Carter v. Dc Department of Human Services Child Family Services

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 17, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-1836
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PATRICK RONALD CARTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-1836 (UNA) ) DC DHS CFS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on consideration of plaintiff’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court will grant the

application and, for the reasons discussed below, dismiss the complaint and this civil action

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who has sole legal and physical custody of his minor child, resides in an

apartment in the District of Columbia and appears to receive services from the company

managing the building (The Sterling). See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that, on May 11, 2023,

he “was detained by Law enforcement [and] taken to a mental health facility (CPEP) . . . for 24

hours,” at which time the District’s Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) removed the

child. Id. According to plaintiff, CFSA is guilty of “hijacking and kidnapping” his child, and

thereby violated his “human rights and civil rights as well as his constitutional rights to serve his

child’s best interest.” Id. Regarding The Sterling, plaintiff alleges that its staff defame and

harass him, unlawfully enter his unit, invade his privacy, fail to secure tenants’ safety, and

otherwise interfere with his enjoyment of his unit. See id. at 1-2. For example, he alleges a staff

member contacted CFSA to provide “fals[e] information displaying Plaintiff as a mental patient”

thereby securing his child’s placement “in juvenile custody[.]” Id. at 2. Plaintiff allegedly has

1 sustained “injury to emotional stability,” injury to his reputation, and other harms as a result of

defendants’ actions for which he demands “compensatory . . . and punitive damages in the sum

of exactly $1,365,000,000 . . . and immediate return of [his] minor child[.]” Id. at 2. The Court

will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for the following reasons.

First, CFSA is a component of the District of Columbia government which itself is not a

suable entity. Therefore, CFSA must be dismissed as a party defendant. See Melton v. District

of Columbia, 85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 191 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing CFSA as party defendant),

aff’d, No. 15-7043, 2015 WL 9012019 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015).

Second, assuming that plaintiff intended to sue the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for alleged violations of constitutionally protected rights, the complaint fails to allege

facts demonstrating a basis for the District’s liability. “To establish municipal liability under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that there was an underlying constitutional violation,

and second, show that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.”

Bell v. District of Columbia, 82 F. Supp. 3d 151, 155 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted). To

satisfy the second prong, plaintiff must allege that the District (1) “explicitly adopted the policy

that was the moving force of the constitutional violation”; (2) “knowingly ignore[d] a practice

that was consistent enough to constitute custom”; or (3) failed to “respond[ ] to a need . . . in

such a manner as to show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the need will

result in constitutional violations.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 389 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (cleaned up). Alternatively, plaintiff could allege that an authorized municipal

policymaker made a one-time decision that resulted in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See

Singletary v. District of Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Without such factual

allegations, plaintiff fails to demonstrate a basis for the District’s liability. See Richardson on

2 behalf of A.G.H. v. District of Columbia Superior Court, No. 1:22-cv-2585, 2022 WL 17615792,

at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2022)

Third, insofar as plaintiff brings tort claims against The Sterling, the complaint fails to

demonstrate a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal

district courts is limited and is set forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these

statutes, federal jurisdiction is available when a “federal question” is presented or when the

parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. “For

jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the

parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”

Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.

Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978)). Plaintiff does not appear to raise a federal claim against

The Sterling, and because plaintiff and The Sterling reside or conduct business in the District of

Columbia, plaintiff does not demonstrate diversity jurisdiction.

Fourth, insofar as plaintiff demands custody of his child, this federal district court lacks

jurisdiction to grant such an award. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)

(concluding “that the domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to issue

divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) (explaining that domestic relationship exception divests federal court of jurisdiction

over “grant[ing] a divorce, determin[ing] alimony or support obligations, or resolv[ing] parental

conflicts over the custody of their children”).

Fifth, notwithstanding plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with The Sterling, there are no factual

allegations indicating whether any defendant engaged in a practice made unlawful under the Fair

Housing Act by, for example, “discriminat[ing] against [plaintiff] person in the terms,

3 conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities

in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”

42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

An Order is issued separately.

2023.07.17 09:36:37 -04'00' DATE: July 17, 2023 TREVOR N. McFADDEN United States District Judge