Carpenter v. Machold

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Carpenter v. Machold

86 A.D.2d 727, 447 N.Y.S.2d 46, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15285

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 21, 1982

StatusPublished

Cited by22 cases

This text of 86 A.D.2d 727 (Carpenter v. Machold) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Carpenter v. Machold, 86 A.D.2d 727, 447 N.Y.S.2d 46, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15285 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).

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Opinions

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cerrito, J.), entered October 7, 1980 in Fulton County, which denied defendant Machold’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint as against her. Plaintiff John Carpenter, while doing repair work at defendant Machold’s home, slipped and fell off a ladder. He thereafter signed a document which reads as follows: “To Marguerite Machold I do not intend to sue you for my injuries of February 23, 1978 at your house.” Plaintiff subsequently commenced a lawsuit against defendant Machold and others for injuries sustained in the fall. Defendant Machold moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff had released her from liability by execution of the afore-mentioned document. The motion was denied. We concur with the finding of Special Term. To constitute a release, a writing must contain an expression of a present intention to renounce a claim (Pratt Plumbing & Heating v Mastropole, 68 AD2d 973). It need not be supported by consideration. It suffices if it is in writing (General Obligations Law, § 15-303). In arriving at the meaning of a written instrument, the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used will be imparted to it. An analysis of the language of the instant document indicates that the promisor had a present intention not to sue defendant Machold. However, the document bears no words of release, discharge or renunciation as are required in a writing purporting to be a release. The words, “I do not intend” cannot be equated with the required explicit, unequivocal statement of a present promise to release defendant from liability. Order affirmed, without costs. Main, Mikoll and Weiss, JJ., concur; Kane, J. P., and Yesawich, Jr., J., dissent and vote to reverse in the following memorandum by Kane, J. P.

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Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Cerrito, J.), entered October 7, 1980 in Fulton County, which denied defendant Machold’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint as against her. Plaintiff John Carpenter, while doing repair work at defendant Machold’s home, slipped and fell off a ladder. He thereafter signed a document which reads as follows: “To Marguerite Machold I do not intend to sue you for my injuries of February 23, 1978 at your house.” Plaintiff subsequently commenced a lawsuit against defendant Machold and others for injuries sustained in the fall. Defendant Machold moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff had released her from liability by execution of the afore-mentioned document. The motion was denied. We concur with the finding of Special Term. To constitute a release, a writing must contain an expression of a present intention to renounce a claim (Pratt Plumbing & Heating v Mastropole, 68 AD2d 973). It need not be supported by consideration. It suffices if it is in writing (General Obligations Law, § 15-303). In arriving at the meaning of a written instrument, the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used will be imparted to it. An analysis of the language of the instant document indicates that the promisor had a present intention not to sue defendant Machold. However, the document bears no words of release, discharge or renunciation as are required in a writing purporting to be a release. The words, “I do not intend” cannot be equated with the required explicit, unequivocal statement of a present promise to release defendant from liability. Order affirmed, without costs. Main, Mikoll and Weiss, JJ., concur; Kane, J. P., and Yesawich, Jr., J., dissent and vote to reverse in the following memorandum by Kane, J. P.

Hatco Corporation v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., a Corporation of the State of Connecticut, and Third-Party v. Allstate Insurance Company (As Successor to Northbrook Excess and Surplus Company) American Employers' Insurance Company Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and the London Market Companies Commercial Union Insurance Company Continental Casualty Company Pacific Employers Insurance Company Unigard Security Insurance Company, Third-Party and Commercial Union Insurance Company, Third-Party and Fourth-Party v. Maryland Casualty Company, Fourth-Party and Fifth-Party v. American Centennial Insurance Company Evanston Insurance Company First State Insurance Company Gibraltar Casualty Company Hartford Casualty Insurance Company Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and the London Market Companies Midland Insurance Company Reliance Insurance Company Republic Insurance Company Royal Indemnity Company Transport Indemnity, A/K/A Mission American Insurance Company Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Fifth-Party and W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn.

59 F.3d 400 (First Circuit, 1995)

Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.

59 F.3d 400 (Third Circuit, 1995)

Sterling Drug Inc. v. Bayer AG

792 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D. New York, 1992)

Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc. v. Leasure (In Re Thomson McKinnon Securities Inc.)

132 B.R. 9 (S.D. New York, 1991)

United States ex rel. Falco Construction Corp. v. Summit General Contracting Corp.

760 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. New York, 1991)

US for Use of Falco Const. v. Summit Gen. Contr.

760 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. New York, 1991)

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704 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. New York, 1989)

State v. Upstate Storage, Inc.

145 A.D.2d 714 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)

Royal Insurance Co. of America v. Cathy Daniels, Ltd.

684 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. New York, 1988)

Gerlach v. the Horn & Hardart Co.

683 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. New York, 1988)

Barrett v. United States

651 F. Supp. 611 (S.D. New York, 1986)

A.F.L. Falck, S.P.A. v. E.A. Karay Co.

639 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. New York, 1986)

Derry Finance N v. v. Christiana Companies, Inc.

616 F. Supp. 544 (D. Delaware, 1985)

Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, as of the Estate of Darryl F. Zanuck, Deceased v. Genevieve Gillaizeau

766 F.2d 709 (Second Circuit, 1985)

Bank of America National Trust & Saving Ass'n v. Gillaizeau

593 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. New York, 1984)

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86 A.D.2d 727, 447 N.Y.S.2d 46, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15285, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carpenter-v-machold-nyappdiv-1982.

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