Carroll v. State
This text of 563 S.E.2d 125 (Carroll v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Ronnie L. Carroll was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and burglary, in connection with the shooting death of Vernon Raborn.1 On appeal, he asserts, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a custodial statement because he had invoked his right to counsel. We find no error and affirm.
1. In view of the eyewitnesses’ testimony and forensic evidence presented by the State, we find the evidence sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find Carroll guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. A detective advised Carroll of his Miranda rights and asked him if he wanted to discuss what happened. When Carroll replied that he did, the detective presented a waiver of counsel form to Carroll. At that point, Carroll asked “how” he would get an attorney. The detective explained that Carroll would be taken to jail (he was already under arrest) and that an attorney would be appointed for him. Carroll then signed the waiver of counsel form and gave a statement to the detective.
Carroll asserts the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statement because it was made after he invoked his right to counsel.2 We disagree.
A suspect who asks for a lawyer at any time during a custodial interrogation may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement until an attorney has been made available or until the suspect reinitiates the conversation. If [161]*161the police persist in questioning a suspect who has requested that counsel be present, any resulting statements made by the suspect are inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief. In Davis v. United States, [512 U. S. 452 (114 SC 2350, 129 LE2d 362) (1994)], the United States Supreme Court stated that a suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” The Supreme Court found that the suspect’s statement, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was ambiguous and therefore not a clear request for counsel that required the cessation of questioning. This Court reached the same result in Jordan v. State, [267 Ga. 442 (1) (480 SE2d 18) (1997)] where the suspect said he “might need a lawyer” and the police continued to interrogate him. This Court held that this reference to a lawyer was ambiguous and that the suspect’s ensuing statement was therefore admissible.
Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 271-272 (553 SE2d 598) (2001).
In this case, Carroll’s inquiry as to “how” he would be appointed a lawyer was not an unambiguous request for counsel. It follows that the trial court did not err in admitting Carroll’s statement into evidence.
3. Ronald Wynn testified that he saw Carroll at a club on the night of the murder; that Carroll told him Crawford killed somebody that night; and that he believed Carroll said he knew about the murder because he was there. Wynn added that Carroll did not go into details about the murder. At that point, the district attorney asked Wynn if he recalled giving a statement to an investigator in which he expounded upon such details. Wynn replied that if he did give such a statement, he did not remember. Later, Wynn’s taped statement was authenticated by the investigator and played for the jury.
Carroll asserts the trial court erred in admitting Wynn’s prior, taped statement. This assertion is without merit. The statement was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, and as substantive evidence. Holiday v. State, 272 Ga. 779 (534 SE2d 411) (2000).
4. Viewing the charge as a whole, it cannot be said that the trial court’s charge on knowledge, in which the trial court used the word “and” instead of “or” in the second sentence of the pattern charge, constituted reversible error. Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63, 67 (3) (548 SE2d 310) (2001). As in Eckman, the trial court charged the jury that it was incumbent upon the State to prove every element of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
563 S.E.2d 125, 275 Ga. 160, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1292, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carroll-v-state-ga-2002.