Carpenter v. Tyler Independent School District

429 F. Supp. 2d 848, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24355, 2006 WL 1121287
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedApril 26, 2006
Docket6:05cv124
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 429 F. Supp. 2d 848 (Carpenter v. Tyler Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carpenter v. Tyler Independent School District, 429 F. Supp. 2d 848, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24355, 2006 WL 1121287 (E.D. Tex. 2006).

Opinion

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

LOVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Enter Judgment and Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Docket No. 28). After careful consideration, the Court finds that the following order should issue.

Background

Plaintiff David Carpenter (“Carpenter”) was a teacher at A.T. Stewart Middle School for Defendant Tyler Independent School District (“TISD”). On several occasions during the 2003-2004 school year, Carpenter was called for active duty in the military, specifically the Air Force Reserves, requiring his absence from the classroom. At the conclusion of said school year, TISD did not offer Carpenter a new contract.

*850 Carpenter insisted that his involvement in the uniformed services was a substantial or motivating factor in TISD’s decision not to renew his teaching contract. Accordingly, Carpenter brought an action against TISD under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), alleging discrimination based on his military service. TISD alleged, however, that it was Carpenter’s poor performance in the classroom, not his military service, that led to his termination.

Trial on the matter was held March 26-27, 2006 before the Honorable United States Magistrate Judge John D. Love. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was required to make the determination of whether TISD discriminated against Carpenter, and if so, what amount of back pay to award Carpenter to compensate him for his losses. On Tuesday, March 27, 2006, the jury members returned the following unanimous verdict:

QUESTION NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT discriminated against DAVID CARPENTER because of his military service?
ANSWER “Yes” or “No”: YES
QUESTION NO. 2
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT’S conduct in discriminating against DAVID CARPENTER because of his military service was willful?
ANSWER ‘Tes” or “No”: NO
QUESTION NO. 3
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate DAVID CARPENTER for the damages that he suffered, if any, as a result of the conduct of TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT?
Answer in dollars and cents, or state “none”: $ NONE

Applicable Law

In considering Carpenter’s motion, the Court must consider all the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Baltezore v. Concordia Parish Sheriffs Dep’t, 767 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.1985). If there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion will be denied. Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969).

A jury is awarded great discretion in awarding damages within the range shown by the evidence. Neiman-Marcus Group v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.1990). A jury’s conclusion on damages should not be disturbed unless it is “entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained.” Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.1983). Because fixing the amount of damages requires sifting and weighing of the evidence, the jury’s conclusion demands deference, unless it is “shocking [to] the judicial conscience” or “exceeds that amount that any reasonable man could feel the claimant is entitled to.” Bridges v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir.1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 249 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir.1957).

In any action brought against a state or private employer under the USERRA, the court may require the employer to comply with the provisions of the USERRA. 38 *851 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1)(A). Also, the court may require the employer to compensate the person for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of such employer’s failure to comply with the provisions of the USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1)(B). In addition to the remedies provided in § 4323(d), the Court may use its full equity powers, including injunctive relief to vindicate fully the rights or benefits provided under the Act. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(e).

Analysis

Carpenter urges the Court to disregard the jury’s verdict with respect to Plaintiffs damages and enter judgment for Carpenter’s lost back pay in the amount of $76,948.48, arguing that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding. In the Court’s charge to the jury, the jury was instructed that “[i]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of an opportunity to lessen his damages, you should deny him recovery for those damages ...” TISD contends that the jury’s verdict infers that the jury found that Carpenter failed to mitigate his damages.

At trial, evidence was introduced demonstrating that Carpenter made little effort to secure other employment. Carpenter claims that he actively sought alternate employment by submitting resumes and filing job applications, as well as speaking with certain school officials regarding possible employment. Absent from the record, however, is any documentation, whether it be in the form of letters, copies of job applications or otherwise, substantiating Carpenter’s assertions that he sought to obtain another teaching position. See Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474 (5th Cir.2001) (affirming the district court’s denial of back pay for failure to adequately document asserted job search). Additionally, Carpenter was unable to identify or recall at least some of the schools where he claims he submitted job applications.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Harper v. Marcorp, Ltd.
District of Columbia, 2023
Ward v. Shelby County
W.D. Tennessee, 2022
Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc.
680 S.E.2d 791 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2009)
Maher v. City of Chicago
463 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Illinois, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
429 F. Supp. 2d 848, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24355, 2006 WL 1121287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carpenter-v-tyler-independent-school-district-txed-2006.