Black v. Post

67 S.E. 1072, 67 W. Va. 253, 1910 W. Va. LEXIS 16
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 22, 1910
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 67 S.E. 1072 (Black v. Post) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Black v. Post, 67 S.E. 1072, 67 W. Va. 253, 1910 W. Va. LEXIS 16 (W. Va. 1910).

Opinion

Williams, Judge:

Rebecca Black owned a tract of 140 acres of land in Upshur county, and, on the 25th of December, 1906, conveyed it to her nephew, A. Y. Post, in consideration that he would support her while she lived, supply her with medical attention in case of sickness, and at her death give her a respectable burial, and in further consideration that he would pay to Rosie Bonnell and Charley Bonnell, her grandchildren who were then infants about the age of thirteen and sixteen years respectively, $500 each, which was not to become payable until each of the said infants should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and then to be paid in installments of $50 per year without interest.

On the 14th of January, 1907,- she brought this suit in the circuit court of Upshur county to have the conveyance set aside and declared void on the following grounds; (1) mental incompetency in the grantor to make a conveyance; (2) inadequacy of consideration; and (3) fraud in the procurement of the deed. Pending the suit Rebecca Black died, and an amended bill was filed by- Mrs. Jane Bonnell, her daughter and only heir at law and the mother of the grandchildren provided for in the deed. The defendant answered and denied specifically all [255]*255tire allegations of tire bill. The case turns upon whether, or not, the depositions of witnesses taken and filed in the case are sufficient to sustain the charges in the bill. The evidence is voluminous, covering over five hundred pages of the printed record. It would be a laborious and useless task to review all the testimony in this opinion; it could serve no useful purpose. The most of it has no special bearing on the case. It consists largely of the opinions of Bébecca Black’s neighbors concerning her competency, or incompetency, to make a deed; many of the witnesses being of the opinion that she was not competent, and others being of the opinion that she was competent, to make the deed. One witness goes so far as to say that he did not believe she knew right from wrong, and bases his reason for this belief on the fact that Bebecca Black did not attend church; others stated that they did not regard her as competent to transact business, and based their opinion on the ground that she told them she wanted to get married, that she had said she would make a deed for half her farm to some good man if he would marry her and take care of her. The proof shows that she had been a widow for about four years, that she lived on this farm all alone, that she was not physically able to take care of the farm and feed her stock, that she could not secure the services of a reliable man to do it for her, that her manner was disagreeable, that she was odd and eccentric, and that her daughter, Jane Bonnell, seldom went to see her. Bebecca Black was at this time about sixty-three years of age. TJnder these circumstances we do not think that her expression, of .a desire to get married was evidence of mental weakness. True she evinced more. candor in regard to this matter than is usually disclosed by her sex; this proves that she did not possess that high degree of modesty concerning matrimonial affairs that is usual in womankind, but it does not prove mental incapacity. . She may have been influenced more by motives of business than of sentiment to make known her wish to get married, and may have adopted this method of making her wish known. Men sometimes convey all their property in consideration of marriage, and display good judgment in doing so. Why then impeach a woman’s competency to transact business who is willing to convey only half her property in consideration of marriage? Be-becca Black’s failure to attend church is no evidence of want [256]*256of business capacity, or of the fact that she did not know right from wrong. It might just as well be taken as evidence to prove the contrary. She may have refused to attend upon the services of the church because she did not want to be reminded of her sins. Many of the witnesses, who gave their opinions that Rebecca Black was not competent to make the deed, are shown to have had dealings with her; either in the way of leasing land from her for the purpose of raising crops, harvesting her meadows for a share of the crop, or purchasing cattle from her. It is clearly proven that, during her husband’s lifetime, she looked after her own business and did her own trading. It is true she often sought the opinions of others concerning the value of certain property she desired to sell. This is nothing more than most people do. Some people get their information as to the market value of articles by reading the published reports of the market, others by inquiry of those on whose judgment they rely. Few persons depend altogether on their own judgment,_ and those who do so usually evince bad judgment. That Rebecca Black was eccentric and peculiar in her manner, thought and speech there can be no doubt, but that she was competent to transact business, and had sufficient mind to make disposition of her property and to know' the effect of a deed of conveyance, we think there can be as little doubt.

The presumption of law- is always in favor of the competency of the grantor to execute a deed at the time it was made, and the burden of proof is on the party attacking the deed to overcome this presumption. Smith on Frauds 187; Eakin v. Hawkins, 52 W. Va. 124; Irwin v. Hedrick, Id. 537; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va. 612; Snodgrass v. Knight, 43 W. Va. 294; Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168. The judge of the circuit court, in deciding this case, rendered a carefully prepared written opinion which is made a part of appellee’s brief. We conclude our observations upon the question of the grantor’s sanity and mental capacity at the time of making the deed with the following quotation from that opinion, viz: “But when the opinions of these witnesses are analyzed in the light of the facts upon which they are based, there is scarcely a fact in the case tending to warrant the opinion that she was insane. Neither is there much to justify the opinion that she was an imbecile, or non compos mentis, and incompetent to transact the ordinary busi[257]*257ness affairs of her life. For -twenty years or more she held her property in her own name and dealt with it herself, buying and selling her stock, and disposing of the products of her farm. This was the ease when her husband was living, as much as after his death. With but few exceptions her trades appear to have been based on good ordinary judgment. She knew the value of money and how to keep it. She was close and penurious, frugal to a fault, but always met her obligations with promptness and honesty.”

Having ascertained that the grantor had sufficient capacity to dispose of her property, which is the point on which plaintiff chiefly relied, and the one upon which the overwhelming amount of testimony seems to center, it goes a long way towards disposing1 of the other charges of inadequacy of consideration and fraud in the procurement of the deed. Inasmuch as the law gives a person an unqualified right to dispose of his property as he pleases, even to the extent of giving it away, it necessarily follows that inadequacy of consideration is not alone sufficient to overthrow a deed. It is only evidence to be considered along with other facts and circumstances bearing .on the charge of fraud in the procurement of the deed. Is this charge sustained ? We think not. The grantee is a nephew of Bebecea Black,, he is her brother’s son.

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Bluebook (online)
67 S.E. 1072, 67 W. Va. 253, 1910 W. Va. LEXIS 16, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/black-v-post-wva-1910.