Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians

35 F.R.D. 535, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2344, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9715
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 7, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 35 F.R.D. 535 (Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carroll v. American Federation of Musicians, 35 F.R.D. 535, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2344, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9715 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

Opinion

LEVET, District Judge.

These consolidated actions are brought by members and former members of the defendant unions charging the defendants with having unlawfully combined with non-labor groups to restrain interstate commerce, all in violation of the anti-trust laws. Basically, the plaintiffs allege that they and others, as orchestra [537]*537leaders, are employers of the instrumentalists (sidemen) in their orchestras and that their continued membership in the union and the imposition of the union regulations upon them effectuates a conspiracy between a labor and a non-labor group to restrain interstate commerce. The predatory acts alleged are the fixing of prices for musical services; the refusal to bargain collectively concerning wage scales; the requirement of employment quotas; compelling orchestra leaders to become and remain members of the unions and the licensing and regulation of booking agents. Defendants presently move for summary judgment.

The basis of the defendants’ motions is that “[tjhere is job competition and other economic inter-relationship between leaders (such as the plaintiffs who may be employers) with other leaders who are employees; between leaders and •subleaders who are admittedly employees; between leaders who play instruments and sidemen who are admittedly employees and who likewise play instruments.” These economic interrelationships are said to justify the regulations the defendants impose and their requirement that orchestra leaders such ■as the plaintiffs become and remain members of the defendant-unions.

■ The amenability of labor unions to the anti-trust laws has had a long and tortuous history from its first judicial encounter in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488 (1908) (the Danbury Hatters case); the Congressional attempt to turn this course of decision in Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 38 Stat. 738 (1914), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 52; the construetion of the Clayton Act in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1921) and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927); again, the Congressional response in the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115; and the eventual acceptance of labor’s immunity in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940) and United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941). For the present purposes, it is possible to set forth in a single annotated sentence the applicable law. A labor union is exempted from both the injunctive1 and damage2 provisions of the anti-trust laws for all its activities in a bona fide labor dispute3 save in those instances when, in the absence of job or wage competition or the existence of an economic interrelationship significantly effecting other legitimate union interests 4 it combines with non-labor groups to effect some direct commercial restraint.5

We are concerned here with the exception to labor’s immunity implicit in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941) and made explicit in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939 (1945)—labor’s combination with a non-labor group. The initial, and perhaps sole issue in this case, is whether the plaintiffs, assuming they are employers and independent contractors, are such a non-labor group as to prevent the union from having a legitimate interest in their regulation. For upon the resolution of this issue depends [538]*538the existence of a “labor dispute” and the applicability of the Allen-Bradley exception. See fn. 2 of Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in the Meat Drivers case, 371 U.S. at 107-108, 83 S.Ct. at 169-170.

The answer must come from a resolution of the contrary attractions of Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union Local No. 753, Intern. Broth, of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed. 63 (1940); Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1942) ; Local 24 of Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 79 S.Ct. 297, 3 L.Ed.2d 312 (1959) on the one hand and Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 83 S.Ct. 162, 9 L.Ed.2d 150 (1962); United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., 183 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y.1960) on the other. The criterion is whether there exists between the independent contractors and the employees who are a proper subject of unionization such “job or wage competition or economic interrelationship of any kind,” 371 U.S. at 103, 83 S.Ct. at 167, as to make it a legitimate union objective in seeking as members the self-employed entrepreneurs.

The employment relationship in this industry is anything but simple and is one of the “[mjyriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in terms of employment, [which] blanket the nation’s economy.” N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126, 64 S.Ct. 851, 858, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). The affidavits submitted by the defendants establish beyond doubt that there is a substantial similarity between the duties performed by the plaintiffs, who act always as leaders and never as sidemen, and the vast majority of the union’s membership who may occasionally act as a leader or subleader.6 But the-substantial overlapping of physical duties is not in and of itself determinative. There was a substantial similarity in the duties performed by the “jobbers”' and the union members in both the Meat Drivers and Fish Smokers cases. In the Meat Drivers ease the processors of yellow grease, the employers of the union members, obtained raw grease either directly from large restaurants or by purchase from the independent grease peddlers.

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35 F.R.D. 535, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2344, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9715, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carroll-v-american-federation-of-musicians-nysd-1964.