, 181 S. W. 2d 269, 153 A. L. R. 1054; Seay v. Latham, 143 Texas 1, 182 S. W. 2d 251, 155 A. L. R. 180. The issue involved there was whether the electors [11]*11selected by the Democratic Convention held in May, 1944, could be substituted by the Democratic Convention held in September, 1944. In Seay v. Latham this Court held that the State Democratic Convention held in September, 1944, had that power.
The State Democratic Convention held on September 12, 1944, adopted the following resolution:
“Be it resolved that the State Executive Committee direct the presiding officer of each precinct convention and each county convention to require all persons who desire to participate in said conventions to pledge themselves that they will support the nominees of the Democratic party for all National, State and County officials. And if any person declines to so pledge himself, then he shall not be allowed to participate in the convention.
The State Democratic Convention in May, 1948, adopted the following resolution:
“resolved that all members of this Convention, officers and electors, shall be pledged to support all the nominees of the Democratic Party.”'
In the course of the Democratic Convention in September, 1948, a resolution was adopted, from which the following is quoted:
“(Each) County Chairman shall communicate with each Precinct Chairman in his county, either by registered mail or in person, and secure from such Precinct Chairman a written statement, signed by such Precinct Chairman, stating that such Precinct Chairman is supporting and will continue to support the nominee of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President, to-wit: Hon. Harry S. Truman and Senator Alben W. Barkley, in the coming general election; and such Precinct Chairmen are hereby required to file such written, signed statement with the chairman of such County Democratic Executive Committee within one week after receipt of such communication from the County Chairman.
“In the event any Precinct Chairman fails or refuses to file such statement with the County Chairman within the time and in the manner above prescribed, then his office shall be and is hereby declared to be vacant and shall be filled as hereafter provided and in the manner prescribed by law; * * *.”
In 1891 Section 8 of Article. V of the Constitution was adopted, which conferred upon the District Court the authority [12]*12to try contested elections. Section 8 provides that, “The District Court shall have original jurisdiction * * * of contested elections.” This Court held in Odell v. Wharton, 87 Texas 173, 27 S. W. 123, that the foregoing section of the Constitution was not self-executing, because it prescribes no rules by which jurisdiction may be enforced. It was also held that a contested election is not a civil suit, and therefore cannot be tried by the rules applicable to such cases. See also 16 Tex. Jur., p. 138, sec. 113. The power to enact laws regulating contested elections rests with the Legislature, and the statutes enacted must be looked to in order to find the provisions controlling the trial of contested election suits. If such statutes provide a method of procedure, that method is final and exclusive, and the courts are limited to such procedure. 16 Tex. Jur., pp. 142-146, secs. 115 and 116.
At various times the Legislature has enacted many articles of the Statutes relating to elections and contested elections. Among the articles enacted are Articles 3047, 3107, 3118, 3130, 3134, 3137, 3139, 3146, 3147, 3148, 3152, and 3156. Article 3107 reads:
“Every political party in this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own way determine tvho shall he qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political party; provided that no person shall ever be denied the right to participate in a primary in this State because of former political views or affiliations or because of membership or non-membership in organizations other than the political party.” (Emphasis ours.)
Article 3118 provides how county executive committeemen shall be elected, and defines their duties.
Article 3134 prescribes how the delegates from the precinct and county conventions may be selected.
The action of the Democratic Convention complained of occurred on September 14, 1948, and this suit was filed in the District Court on October 18, 1948. The provisions of Articles 3148 and 3152, if available, were not invoked, and they pass out of this controversy. Article 3139 prescribes the time when the State Convention shall convene and the duties of the convention.
[13]*13 In Love v. Buckner, 121 Texas 369, 49 S. W. 2d 425, this Court held that the State Executive Committee of a political party could require party voters to make a pledge, before being permitted to participate in a precinct or county convention of the party, to support nominees of such party for President and Vice-president. In construing this article this Court also held in Bell v. Hill, 123 Texas 531, 74 S. W. 2d 113, that the right to determine policies and membership of a political party is to be exercised by the State convention of the party, and cannot be conferred on a State or governmental agency by the Legislature. It was also held in that case that in determining the membership of a political party, the will of the party is supreme, and the executive committee is a mere agency, notwithstanding the statute providing that the political party, through the State Executive Committee, shall have power to prescribe qualifications of its members. See also Seay v. Latham, supra.
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Mr. Justice Sharp
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause involves certain proceedings at the State Democratic Convention held in Fort Worth in September, 1948, whereby the State Convention seated a delegation favorable to petitioners over one favorable to respondents. The convention elected the petitioners Jack Carter and Mrs. J. W. Douglas as Democratic Executive Committeeman and Committeewoman, respectively, from the Tarrant County district. The convention also required each precinct chairman to take a pledge to support the democratic nominees for president and vice-president. Respondents Neville G. Penrose and Mrs. Bennett L. Smith, together with certain parties elected as delegates to the State Convention and certain Tarrant County precinct chairmen, brought suit for an injunction against the petitioners here. The Court of Civil Appeals at Fort Worth affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting to certain respondents a temporary injunction. The material facts of this case are set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reported in 220 S. W. 2d 351, and there is no need to further burden this record with a recitation of such facts.
At the very outset we must decide if this cause presents a justiciable matter for the courts, or if the Legislature has taken such jurisdiction away from the courts and lodged the jurisdiction over contests of this character solely within the party convention and other party machinery.
This Court has heretofore passed on the power of the State Democratic Convention to manage its own affairs. Stanford et al. v. Butler et al., 142 Texas 692, 181 S. W. 2d 269, 153 A. L. R. 1054; Seay v. Latham, 143 Texas 1, 182 S. W. 2d 251, 155 A. L. R. 180. The issue involved there was whether the electors [11]*11selected by the Democratic Convention held in May, 1944, could be substituted by the Democratic Convention held in September, 1944. In Seay v. Latham this Court held that the State Democratic Convention held in September, 1944, had that power.
The State Democratic Convention held on September 12, 1944, adopted the following resolution:
“Be it resolved that the State Executive Committee direct the presiding officer of each precinct convention and each county convention to require all persons who desire to participate in said conventions to pledge themselves that they will support the nominees of the Democratic party for all National, State and County officials. And if any person declines to so pledge himself, then he shall not be allowed to participate in the convention.
The State Democratic Convention in May, 1948, adopted the following resolution:
“resolved that all members of this Convention, officers and electors, shall be pledged to support all the nominees of the Democratic Party.”'
In the course of the Democratic Convention in September, 1948, a resolution was adopted, from which the following is quoted:
“(Each) County Chairman shall communicate with each Precinct Chairman in his county, either by registered mail or in person, and secure from such Precinct Chairman a written statement, signed by such Precinct Chairman, stating that such Precinct Chairman is supporting and will continue to support the nominee of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President, to-wit: Hon. Harry S. Truman and Senator Alben W. Barkley, in the coming general election; and such Precinct Chairmen are hereby required to file such written, signed statement with the chairman of such County Democratic Executive Committee within one week after receipt of such communication from the County Chairman.
“In the event any Precinct Chairman fails or refuses to file such statement with the County Chairman within the time and in the manner above prescribed, then his office shall be and is hereby declared to be vacant and shall be filled as hereafter provided and in the manner prescribed by law; * * *.”
In 1891 Section 8 of Article. V of the Constitution was adopted, which conferred upon the District Court the authority [12]*12to try contested elections. Section 8 provides that, “The District Court shall have original jurisdiction * * * of contested elections.” This Court held in Odell v. Wharton, 87 Texas 173, 27 S. W. 123, that the foregoing section of the Constitution was not self-executing, because it prescribes no rules by which jurisdiction may be enforced. It was also held that a contested election is not a civil suit, and therefore cannot be tried by the rules applicable to such cases. See also 16 Tex. Jur., p. 138, sec. 113. The power to enact laws regulating contested elections rests with the Legislature, and the statutes enacted must be looked to in order to find the provisions controlling the trial of contested election suits. If such statutes provide a method of procedure, that method is final and exclusive, and the courts are limited to such procedure. 16 Tex. Jur., pp. 142-146, secs. 115 and 116.
At various times the Legislature has enacted many articles of the Statutes relating to elections and contested elections. Among the articles enacted are Articles 3047, 3107, 3118, 3130, 3134, 3137, 3139, 3146, 3147, 3148, 3152, and 3156. Article 3107 reads:
“Every political party in this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own way determine tvho shall he qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political party; provided that no person shall ever be denied the right to participate in a primary in this State because of former political views or affiliations or because of membership or non-membership in organizations other than the political party.” (Emphasis ours.)
Article 3118 provides how county executive committeemen shall be elected, and defines their duties.
Article 3134 prescribes how the delegates from the precinct and county conventions may be selected.
The action of the Democratic Convention complained of occurred on September 14, 1948, and this suit was filed in the District Court on October 18, 1948. The provisions of Articles 3148 and 3152, if available, were not invoked, and they pass out of this controversy. Article 3139 prescribes the time when the State Convention shall convene and the duties of the convention.
[13]*13 In Love v. Buckner, 121 Texas 369, 49 S. W. 2d 425, this Court held that the State Executive Committee of a political party could require party voters to make a pledge, before being permitted to participate in a precinct or county convention of the party, to support nominees of such party for President and Vice-president. In construing this article this Court also held in Bell v. Hill, 123 Texas 531, 74 S. W. 2d 113, that the right to determine policies and membership of a political party is to be exercised by the State convention of the party, and cannot be conferred on a State or governmental agency by the Legislature. It was also held in that case that in determining the membership of a political party, the will of the party is supreme, and the executive committee is a mere agency, notwithstanding the statute providing that the political party, through the State Executive Committee, shall have power to prescribe qualifications of its members. See also Seay v. Latham, supra. It will be observed that the latter part of Article 3107 prohibits the party from disqualifying its members, under certain conditions, in the following language: “* *; provided that no person shall ever be denied the right to participate in a primary in this State because of former political views or affiliations or because of membership or non-membership in organizations other than the political party.” This provision just quoted has been sustained by this Court in Love v. Wilcox, 119 Texas, 256, 28 S. W. 2d 515, 70 A. L. R. 1484.
The basic reason for the enactment of Article 3107 and the decisions of this Court upholding the right of the party to demand a pledge of those who vote in the primary elections to support its nominees rests upon the ground that the party has the right to demand that those who vote in the primaries, and those who seek to hold offices within the party, should make a pledge to support the party nominees. Anything less than this would destroy all party unity, loyalty, and discipline in primaries and conventions.
In 1941 the Legislature materially amended certain articles of the Statutes, and repealed others, relating to contested elections. Among the articles amended is Article 3146, which reads:
“Except for a place on party tickets for public elective offices, all contests within a political party shall be decided by the State, District, or County Executive Committee, as the nature of the office may require, each such Committee to retain all such powers and authority now conferred by law.”
In the case of Wall v. Currie, 147 Texas 127, 213 S. W. 2d [14]*14816, this Court quoted with approval the statement contained in 29 C. J. S., Elections, pp. 121-122, sec. 88, as follows:
“Except to the extent that jurisdiction is conferred by statute or that the subject has been regulated by statute, the courts have no power to interfere with the judgments of the constituted authorities of established political parties in matters involving party government and discipline, to determine disputes within a political party as to the regularity of the election of its executive officers, or their removal, or to determine contests for the position of party committeemen or convention delegates.”
In the case of Wall v. Currie, supra, Currie claimed that he had been elected chairman of the Dallas County Executive Committee of the Republican party, and that Wall sought to interfere with him in the performance of his duties. The trial court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction. This Court sustained the action of the trial court, and applying the foregoing rule to the facts of that cause held: “It is well established in this state, as well as in a majority of the other states, that officers of a political party, such as members of a party executive committee, are not public or governmental officers, even when provided for by statutory law.”
In this State political parties have not by law been created either State or governmental agencies, and in the absence of a statute covering the matter, committees of any political party in acting for the party’s interests are not acting as officers of the State. And it is held that officers of a political party, such as chairmen of the County Executive Committees and precinct committeemen, although provided for by election laws, are not regarded as public or governmental officers. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Texas 369, 218 S. W. 479, 221 S. W. 880; Waples v. Marrast, 108 Texas 5, 184 S. W. 180, 1917A L. R. A., 253; Walker v. Mobley, 101 Texas 28, 103 S. W. 490; McCombs v. Stevenson, Tex. Civ. App., 195 S. W. 2d 566; Walker v. Hopping, Tex. Civ. App., 226 S. W. 146; 16 Tex. Jur., pp. 56-59, secs. 47-49.
By Article 3107 the State Executive Committee of every political party in this State is clothed with the authority to prescribe the qualifications of its own members, and shall “in its own way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political party”; subject to the exception specified therein. Some confusion arose as to whether the courts or the political party had jurisdiction to settle disputes within the party. This question was definitely settled when the Legislature in 1941 overhauled the election statutes and enacted H. B. [15]*15No. 857, Chap. 635, Regular Session 47th Legislature, p. 1400 of the General and Special Laws, repealing certains articles of the Statutes and amending others. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St., Art. 3125 et seq. Article 3146 was one of the articles amended, and it now provides that all contests shall be decided within the political party, “except for a place on party tickets for public elective office.” When Articles 3107 and 3146 are construed together, the conclusion is inescapable that respondents were not seeking places on the party ticket for public elective offices, and the action of the convention was final. The rule is well settled in this State that the contest of an election, lacking the elements of a civil suit, is a political rather than a judicial question, and the courts under their general powers, legal and equitable have no jurisdiction of such a controversy. 16 Tex. Jur., p. 135, sec. 111.
The District Court did not have jurisdiction to try the matters alleged by respondents relating to the political offices they sought to retain, nor did it have jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction against petitioners; and the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that it did have such jurisdiction.
This appeal involves only the issuance of a temporary injunction by the trial court. The right of respondents to recover damages as alleged by them was not determined in the trial court nor in the Court of Civil Appeals, and that issue is not involved here. Upon that issue we express no opinion.
The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are reversed, the injunction issued is dissolved, and respondents’ alleged cause, with the exception of their claim for damages, is dismissed.
Opinion delivered February 22, 1950.