Caron v. Town of Poland

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: March 3, 2016
• Docket: ANDap-15-008
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, SS. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AUBSC-AP-15-008

PAUL CARON, ) ) Petitioner, )

t v. RECE\\JED & ~\LED DECISION ON RULE SOB APPEAL

TOWN OF POLAND, .. MAR O 32 8 °' ANOROSCOG INT Respondent. SUPERIOR CO R

Petitioner Paul Caron brings this action pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil

Procedure BOB. Petitioner appeals a denial of emergency general assistance by the

Town of Poland. Based on the following, the decision of the fair hearing officer is

affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND Petitioner lives in a mobile home with his 12 year-old son. (Tr. 4:29-32; 9:31-32.)

Petitioner was last employed in 2013. (Tr. 6:11-12.) Petitioner is presently applying for

Social Security disability benefits. (Tr. 6:9-22.) Petitioner's only source of income for

himself and his son are child support payments in the amount of $130.00 per month.

(App. 2.)

On June 24, 2015, Petitioner applied for emergency general assistance from the

Town of Poland. (Tr. 1:1-6.) Petitioner requested emergency general assistance in the

amounts of $280.00 for rent and $100.00 for electricity. (Tr. 3:11.) Petitioner requested

the $100.00 for electricity because he was facing disconnection of his electricity service.

(Tr. 3:1-6.) Petitioner brought a most recent copy of his electricity bill to his

appointment with the general assistance administrator, which showed a past-due

balance of $509.00. (Tr. 2:16-3:1.) Petitioner did not bring a disconnection notice to his

Page 1 of 12 appointment. (Tr. 2:1-3.) Petitioner testified at the fair hearing that he needed to pay

$99.00 to avoid disconnection of his electricity. (Tr. 3:3-10.) The general assistance

administrator denied Petitioner's application for emergency general assistance, because

he could not provide evidence of his disability or evidence that he was searching for

employment. (Tr. 1:1-6; 7:10-8:3.) The general assistance administrator did not consider

Petitioner's situation to be an emergency. (Tr. 4:14-15.) Petitioner's electricity was

disconnected two days later, on June 26, 2015. (Tr. 5:9-16.)

Petitioner requested a fair hearing, which was held on July 7, 2015, before a fair

hearing officer. (App. 17). Petitioner challenged only the general assistance

administrator's denial of emergency general assistance to pay his electricity bill. (Id.)

Petitioner and the general assistance administrator testified at the fair hearing. The fair

hearing officer found that Petitioner had specifically applied for "Emergency General

Assistance" and not mere general assistance. (Id.) On July 10, 2015, the fair hearing

officer issued a decision denying Petitioner's request for emergency general assistance.

(Id.) Petitioner timely appealed.

Oral argument on Petitioner's appeal was held on February 2, 2016. At oral

argument, counsel for Petitioner stated that Petitioner's electricity had been restored.

The court requested the parties submit memoranda addressing whether this case still

presented a judiciable controversy or whether the case had become moot.

11. MOOTNESS

As a threshold matter, the court declines to dismiss Petitioner's Rule BOB appeal

as moot. "An issue is moot when there is no real and substaptial controversy, admitting

of specific relief through a judgment of conclusive character. McGettigan v. Town of

Freeport, 2012 ME 28,

Page 2 of 12 practical effects flowing from the resolution of the litigation to justify the application of

limited judicial resources. Id. However, there are several exceptions to the mootness

doctrine. Specifically, the court will still consider issues that are otherwise moot if "the

issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or

determinate nature." Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME

48, '!I 8, 18 A.3d 824.

In the case of In re Marcial 0., an appellant challenged an involuntary

commitment order. In re Marcial 0., 1999 ME 64, '!I 1, 728 A.2d 158. Before the appeal

could be heard, appellant was released from involuntary commitment. Id.

Superior Court and Law Court both considered the case under the exception to the

mootness doctrine. Id. '!I'!I 6, 13. The Law Court stated that the case presented more

than just evidentiary issues particular to the case, it presented issues regarding the

proper application of a statute. Id. '!I 12. The Law Court held that the specific questions

of law raised by the case, i.e. the proper application of the statute, were likely to be

repeated, but unlikely to ever be fully litigated. Id.

Here, the factual circumstances of Petitioner's case are not likely to repeat. If

Petitioner were to apply for emergency general assistance in future, the fact of

Petitioner's situation may differ and Petitioner may present different evidence to the

general assistance administrator. However, the issues raised by Petitioner's Rule 80B

appeal concern the proper interpretation and application of the emergency general

assistance provisions contained in the general assistance statute and the Town of

Poland's ordinances. These questions of law are likely to be repeated. Further, given

the fleeting nature of emergency situations, these questions of law are also likely to

escape judicial review. Therefore, the court declines to dismiss Petitioner's Rule 80B

appeal as moot.

Page 3 of 12 III. STAN DARD OF REVIEW

When acting as an appellate court pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure

SOB, the court reviews government agency decisions for errors of law, abuse of

discretion, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Aydelott v.

City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, err 10, 990 A.2d 1024. The petitioner challenging the

decision below bears the burden of proof to overturn the decision. Id. The petitioner

must establish that the decision maker's findings are unsupported by record evidence

and that the record compels contrary findings. Total Quality, Inc. v. Town of Scarborough,

588 A.2d 283, 284 (Me. 1991).

The court reviews interpretations of statutes and municipal ordinances de nova.

Nugent v. Town of Camden, 1998 ME 92, err 7, 710 A.2d 245. In construing a statute or

ordinance, the court looks first to the plain meaning of its language to give effect to the

legislative intent, and if the meaning of the statute or ordinance is clear, the court need

not look beyond the words themselves. Wister v. Town of Mt. Desert, 2009 ME 66, 117,

974 A.2d 903. The statute or ordinance "must not be construed to create absurd,

inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical results." Duffy v. Town of Berwick, 2013 ME 105, err

23, 82 A.3d 148.

IV. GEN ERAL ASSISTANCE STATUTE AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE

Maine's general assistance statute requires municipalities to administer by

ordinance a general assistance program to provide immediate aid to persons who are

unable to provide basic necessities essential to maintain themselves or their families. 22

M.R.S. §§ 4301(5), 4305(1). The general assistance program provides a specific amount

and type of aid for defined needs during a limited period of time. Id. § 4301(5). The

ordinance enacted by municipalities must establish standards, in addition to need, for

Page 4 of 12 determining the eligibility of persons applying for relief and the amount of assistance

provided to each eligible person. Id. § 4305(3)(A).

Maine's general assistance statute provides that, for first-time applicants,

eligibility for general assistance is determined solely on the basis of need. Id. § 4308(1).

The eligibility of repeat applicants is determined based on need and other conditions of

eligibility established by the statute and municipal ordinance. Id. Section 4316-A of the

general assistance statute provides:

An applicant is ineligible for assistance for 120 days in all municipalities in the State when any municipality establishes that the applicant, without just cause: A. Refuses to search for employment when that search is reasonable and appropriate; B. Refuses to register for work; C. Refuses to accept a suitable job offer under this section; ...

Id. § 4316-A(l)(A-C). Just cause for failure to meet the work requirements of § 4316-A

will be found when there is "reasonable and verifiable evidence" that the applicant

suffers for a "physical or mental illness or disability." Id. § 4316-A(5)(A).

Similarly, the Town of Poland's Ordinance§ 5.5 also provides that, as a condition

of eligibility, all recipients of general assistance are required to work or look for work

unless there is "reasonable and verifiable evidence" that the recipient is disabled or has

other just cause for not fulfilling the work requirement as defined in the or ·nan .

Poland, Me., Gen. Assist. Ordinance, § 5.5 ("Ordinance, § 5.5''). Repeat applicants who

fail to meet the ordinance's work requirement, without just cause, are ineligible for

further assistance for 120 days. Id.

Maine's general assistance statute also provides for emergency general

assistance. The statute states:

A person who does not have sufficient resources to provide one or more basic necessities in an emergency is eligible for emergency general

Page 5 of 12 assistance, even when that applicant has been found ineligible for nonemergency general assistance, except as provided in this subsection.

A. A person who is currently disqualified from general assistance for a violation of section 4315, 4316-A or 4317 is ineligible for emergency assistance under this subsection.

B. Municipalities may by standards adopted in municipal ordinances restrict the disbursement of emergency assistance to alleviate emergency situations to the extent that those situations could not have been averted by the applicant's use of income and resources for basic necessities. The person requesting assistance shall provide evidence of income and resources for the applicable time period.

A municipality may provide emergency assistance when the municipality determines that an emergency is imminent and that failure to provide assistance may result in undue hardship and unnecessary costs.

22 M.R.S. § 4308(2). The statute defines an "emergency" as:

[A]ny life threatening situation or a situation beyond the control of the individual which, if not alleviated immediately, could reasonably be expected to pose a threat to the health or safety of a person.

Id. § 4301(4). The statute also defines "basic necessities" to include electricity. Id. §

4301(1).

The Town of Poland's ordinance also addresses emergency general assistance.

Ordinance§ 4.9 provides:

Although they may otherwise be considered ineligible to receive general assistance, persons who apply for assistance to alleviate an emergency may be granted assistance, . ..

A municipality may provide emergency assistance when the municipality determines that an emergency is imminent and that failure to provide assistance may result in undue hardship and unnecessary costs to either the [applicant] or the municipality.

A person who is currently disqualified from receiving General Assistance due to violation of sections 5.5 ... of this ordinance is ineligible to receive emergency assistance.

Page 6 of 12 Poland, Me., Gen. Assist. Ordinance, § 4.9 ("Ordinance, § 4.9"). Additionally,

Ordinance § 6.8 governing basic necessities and maximum levels of assistance also

provides:

Disconnection of utility service will not be considered an emergency in all cases. The administrator will make an individual, factual analysis to determine if the termination of utility service constitutes an emergency. The administrator will consider the household composition, the time of year, the age and health of the household members, and other appropriate factors in reaching a decision.

Poland, Me., Gen. Assist. Ordinance,§ 6.8 (C) ("Ordinance,§ 6.8 (C)").

V. ANALYSIS

The fair hearing officer found that Petitioner had specifically applied for

"Emergency General Assistance" and not mere general assistance. (App. 17.) The fair

hearing officer denied Petitioner's request for emergency general assistance on four

grounds: (1) Petitioner did not provide evidence that he was disabled and therefore

unable to work; (2) Petitioner was unable to provide evidence that he has tried to find

employment; (3) Petitioner's need was not an emergency because it was not

"unforeseen;" (4) lack of electricity is not considered life-threatening during summer

months and Petitioner still has running water. (Id.)

A. The Lack of Evidence of Disability and Evidence of Job Search

Regarding the first two grounds, the fair hearing officer's determination that

Petitioner was ineligible for emergency general assistance because Petitioner failed to

provide evidence of his disability or evidence that he has tried to find employment

constitute an error of law. The fair hearing officer found that the general assistance

administrator had asked Petitioner for evidence from Petitioner's physician

documenting his disability. (App. 17.) Petitioner was unable to provide the general \

Page 7 of 12 assistance administrator such evidence. (Id.) Petitioner also informed the general

assistance administrator that he was not applying for jobs . .(Id.)

The general assistance statute plainly and unambiguously states that a "person

who does not have sufficient resources to provide one or more basic necessities in an

emergency is eligible for emergency general assistance, even when the applicant has been

found ineligible for nonemergency general assistance," except if the person is "currently

disqualified from general assistance for a violation section 4315, 4316-A, or 4317." 1 22

M.R.S. § 4308(2)(A) (emphasis supplied). Under§ 4316-A, "[a]n applicant is ineligible

for general assistance for 120 days" if the applicant refuses to search for work, register

for work, or accept suitable work without just cause. Id.§ 4316-A(l ).

The Town of Poland's Ordinance§ 4.9 similarly states in plain and unambiguous

language, "Although they may otherwise be considered ineligible to receive general

assistance, persons who apply for assistance to alleviate an emergency may be granted

assistance," except that "[a] person who is currently disqualified from receiving General

Assistance due to violations of sections 5.5, ... is ineligible for emergency assistance."

Ordinance, § 4.9 (emphasis supplied). Like, § 4316-A, Ordinance § 5.5 states that a

repeat applicant "will be considered ineligible for further assistance for 120 days" if

they fail to meet the work requirement without just cause. Ordinance,§ 5.5.

Thus, both§ 4308 and Ordinance § 4.9 plainly and unambiguously state that a

person, who is ineligible for general assistance, may still receive emergency general

assistance. Neither the statute nor the ordinance requires repeat applicants to meet the

work requirement to obtain emergency general assistance. Under both § 4308 and

1 Section 4315 governs ineligibility for making false representations. 22 M.R.S. § 4315. Section 4317 governs ineligibility for failing to secure other available resources. Id. § 4317. The fair hearing officer made no findings that Petitioner made false representations or failed to secure other available resources. Neither section is at issue in this case.

Page 8 of 12 Ordinance § 4.9, the work requirement is only relevant if the applicant is "currently

disqualified" under § 4316-A and Ordinance §5.5, both of which disqualify repeat

applicants from general assistance for 120 days for failing to meet the work requirement

without just cause. Thus, if an applicant had applied and been found ineligible for

general assistance, then the applicant would be "current! y disqualified" for emergency

general assistance for the 120-day period.

Petitioner in this case was not required to meet the work requirements of§ 4316-

A and Ordinance §5.5 in order to be eligible for emergency general assistance. The fair

hearing officer made no finding that Petitioner had applied for general assistance in any

municipality in the last 120 days and been deemed ineligible for any further assistance.

Therefore, the fair hearing officers determination constitutes an error of law.

B. Petitioner's Need was not an Emergency because it was not "Unforeseen"

The fair hearing officer's third ground for denying Petitioner's application also

constitutes an error of law. The fair hearing officer found that, during the hearing,

Petitioner testified that he had a payment plan with the electric company but had fallen

behind in payments by several months. (App. 17.) The fair hearing officer's decision

states, "You knew your final electric bill was corning due and could have come in

sooner thus not creating an 'emergency'; therefore this situation is not 'unforeseen."'

(Id.)

The Town of Poland General Assistance Program appointment notice initially

provided to Petitioner stated:

Emergency Assistance - Emergencies are classified as UNFORESEEN events. Evictions, disconnection of utilities, being out of heating fuel are not considered unforeseen and will therefore not be considered emergencies.

Page 9 of 12 (App. 6.) During the hearing, the general assistance administrator testified that "an

emergency is defined as unforeseen or life-threatening" in addition to being an

imminent threat. (Tr. 3:21; 4:15-16) The general assistance administrator also stated,

"The other thing an emergency - with this bill, [Petitioner] obviously hasn't been

paying that electric bill for a while. If he hasn't been receiving income to pay that bill he

should have been in here prior to the emergency. It was not an unforeseen emergency

that his power would be shut off." (Tr. 8:5-8.) The general assistance administrator

reiterated that she did not consider Petitioner's circumstances an emergency "because

it's not unforeseen." (Tr. 9:8.)

Neither the general assistance statute nor the ordinance requires a situation to be

"unforeseen" in order to constitute an emergency. The general assistance statute

unambiguously defines an "emergency" as "any life threatening situation or a situation

beyond the control of the individual which, if not alleviated immediately, could

reasonably be expected to pose a threat to the health or safety of a person." 22 M.R.S. §

4301(4). Ordinance §4.9 provides a similar definition for an "emergency." Ordinance,

§4.9. Thus, to constitute an emergency under both the statute and the ordinance, the

only requirements are that a situation be (1) either life-threatening or "beyond the

control of the individual;" and (2) "if not alleviated immediately, could reasonably be

expected to pose a threat to the health or safety of a person." 22 M.R.S. § 4301(4);

Ordinance, §4.9.

Although Ordinance§ 6.8(C) does state that disconnection of utility service will

not be considered an emergency in all cases and that the administrator will make an

individual, factual analysis to determine if the termination of utility service constitutes

an emergency based on "appropriate factors," Ordinance § 6.8(C) does not expressly

require a situation be "unforeseen" in order to be emergency. Ordinance, § 6.8(C).

Page 10 of 12 Thus, the statute and the ordinance did not require Petitioner's situation to be

"unforeseen" in order to constitute an emergency.

Therefore, the fair hearing officer committed an error of law in determining that

Petitioner's situation did not constitute an emergency because the situation was not

"unforeseen."

C. Petitioner's Lack of Electricity was not Life-Threatening during Summer Months and because Petitioner still had Running Water

The fair hearing officer found that Petitioner applied for emergency general

assistance on June 24, 2015, in order to pay an electric bill and avoid disconnection.

(App. 17.) During the hearing, Petitioner testified that his electricity was disconnected

two days later on June 26, 2015. (Tr. 5:9-16.) Petitioner testified that he still had

running water. (Tr. 5:3-4.) Petitioner testified that he could not cook, did not have hot

water, and had to bathe at his mother's home because of the lack of electricity. (Tr. 5:1-

21.)

Although the general assistance statute includes electricity as a "basic necessity,"

Ordinance § 6.8(C) plainly and unambiguously states that disconnection of utility

service will not be considered an emergency in all cases and that the administrator will

make an individual, factual determinations. Ordinance, § 6.8(C). In deciding whether

disconnection of a utility constitutes an emergency, the administrator considers

appropriate factors, including the time of year. Id. Here, the fair hearing officer

properly determined that, based on the time of year and the fact that Petitioner still had

running water; the disconnection of Petitioner's electricity did not constitute an

emergency. Therefore, the fair hearing officer's determination that Petitioner's

circumstances did not constitute an emergency was supported by substantial evidence

and was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

Page 11 of 12 VI. CONCLUSION

The decision of the fair hearing officer is affirmed.

The Clerk is directed to enter this Order on the civil docket by reference pursuant

to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).

Page 12 of 12