[Cite as Carrington v. Beverly, 2026-Ohio-1293.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
KAYLA CARRINGTON, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 25CA22
v. :
DERRICK BEVERLY, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:
Derrick Beverly, Middletown, Ohio, pro se.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and James Roeder, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________ CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:4-1-26 ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas
Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that affirmed an order that
terminated the child support obligation of Derrick Beverly,
defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant assigns the
following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY OVERRULING APPELLANT’S [SIC] WITHOUT ADDRESSING MATERIAL EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE GENETIC TESTING WAS CONDUCTED ON HIGHLAND 25CA22 2
ANOTHER ALLEGED FATHER, BRADLEE J. WEST, AND NOT THE APPELLANT.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ORIGINAL JANUARY 23, 2007 CHILD SUPPORT ORDER WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE COURT OF JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER AGAINST APPELLANT.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, INCLUDING CLAIMS OF COERCION, DURESS, AND MISREPRESENTATION BY THE HIGHLAND COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT.”
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT’S OBJECTIONS IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, INCLUDING STOP PROGRAM INTAKE DOCUMENTS AND CHAIN OF CUSTODY RECORDS, WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT APPELLANT NEVER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO PATERNITY TESTING.”
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO VACATE OR RECONSIDER THE PRIOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDER CONSTITUTES PLAIN ERROR AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON AN INVALID AND FRAUDULENT GENETIC TESTING RECORD.”
{¶2} In November 2006, the Highland County Child Support
Enforcement Agency, appellee herein, issued an administrative
order that established appellant as the biological father of a HIGHLAND 25CA22 3
minor child. The order contained a notice that advised
appellant and the child’s mother, Kayla Carrington, that either
parent may object to the order “by bringing an action pursuant
to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code in the
juvenile court . . . within thirty (30) days of the date of this
administrative order.” The record does not contain any evidence
that either parent objected to this order.
{¶3} On January 23, 2007, appellee filed an order to
establish appellant’s duty of support for the child. The order
directed appellant to pay $189.54 in monthly child support.
This order contained a notice that stated, “[e]ither party may
object to this administrative support order by bringing an
action under section 2151.231 of the Ohio Revised Code no later
than thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order.” The
notice further stated that “[i]f neither the mother nor the
father brings an action in the juvenile court within the thirty-
day period, this administrative order is final . . . .” The
record does not contain any evidence that either parent objected
to this order.
{¶4} On March 5, 2025, appellee submitted a recommendation
to terminate appellant’s child support obligation due to the
minor child attaining the age of majority and graduating high
school. The order indicated that as of February 28, 2025,
appellant’s child support obligation was $13,620.79 in arrears. HIGHLAND 25CA22 4
On March 24, 2025, appellee conducted a hearing to
determine whether the March 5, 2025 order contained a mistake.
Appellee concluded that no mistake had occurred and affirmed the
March 5, 2025 recommendation to terminate appellant’s child
support obligation.
{¶5} On April 7, 2025, appellant objected to the
administrative order by filing an action with the juvenile
court. He later filed two additional documents that outlined
more specific objections to the administrative order.
{¶6} In the first document, appellant objected to the court
asserting personal jurisdiction over him and to its subject
matter jurisdiction. He also requested the court to “provide
tangible evidence” to demonstrate that (1) it had jurisdiction,
(2) appellee had complied with the Child Support Enforcement
Act, (3) “all writs and process issued by the Court comply with
the requirements of 28 U.S. Code § 1691,” and (4) “due process
safeguards were followed.” Appellant asserted that “the child
support order was entered against [him] without proper notice,
without an opportunity to be heard, and without demonstrating
that the court had the appropriate jurisdiction over the subject
matter.”
{¶7} In the second document, appellant asserted that “[t]he
circumstances surrounding [his] submission to the child support
process, and the subsequent agreements [he] was compelled to HIGHLAND 25CA22 5
make, violated [his] constitutional rights . . . to due process
and protection against coerced or involuntary contracts.”
Appellant argued that he “was threatened with severe penalties,
including the suspension of [his] driver’s license, income
withholding from [his] employment, and even incarceration if
[he] did not provide [his] private financial information and
consent to forced paternity testing.” He claimed that “[t]his
conduct constitute[d] unlawful coercion and render[ed] any
subsequent agreements void.” Appellant further contended that
his attorney and appellee “misled” him “regarding the full
consequences of signing the paternity acknowledgment and
agreeing to child support obligations.” He argued that he was
given “insufficient and inaccurate” information, which
“depriv[ed him] of the opportunity to make an informed
decision.”
{¶8} Consequently, appellant requested the following relief:
(1) “[i]mmediate cessation of any and all enforcement actions
related to the child support order”; (2) “[a] formal review and
reversal of the paternity acknowledgment and support order”; (3)
“[r]eimbursement of any and all funds collected under the void
child support orders”; and (4) “[a] written acknowledgment from
your office confirming that the child support order is null and
void and will be set aside and dismissed with prejudice.” HIGHLAND 25CA22 6
{¶9} On May 20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing to
consider appellant’s objections. Appellant indicated that he
primarily objected to the amount of arrearages that appellee
stated that he owed. Appellant explained that he had been
incarcerated for about six years and he believed that he should
be relieved from the duty to pay child support during his
incarceration.
{¶10} Appellee, however, pointed out that appellant
initially had paid his child support obligation in 2007, then
stopped paying around the middle of 2007 through the middle of
2012. Appellant indicated that he had been incarcerated during
that time period. Appellee reported that appellant resumed
paying child support in the middle of 2012, which appellant
stated coincided with his release from prison. Appellee
asserted that its records showed that appellant had paid a total
of $28,162.61 in child support.
{¶11} Appellee further stated that, although an agency now
may reduce an incarcerated parent’s child support obligation
during the time of the parent’s incarceration, at the time of
appellant’s incarceration the law did not recognize that an
incarcerated parent is entitled to a child support reduction
during the time of incarceration.
{¶12} The trial court stated that, if the mother agreed to
waive the arrearages, then the court might consider the matter HIGHLAND 25CA22 7
resolved. The court explained that it attempted to secure the
mother’s presence for the hearing, but she could not be served
at the address available. The court thus continued the hearing
to see if the mother could be served.
{¶13} On July 8, 2025, the trial court reconvened the
hearing. At the start, appellee stated that it attempted to
serve the mother, and appellee had not received any failure of
service. Appellee further explained that it attempted to
contact the mother by telephone, but had not been successful.
The court indicated that it had received a certified mail return
and, thus, found that the mother had been properly served.
{¶14} When the trial court asked appellant whether his
objection primarily involved the amount of arrearages owed,
appellant stated that he believed that the termination order was
void because the child support order “was never created
successfully.” He did not believe that he should have been
ordered to pay any child support from the start.
{¶15} The trial court listened to appellant’s argument and
noted that appellant had filed a separate lawsuit against
appellee. The court decided to continue the hearing so that it
could review the lawsuit before it issued a decision.
{¶16} On September 9, 2025, the trial court held another
hearing and gave appellant the opportunity to submit evidence.
Appellee indicated that it had received the documents that HIGHLAND 25CA22 8
appellant had filed, and appellant stated that he did not have
“too much more” to present. Appellant claimed that the
paperwork from appellee (1) did not have correct calculations,
and (2) contained coerced and fraudulent signatures. He stated
that he did not have any additional evidence to submit beyond
what he already had filed.
{¶17} On September 10, 2025, the trial court concluded that
appellant’s objections lacked merit. The court found that
appellant signed the January 23, 2007 support order, understood
the order, and received a copy of it. The court thus overruled
appellant’s objections to the administrative termination order.
This appeal followed.1
A
{¶18} We initially note that appellant’s brief does not
comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure or with this
court’s local rules. App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an appellant’s
brief to contain an argument that sets forth “the contentions of
1 We observe that, on September 17, 2025, appellant filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did not, however, affirm the agency’s termination order until September 18, 2025. Appellant thus prematurely filed his notice of appeal. App.R. 4(C) governs premature notices of appeal and states as follows: “A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision . . . but before entry of the judgment or order that begins the running of the appeal time period is treated as filed immediately after the entry.” In the case at bar, we therefore treat appellant’s notice of appeal as being filed immediately after the court entered its September 18, 2025 judgment. See State ex rel. Conrath v. LaRose, 2022-Ohio-3594, ¶ 15 (“when a party files a premature notice of appeal of a judgment, it is not ineffective,” but it “becomes effective once the judgment is final”). HIGHLAND 25CA22 9
the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented
for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
on which appellant relies.” Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7)
similarly states that an appellant’s brief must contain an
argument with “the contentions of the appellant with respect to
the assignments of error and the supporting reasons with
citations to the authorities and statutes on which the appellant
relies.” This rule further commands that “[e]ach assignment of
error shall be separately discussed and shall include the
standard or standards of review applicable to that assignment of
error under a separate heading placed before the discussion of
the issues.” Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶19} App.R. 16(A)(2) allows us to “disregard an assignment
of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to
identify in the record the error on which the assignment of
error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in
the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).”
{¶20} In the case at bar, appellant’s argument does not
comply with Fourth Dist.Loc.R. 16(A)(7) or App.R. 16(A)(7).
Appellant’s “Law and Argument” section consists of six
paragraphs that read as follows:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, a person may not be deprived of liberty HIGHLAND 25CA22 10
or property without due process of law. Fundamental fairness requires notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and decisions based on competent, reliable evidence (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
In this case, the evidence relied upon by the Highland County CSEA was neither competent nor reliable. The LaGene Technologies chain of custody documentation plainly identifies Bradlee J. West as the alleged father tested, not Appellant. The trial court failed to address this material discrepancy or hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the authenticity of the testing results.
Fraud on the court occurs when an officer of the court, such as a government attorney or agency, engages in conduct that defiles the judicial process itself (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)). The CSEA’s misrepresentation of genetic evidence constitutes such fraud, rendering the 2007 judgment void. A void judgment may be attacked at any time.
Additionally, if the agency used DNA obtained from Appellant’s juvenile STOP program intake records without consent, such conduct violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio law provides no authority permitting a child support agency to use juvenile or detention DNA samples for paternity proceedings without a valid court order and notice to the individual tested.
The trial court’s refusal to examine these claims or consider newly discovered evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable (Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983)). The failure to hold a hearing where allegations of fraud and misrepresentation are supported by documentary evidence is arbitrary and denies fundamental fairness.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment below and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the genetic testing, the origin of HIGHLAND 25CA22 11
Appellant’s alleged DNA, and the lawfulness of the 2007 support order.
{¶21} Although some of these paragraphs cite authorities,
appellant’s brief does not (1) set forth the applicable standard
of review, (2) identify the reasons that support each
contention, or (3) cite authority to support the reasons for
each contention.
{¶22} Because appellant’s assignments of error do not comply
with the appellate rules, we would be well within our discretion
to simply disregard them. However, we prefer to review a case
on its merits rather than dismiss it due to minor
technicalities. Thus, we generally afford considerable leniency
to pro se litigants. E.g., Viars v. Ironton, 2016-Ohio-4912, ¶
25 (4th Dist.); State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, 83 Ohio App.3d
199, 206 (4th Dist.1992). “Limits do exist, however. Leniency
does not mean that we are required ‘to find substance where none
exists, to advance an argument for a pro se litigant or to
address issues not properly raised.’” State v. Headlee, 2009-
Ohio-873, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Nayar, 2007-Ohio-
6092, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.); accord In re Estate of Pallay, 2006-
Ohio-3528, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.); Karmasu v. Tate, 1994 WL 521235, *4
(4th Dist. Sept. 15, 1994). Furthermore, we will not “conjure
up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims
from convoluted reasoning.” Karmasu, 83 Ohio App.3d at 206. HIGHLAND 25CA22 12
{¶23} Additionally, appellate courts “are not obligated to
search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the
parties.” State v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19; see State
v. Clark, 2025-Ohio-4410, ¶ 23 (appellate courts will not
“cobble together an argument for an appellant”); see In re
Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 2011-Ohio-2638, ¶ 19
(appellate courts should not “develop a party’s arguments”).
Moreover, “[a]ppellate courts should not perform independent
research to create an argument for a litigant.” State v. Sims,
2023-Ohio-1179, ¶ 109 (4th Dist.); Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034,
at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 78
(O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983)
(“‘“appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal
inquiry and research”’”). “[W]e cannot write a party’s brief,
pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s
favor. That’s not how an adversarial system of adjudication
works.” Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.
2013). Instead, “‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of
matters the parties present.’” Snyder v. Old World Classics,
L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4, quoting Greenlaw v. United States,
554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). HIGHLAND 25CA22 13
{¶24} In the case sub judice, appellant’s brief does not
contain fully developed arguments for each assignment of error.
Addressing each assignment of error would require us to create
arguments on appellant’s behalf and to conduct independent
research to support those arguments. Because our role is to act
as a neutral arbiter of the legal issues presented, we will not
create appellant’s arguments or conduct research to support his
arguments. Instead, we will consider the essential substance of
the arguments contained within appellant’s assignments of error.
B
{¶25} The essential point of appellant’s assignments of
error appears to be that the trial court erred by failing to
declare the 2007 child support order void. Appellant does not,
however, cite any authority that allows a trial court that is
reviewing objections to a child support termination order to
declare as void a child support order entered almost two decades
ago. We therefore overrule appellant’s assignments of error
relating to the validity of the 2007 child support order. See
generally Pannell v. McCall, 2025-Ohio-915, ¶¶ 11-12 (10th
Dist.) (parent waived any objection to an administrative support
order when the parent did not timely object to the order); In re
I.L.J., 2019-Ohio-5241, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.) (if neither parent
objects to an administrative order establishing child support
within 30 days of that order, “the administrative support order HIGHLAND 25CA22 14
is final and enforceable by a court and may be modified only as
provided in R.C. Chapters 3119, 3121, and 3123”); In re J.M.G.,
2013-Ohio-2693, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.) (rejecting a parent’s
assertion that the parent was denied a “meaningful opportunity
to be heard” concerning the parent’s objections to an
administrative child support order when the parent failed to
timely object to the administrative order).
{¶26} Moreover, to the extent that appellant claims that the
trial court failed to afford him an evidentiary hearing to
consider his claims of fraud and misrepresentation, we observe
that the trial court held three separate hearings to consider
appellant’s objections. Appellant appeared at each hearing, and
the trial court allowed him to submit any evidence that he had.
Appellant informed the court that he had filed all of the
evidence that he intended to submit in support of his objections
to the termination order. The record thus does not support
appellant’s contention that the trial court failed to hold a
hearing or failed to allow him to submit evidence.
{¶27} In sum, nothing in the record suggests that the trial
court erred by overruling appellant’s objections to the
administrative order terminating his child support obligation.
{¶28} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s assignments of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment. HIGHLAND 25CA22 15
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. HIGHLAND 25CA22 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.