Carrigan v. Davis

100 S.E. 91, 84 W. Va. 473, 1919 W. Va. LEXIS 62
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 16, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 100 S.E. 91 (Carrigan v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carrigan v. Davis, 100 S.E. 91, 84 W. Va. 473, 1919 W. Va. LEXIS 62 (W. Va. 1919).

Opinion

Williams, Judge:

Defendant William Davis has appealed from two decrees of the circuit court of Marshall county, pronounced on the [475]*47520th of June, 1916, and tbe 28th of February, 1917, respectively, avoiding a conveyance to him of a tract of land by William G-. Bole, made thé 9th of October, 1913, the day Bole becam'e twenty-one years of age. He was an only child and heir at law of his mother, from whom he inherited the land. His mother died about the year 1902, and his father about the year 1909. James D. Burley was appointed his guardian in 1902, and continued as such until he reached his majority, and the boy resided with his father until the latter’s death. By means of a friendly suit the guardian sold the coal under the land, described by metes and bounds and as containing 69 acres and 125 poles. The fund derived therefrom, amounting to $662.92, went into the guardian’s hands. The expectation of coming into possession of this fund, when he should become of age, enabled the boy to obtain credit from a number of people, on his promise that he would then pay them. There was an oil and gas lease on the land, and the rentals in lieu of drilling amounted to $120.00 per year. In his final settlement, apparently not' yet approved by the court, the guardian charges himself with $390.00 derived from this source, thus showing a sum in his hands to the credit of his ward, at the time he became of age, of $671.25. On the 17th of January, 1914, on the order of his ward, the guardian turned over to C. A. Showaere, his attorney, the balance of this fund, after crediting himself with certain disbursements on his ward’s account. The sum turned over to his ward’s attorney is $286.79. These facts are significant in considering the weight of evidence concerning Bole’s alleged imbecility and incapacity, and whether the charge, that Davis exerted an undue influence over him and fradulently induced him to convey his land to him, is sustained.

In the spring of 1913 Bole married a woman much older than himself, by the name of Stella Patterson, and began housekeeping with her on his little farm. Soon thereafter he separated from her, charging her with adultery; and, being well acquainted with defendant Davis, he disclosed to him his domestic troubles. Thereupon Davis advised him he had good grounds for a divorce from Ms wife. Bole [476]*476then consulted an attorney who advised' him that, as he had continued • to cohabitate with his wife after he knew of her guilty conduct, he thereby condoned the offense, and could not obtain a divorce. This happened before he was of age. On the 21st of July, 1914, about nine months after he became of age, Charles E. Carrigan was appointed a committee for him on motion therefor made by his wife Stella, to whom apparently he had shortly before become reconciled, and .this suit was instituted by his committee on-the 24th of the following August. The presumption of law is that, at the time Bole made the deed, he was sane, and his committee has the burden of proving otherwise. Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612; and Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124. Bole understood and appreciated the nature, character and effect of the transaction, and that shows he had sufficient mental capacity to satisfy the rule of ■ law. “Eccentricity of manner and mental weakness of the grantor which does not amount to imbecility are not sufficient to overthrow a deed in the absence of proof of fraud in its procurement.” Black v. Post, 67 W. Va. 253.

Plaintiff prays that the deed be canceled on two grounds: First, that his ward was non compos mentis and incapable of understanding such a transaction; and, second, that defendant exerted an undue influence over his ward, and induced' him to make the deed by fraudulent and improper means. The depositions in the case make a voluminous record, over seven hundred pages. It is an unnecessary task which can serve no useful purpose to review in this opinion the conflicting! testimony. Many witnesses have testified respecting Bole’s mental capacity, and their opinions are diametrically opposed to one another. Two or three physicians and very many lay witnesses for the plaintiff swear, in their opinions, that he was not mentally capable of transacting business. But the doctors who so testified made no particular examination of him, and only a few plaintiff’s other witnesses had had personal transactions or dealings with him, and their opinions were based on general impressions received from conversations with the boy and from neighborhood rumors. On the other, hand, many witnesses for de[477]*477fendant testified that he was as capable of understanding and appreciating the nature of a transaction as anyone else. Dr. C. A. Wingerter, the only expert witness, a specialist in mental and nervous diseases with an experience of eight years or more, saw Bole on three occasions, and on two of them made a careful examination of him with a view of ascertaining whether he had any mental disease or was in any way abnormal. He examined him for two hours on each occasion, and his opinion is that he had the capacity to understand the nature, character and effect of business transactions, and that he was normal. The late distinguished juage below, 'whose written opinion in the case is copied in brief of counsel for appellee, held that .mental incompetency was not shown. On the contrary, he says: “That brought to face a transaction he understands the act andv what it means. He is not destitute of intelligence but he is wltnout judgment. ’ However, the court annulled the deed on the ground' that Davis had induced Bole to make it by fraudulent means and undue influences exerted over him. But we hardly think this conclusion is justified by the weight of the evidence. Before he became of age, • Bole induced many persons to extend him credit on his promise of paying them out of the funds in the hands of his guardian, when he became of age. He thereby deceived almost everyone who is shown tó have had any dealings with him. He made many such promises and kept none of them. Such conduct may indicate moral obliquity, but it certainly does not tend to prove mental incapacity. Concerning Ms dealings with Davis, he and Davis are the'most important witnesses, and * as to the important transactions, the only witnesses. Bole first applied to Davis for money sometime in March, 1913, telling him he was in need of clothing. Davis then let him have about ten dollars, and continued to advance sums of money to him after that time, varying in amounts, until sometime in the month of October, 1913, on the faith of Bole’s promise to pay him out of the fund in Ms guardian’s hands, ■ when he became of age. Davis kept an itemized account of the money advanced to Bole, and, when evidenced [478]*478by check, produces the checks endorsed by Bole, and when paid in cash, produces Bole’s receipts therefor. Bole swears he kept no account and admits giving receipts to Davis, and, when they were shown to him; admitted the genuineness of his signature thereto, but denied recollection-of many of the particular transactions. The court referred the cause to a commissioner to state an account of the sums of money advanced by Davis to Bole before he reached the age of twenty-one, the amount advanced after that time, and how much advanced during either period was for necessaries.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
100 S.E. 91, 84 W. Va. 473, 1919 W. Va. LEXIS 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carrigan-v-davis-wva-1919.