Carpenter v. Wilkinson

946 F. Supp. 522, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15288, 1996 WL 598670
District Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided September 20, 1996·No. 1:95 CV 0721·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Resolving Docket No. 29)

DOWD, District Judge.

Before the Court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 29), 1 plaintiffs memorandum in opposition (Docket No. 40), and defendants’ reply (Docket No. 45). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 28,1995, pro se plaintiff, Robert Francis Carpenter (“Carpenter”), an inmate at Lorain Correctional Institution (“Lor.C.I.”), having been previously granted leave to proceed informa pauperis, filed the above-captioned case against (1) Reginald Wilkinson, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), (2) Norm Rose, Warden of Lor.C.I., (3) Ben Kelly, (4) Chaplain Westra, and (5) Lor.C.I. Publication Screening Committee, alleging violations of his First Amendment right of free exercise of religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been “a self proclaimed Satanist” since 1991 and that his beliefs are “deeply rooted.” Complaint, ¶ IV(2). He alleges that in 1994 he sought prison officials’ permission to receive and keep in his possession a copy of The Satanic Bible by Anton S. LaVey, 2 but that permis *524 sion was ultimately denied after the book was reviewed by prison and ODRC officials.

Carpenter asserts that The Satanic Bible plays a role in Satanism analogous to the Holy Bible in Christianity and the Koran in Islam. Carpenter Depo., pp. 15-16, 22. Prison officials, however, denied permission for Carpenter to keep the book because (1) “Satan worship is not [an] authorized religion with the [ODRC]” and (2) because they found the book to be “inflammatory.” Carpenter Depo., Exhibits C, J and L. This lawsuit resulted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When considering a motion for summary judgment, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions] must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). However, the adverse party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The Rule requires the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial to oppose a proper summary judgment motion “by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves[J” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). General averments or conclusory allegations of an affidavit do not create specific fact disputes for summary judgment purposes. See Lujan v. National, Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188-89, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Nor may a party “create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts ... earlier deposition testimony.” Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1986) (citing Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir.1984)). Further, “ ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ ” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512).

In sum, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

III. DISCUSSION

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants advance these arguments: (1) that Satanism is not a “religion” for First Amendment purposes, but that if it is a religion, defendants have not substantially burdened plaintiffs ability to practice that religion; and (2) that defendants have legitimate penological reasons both for distinguishing between Satanism and other religions and for barring The Satanic Bible from Ohio’s prisons.

A. The First Amendment Claim

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Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15288, 1996 WL 598670 (N.D. Ohio 1996).

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