Carter v. Cabka North America, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedSeptember 15, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-01373
StatusUnknown

This text of Carter v. Cabka North America, Inc. (Carter v. Cabka North America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carter v. Cabka North America, Inc., (E.D. Mo. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

LONTI J. CARTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:25-CV-01373 RWS ) CABKA NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff Lonti Carter’s motion for leave to commence this employment discrimination action without payment of the required filing fee. [ECF No. 2]. Having reviewed the application and financial information provided, the Court will grant the motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will direct plaintiff to file an amended complaint, along with a copy of his notice of right to sue and his charge of discrimination. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372- 73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a self-represented plaintiff’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The Complaint Plaintiff Lonti Carter initiated this action on September 11, 2025, by filing an employment discrimination complaint against defendants Cabka North America, Inc. and American Staffing, LLC. His complaint is typewritten rather than submitted on the Court’s employment discrimination complaint form, as required under Local Rule 2.06(A). Plaintiff has also failed to sign his complaint with an original signature.1 See Fed.R.Civ.P.11. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with either a copy of his charge of discrimination or his right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Because the Court is requiring plaintiff to amend his pleading, he will be asked to supplement the docket with copies of his right to sue letter and his charge.

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., alleging disability discrimination and retaliation against defendant Cabka. Plaintiff additionally asserts various state law claims, including negligent hiring/retention/supervision, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, personal injury and assault and battery. Plaintiff was contracted to Cabka through American Staffing. He claims that he was being “trained and prepared for permanent hire and promotion” at Cabka, and that Cabka had sponsored him to obtain his forklift license. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff alleges that after completion of his certification as a forklift driver, he had been assured by Cabka that he would be hired as a Cabka

employee. Id. However, on November 10, 2023, while working at Cabka’s Hazelwood, Missouri, facility, plaintiff was working on a two-person task with his co-worker, Brandon Taylor. Id. at 2. He asserts that because he had previously noticed Taylor limping, he asked Taylor if he would be okay continuing the task. Taylor allegedly became enraged, produced a loaded firearm, and began to advance toward plaintiff. Id. As plaintiff struggled with Taylor, Taylor pulled the trigger and the firearm discharged, narrowly missing plaintiff. Plaintiff disarmed Taylor and threw the weapon away from him to eliminate the threat. Id.

1Plaintiff has used an electronic signature on his complaint, but because plaintiff is not approved for electronic filing in this Court, he is required to place an original signature on his complaint. Plaintiff asserts that Cabka Supervisor Coleman then picked up Taylor’s weapon and returned it to Taylor, despite Cabka’s “No Weapons” policy. Id. Coleman did not check on plaintiff, and plaintiff believes Coleman attempted to hide the weapon from the facility’s cameras. Coleman then purportedly allowed Taylor to leave the facility armed, and he ignored calls from law enforcement requesting recovery of the weapon. Id. Coleman had another supervisor contact

the police regarding the incident; however, plaintiff claims that Coleman never spoke to law enforcement himself. Id. Plaintiff states that immediately following the incident on November 10, 2023, he was banned from Cabka’s property and “prevented from making a full report of the firearm assault.” [ECF No. 1 at 3]. He states that he was only allowed to speak to “Supervisor Glen” at Cabka, and blocked from accessing normal reporting channels, which he believes illustrates Cabka’s retaliatory and discriminatory intent. Id.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Sam Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants
293 F.3d 481 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Jane E. Stewart v. Independent School District No. 196
481 F.3d 1034 (Eighth Circuit, 2007)
Yulanda Hill v. Carolyn Walker
737 F.3d 1209 (Eighth Circuit, 2013)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Raymond L. Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC
820 F.3d 371 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Barton Ex Rel. Estate of Barton v. Taber
820 F.3d 958 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Carter v. Cabka North America, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carter-v-cabka-north-america-inc-moed-2025.