OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the misdemeanor offense of obscenity under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 43.23(c). The appellant pleaded not guilty and was tried and convicted by the trial court. The trial court found that the appellant, “knowing the content and character of the material, (did) intentionally sell to N.D. Wong obscene material, namely, a magazine entitled, ‘Super #3.’ ” 1 The trial court sentenced the appellant to 10 days confinement and a $500.00 fine.
On appeal the appellant argued that the evidence admitted before the trial court was “insufficient to show the appellant knew the character and content of the allegedly obscene material.” The Court of Appeals decided that the State failed to prove that appellant knew the character and content of the magazine. Though the [914]*914trial was before the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated they could not be certain that the trial court did not rely on the presumption in Section 43.23(e). The Court of Appeals ruled that:
“Without the use of the unconstitutional presumption contained in Section 43.-23(e), the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine.”
Carroll v. State, unpublished (No. 01-83-0229-CR, 1st Ct. of App., September 27, 1984). From this decision, the State petitioned this Court for discretionary review. We granted the State’s petition to examine the grounds of review therein.
In its first ground of review, the State alleges that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on a “test”, gleaned from dicta in this Court’s decision in Shealey v. State, 675 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), in order to rule that there was insufficient evidence to prove the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine. The State seems to argue that the Court of Appeals in the instant case, following the Court of Appeals in Gonzales v. State, 676 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], 1984), ruled the evidence insufficient because the only direct evidence was that the appellant saw the covers of the magazine. The State alleges that this test ignores the importance of circumstantial evidence in determining whether the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine sold.
We have already stated that we do not approve of the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in Gonzales, supra:
“We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant’s conviction must be reversed due to the submission of a charge on § 43.23(e). Refusal of discretionary review by this Court does not constitute an endorsement or adoption of the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. This is true ... where the petition is refused with a brief opinion disavowing the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals, as in the instant case.” Gonzales v. State, 689 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
Whether the Court of Appeals in the instant case was merely relying on the reasoning in Gonzales v. State, 676 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], 1984),2 or was elevating that reasoning to the status of a “test”, we disavow the reasoning, or “test”, used by that court.
In its second ground for review, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled the evidence was insufficient to prove appellant’s knowledge of the magazine’s character and content. The State believes that the evidence in the instant case, both circumstantial and direct, supports the trial court’s decision that the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine which he sold. We agree.
This Court has ruled that the State has the burden to establish that a defendant, “either individually or as a party, directly or by circumstantial evidence,” knows the character and content of the obscene material in question. Davis v. State, 658 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). We will not require the State to prove that a defendant has this culpable knowledge by direct evidence alone.
Eyewitness testimony of a vendor’s perusal of the contents of a magazine or a book is not an absolute necessary element in proving that the vendor knew the character and content of the books or magazines he sells. Circumstantial evidence may justify a finding that the vendor knows that the character and content of a magazine or book is obscene. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); Staten v. State, 686 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th], 1985). We do not hold that any one particular kind of evidence is required to establish knowledge of the material’s character and content.
This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment. The evidence, in the instant case, is sufficient to prove that the appel[915]*915lant knew the character and content of the magazine, “Super #3.” A review of the facts proven by the State supports this conclusion. On the day in question, the appellant picked up several boxes at United Parcel Service and took them to the Palace Bookstore at 7637V2 Long Point in Harris County. The boxes were addressed to either Steven W. Carroll or Empire Distributing at 1307 Wilcrest Drive, Number 259.
When Officer Wong entered the Palace Bookstore, he observed the contents of the store. Photographs were admitted in evidence to support his observations. Wong first observed the appellant standing at a display counter unloading the magazines from the boxes. What appears to be obscene devices were on display at the counter, with the price of sale clearly marked. At several shelves around the store, magazines, whose covers depict “ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,” were on display on the shelves. Numerous signs with the words “HARD CORE” were displayed on the magazine shelves. Displays of movie stills, which depict the same as the magazine covers, advertise that the movies are available for viewing for 25 cents, and on the pictures are the words “DIRTY MOVIES.”.
When Wong saw the appellant taking the magazines from the boxes, one of the boxes was already empty. Wong observed the appellant take the magazines, one at a time, and place them in a plastic cellophane wrapper. Then, appellant handed the magazines to a Mr. Peveto, who would seal the wrappers with a heat lamp. After the wrappers were sealed, appellant placed the magazines on the shelves shown in the State’s photographic exhibits. Wong testified that, during this process, appellant saw the cover of the magazine, “Super # 3”, at least twice.
The State then offered the magazine into evidence. Appellant did not object. Wong stated that he saw appellant remove the magazine from the box, place it in a wrapper and display it on a shelf. Wong picked it off the shelf and bought it. He gave the magazine and $20.00 to appellant, who then handed the money to Mr. Peveto to make change for the purchase.
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OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WHITE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the misdemeanor offense of obscenity under V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 43.23(c). The appellant pleaded not guilty and was tried and convicted by the trial court. The trial court found that the appellant, “knowing the content and character of the material, (did) intentionally sell to N.D. Wong obscene material, namely, a magazine entitled, ‘Super #3.’ ” 1 The trial court sentenced the appellant to 10 days confinement and a $500.00 fine.
On appeal the appellant argued that the evidence admitted before the trial court was “insufficient to show the appellant knew the character and content of the allegedly obscene material.” The Court of Appeals decided that the State failed to prove that appellant knew the character and content of the magazine. Though the [914]*914trial was before the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated they could not be certain that the trial court did not rely on the presumption in Section 43.23(e). The Court of Appeals ruled that:
“Without the use of the unconstitutional presumption contained in Section 43.-23(e), the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine.”
Carroll v. State, unpublished (No. 01-83-0229-CR, 1st Ct. of App., September 27, 1984). From this decision, the State petitioned this Court for discretionary review. We granted the State’s petition to examine the grounds of review therein.
In its first ground of review, the State alleges that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on a “test”, gleaned from dicta in this Court’s decision in Shealey v. State, 675 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), in order to rule that there was insufficient evidence to prove the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine. The State seems to argue that the Court of Appeals in the instant case, following the Court of Appeals in Gonzales v. State, 676 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], 1984), ruled the evidence insufficient because the only direct evidence was that the appellant saw the covers of the magazine. The State alleges that this test ignores the importance of circumstantial evidence in determining whether the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine sold.
We have already stated that we do not approve of the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in Gonzales, supra:
“We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant’s conviction must be reversed due to the submission of a charge on § 43.23(e). Refusal of discretionary review by this Court does not constitute an endorsement or adoption of the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. This is true ... where the petition is refused with a brief opinion disavowing the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals, as in the instant case.” Gonzales v. State, 689 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
Whether the Court of Appeals in the instant case was merely relying on the reasoning in Gonzales v. State, 676 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st], 1984),2 or was elevating that reasoning to the status of a “test”, we disavow the reasoning, or “test”, used by that court.
In its second ground for review, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled the evidence was insufficient to prove appellant’s knowledge of the magazine’s character and content. The State believes that the evidence in the instant case, both circumstantial and direct, supports the trial court’s decision that the appellant knew the character and content of the magazine which he sold. We agree.
This Court has ruled that the State has the burden to establish that a defendant, “either individually or as a party, directly or by circumstantial evidence,” knows the character and content of the obscene material in question. Davis v. State, 658 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). We will not require the State to prove that a defendant has this culpable knowledge by direct evidence alone.
Eyewitness testimony of a vendor’s perusal of the contents of a magazine or a book is not an absolute necessary element in proving that the vendor knew the character and content of the books or magazines he sells. Circumstantial evidence may justify a finding that the vendor knows that the character and content of a magazine or book is obscene. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); Staten v. State, 686 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th], 1985). We do not hold that any one particular kind of evidence is required to establish knowledge of the material’s character and content.
This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment. The evidence, in the instant case, is sufficient to prove that the appel[915]*915lant knew the character and content of the magazine, “Super #3.” A review of the facts proven by the State supports this conclusion. On the day in question, the appellant picked up several boxes at United Parcel Service and took them to the Palace Bookstore at 7637V2 Long Point in Harris County. The boxes were addressed to either Steven W. Carroll or Empire Distributing at 1307 Wilcrest Drive, Number 259.
When Officer Wong entered the Palace Bookstore, he observed the contents of the store. Photographs were admitted in evidence to support his observations. Wong first observed the appellant standing at a display counter unloading the magazines from the boxes. What appears to be obscene devices were on display at the counter, with the price of sale clearly marked. At several shelves around the store, magazines, whose covers depict “ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,” were on display on the shelves. Numerous signs with the words “HARD CORE” were displayed on the magazine shelves. Displays of movie stills, which depict the same as the magazine covers, advertise that the movies are available for viewing for 25 cents, and on the pictures are the words “DIRTY MOVIES.”.
When Wong saw the appellant taking the magazines from the boxes, one of the boxes was already empty. Wong observed the appellant take the magazines, one at a time, and place them in a plastic cellophane wrapper. Then, appellant handed the magazines to a Mr. Peveto, who would seal the wrappers with a heat lamp. After the wrappers were sealed, appellant placed the magazines on the shelves shown in the State’s photographic exhibits. Wong testified that, during this process, appellant saw the cover of the magazine, “Super # 3”, at least twice.
The State then offered the magazine into evidence. Appellant did not object. Wong stated that he saw appellant remove the magazine from the box, place it in a wrapper and display it on a shelf. Wong picked it off the shelf and bought it. He gave the magazine and $20.00 to appellant, who then handed the money to Mr. Peveto to make change for the purchase. Peveto returned the magazine and change to Officer Wong.
After both sides closed and rested, the trial court told appellant that “based on the evidence, it is the opinion of the Court that you, Steven W. Carroll, are guilty of the offense you are charged with.” This was not a ease where the State merely showed that a defendant saw the cover of the magazine. In the instant case, the appellant not only saw the cover of “Super #3” before selling it to Officer Wong, he also picked it up at United Parcel Service where it had been delivered to him, unloaded it at the store, wrapped it in cellophane and placed it on display with other magazines and films of the same ilk. From both the circumstantial and direct evidence against the appellant, the trial court could rightfully determine that appellant knew the character and content of “Super # 3” at the time he sold it to Officer Wong.
In the State’s third ground of review, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred when it assumed that the trial court relied on the Sec. 43.23(e), supra, presumption to convict the appellant. We agree. There is nothing in the record before us (in the information, judgment and sentence, and the transcript) to indicate that the trial court based its decision on the statutory presumption alone. To the contrary, the record is replete with evidence to justify a finding of guilt by the trial court. We find that the Court of Appeals erred when it assumed that the trial court based the appellant’s conviction on the statutory presumption in Sec. 43.23(e), supra.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment and conviction of the trial court.
ONION, P.J., dissents.
MILLER, J., concurs in the result.