Carper v. New Castle County Board of Education

432 A.2d 1202, 1981 Del. LEXIS 342
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware
DecidedJune 22, 1981
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 432 A.2d 1202 (Carper v. New Castle County Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carper v. New Castle County Board of Education, 432 A.2d 1202, 1981 Del. LEXIS 342 (Del. 1981).

Opinions

QUILLEN, Justice:

This appeal by the State Treasurer from an order of the Superior Court requires us to construe a statute, 29 Del.C. § 5202, governing health care insurance for State employees. The issue presented is solely one of statutory construction. Specifically, it concerns the relative contributions, under § 5202, of the State and appellee, the New Castle County Board of Education (Board), to the cost of health care coverage of certain New Castle County School District employees (District employees).

Prior to January 1, 1980, 29 Del.C. § 5202(a) provided, in relevant part:

“This State shall pay the full cost of premium or subscription charges for a basic plan of health care insurance coverage for all regular officers and employees and for eligible pensioners of the State not otherwise covered under a group health care insurance contract.”

On or about November 21, 1978, the Board entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the New Castle County Education Association, representative of the bargaining unit comprised of the certificated non-administrative District employees. Provisions of that contract pertinent to this appeal provide:

“23:9.1 Employees will continue to receive existing carrier-provided fringe benefits insofar as they remain available through June 30, 1979. If a benefit is cancelled the parties shall meet to negotiate an alternate fringe benefit equal to the fringe benefit that was cancelled. Employees who are currently enrolled in the State plan of Blue Cross Blue Shield will receive no less than $25.00 per month toward coverage beyond the basic State plan for the period January 1, 1979 to June 30, 1979.
“23:9.2 Effective July 1, 1979 employees will receive fully paid family comprehensive Blue Cross Blue Shield, limited to the premium in effect at the signing of this agreement. Any increase in the premium will be covered by using other fringe benefit money or payroll deduction.”

As of July 1,1979, the State was contributing, pursuant to § 5202(a), $33.16 per month toward the health care coverage of each District employee, the full cost of an individual basic health insurance plan. And the Board was obligated by contract to contribute up to $63.56 per month for District employees electing to receive comprehensive family coverage, the difference between the State’s contribution and the total cost of comprehensive family coverage.

Effective January 1, 1980, the General Assembly amended § 5202 in two significant respects. The State’s obligation under subsection (a) was altered as follows:

“The State shall pay premium or subscription charges for the following, whichever is greater:
1. The full cost of a basic individual contract of health care insurance coverage for all regular officers, employees and eligible pensioners of the State not otherwise covered under a [1204]*1204group health care insurance contract, or
2. Seventy-five percent of the cost of the basic subscriber and child contract or basic family contract for eligible regular officers, employees and pensioners not eligible for federal medicare.” 1

And subsection (d) was added:

“Agencies or other units of the State providing a contribution on April 1, 1979, by contract, agreement or otherwise, toward the cost of health care coverage of regular officers, employees and eligible pensioners, their spouses, dependent children or families, shall continue to make such contributions after such date, unless relieved of such responsibility by an act of the General Assembly.”

Thereafter, in January of 1980, the Board filed a complaint in Superior Court, seeking a writ of mandamus to be issued to the State Treasurer or, alternatively, a declaratory judgment directing the State Treasurer to pay the maximum amount provided by § 5202(a), as amended, toward the health care coverage of District employees, without diminution by reason by any obligation on the part of the Board under § 5202(d). The State Treasurer counterclaimed against the Board, asking for a declaratory judgment that, under § 5202(d), the Board must continue to pay $63.56 per month toward the cost of comprehensive family insurance for District employees, and that, under § 5202(a), the State shall pay the balance of the cost of comprehensive family coverage. There being no factual dispute, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings.

The Superior Court found for the Board, holding that § 5202(a) unambiguously requires the State to pay 100% of an individual basic plan for 75% of a family basic plan, whichever the case may be, and nothing less.2 It further said that § 5202(d) requires the Board to “supplement the State’s payments under subsection (a) as necessary to provide its employees with the same level of health care benefits as they were entitled to receive by contract. . .as of April 1, 1979.” The State Treasurer appeals; we reverse.3

In this Court, the State Treasurer argues that the purpose and effect of the § 5202 amendments is that a State agency’s obligation under subsection (d) modifies the State’s obligation under subsection (a). This contention is based on the State Treasurer’s reading of subsection (d) to require the Board, and other agencies or units of the State contributing to employee health care insurance as of April 1, 1979, to continue making “such contributions” in the same dollar amount. This construction would apportion the responsibility for District employee health care insurance in the following manner: the Board would continue to contribute $63.56 per month as it is obligated to do by contract as of April 1,1979, and the State would pay the difference, up to 75% of the total cost of basic family coverage as required by subsection (a), between the amount paid by the Board and the full cost of comprehensive family coverage.

The Board, on the other hand, espouses the reasoning of the Superior Court: the amendments to § 5202 unambiguously increase the State’s mandatory contribution while maintaining the supplemental contributions by State agencies or units, such as [1205]*1205the Board, toward the cost of health care insurance for State employees. Under this view, the reference to “contribution” in subsection (d) means such amounts, if any, over and above the State’s obligation under subsection (a), which are necessary to maintain the level of coverage afforded State employees by agencies or other units of the State on April 1, 1979. The relative contributions of the parties under this view would be as follows: the State would contribute 75% of basic family coverage and the Board would then pick up the difference between the State’s contribution and the full cost of family comprehensive insurance for District employees electing such coverage under their contract.

Unlike the Superior Court, we cannot say that the language of § 5202 makes clear that either party’s interpretation is correct. Rather, reading subsections (a) and (d) in conjunction, we find ambiguity in § 5202. Our task, then, in order to resolve the ambiguity, is to discern the legislative intent behind the § 5202 amendments. Mosley v. Bank of Delaware, Del.Supr., 372 A.2d 178 (1977); A & P Stores v. Hannigan,

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Bluebook (online)
432 A.2d 1202, 1981 Del. LEXIS 342, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carper-v-new-castle-county-board-of-education-del-1981.