Carolina Gracia, individually and as successor-in-interest to Louie Grijalva IV v. County of Kern, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAROLINA GRACIA, individually and as Case No.: 1:23-cv-01104-JLT-CDB successor-in-interest to LOUIE 12 GRIJALVA IV, ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 Plaintiff, (Doc. 60) 14 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 15 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO OPPOSE DEFENDANTS’ 16 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

17 18 Plaintiff Carolina Gracia is represented by counsel in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. section 1983. This action proceeds against Defendant County of Kern, David Navarro, and 20 Does 1 through 10, as alleged in the operative second amended complaint. 21 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 22 On February 20, 2025, formerly assigned Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe issued 23 her Order Regarding Status Conference and Order Amending Scheduling Conference Order. 24 (Doc. 46.) Relevant here, the pretrial motion filing deadline was set for January 23, 2026, and the 25 pretrial conference and jury trial were scheduled for June 22, 2026, and September 15, 2026, 26 respectively, before District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston. (Id. at 1, 3.)1 27 1 On August 6, 2026, Judge McAuliffe extended the deadline for expert disclosures; all other deadlines and the 1 On March 7, 2025, Defendants County of Kern and David Navarro filed an answer to the 2 operative complaint. (Doc. 48.) 3 On January 23, 2026, the answering Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 4 addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 57.) 5 On January 28, 2026, this action was reassigned from Judge McAuliffe to the 6 undersigned. (Doc. 58.) The following day, the hearing noticed for February 20, 2026, before 7 Judge Thurston was vacated; the undersigned ordered that a hearing would be scheduled, if 8 warranted, after briefing on Defendants’ motion was complete. (Doc. 59 [Minute Order].) 9 On February 17, 2026, when Plaintiff had failed to timely file either an opposition or a 10 statement of non-opposition to Defendants’ pending summary judgment motion, the Court issued 11 its Order to Show Cause (OSC) in Writing Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed for Plaintiff’s 12 Failure to File an Opposition or Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 13 Summary Judgment. (Doc. 60.) Specifically, Plaintiff was ordered to respond to the OSC within 14 seven (7) days, or, alternatively, to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the 15 summary judgment motion. (Id. at 3.) 16 On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff submitted the Declaration of Jerry L. Steering in 17 Response to Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions for Failure to File Opposition to Defendants’ 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 63.) 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 Plaintiff’s Response to the OSC 21 In his response to the OSC, Plaintiff’s counsel Jerry L. Steering declares he was scheduled 22 to start a felony jury trial in the Orange County Superior Court on January 26, 2026, and when 23 Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on January 23, he “was overloaded having 24 to assimilate literally approximately 16,000 documents” in the unrelated matter set for trial. (Doc. 25 63 at 2, ¶¶ 3-4.) Counsel declares that jury selection began on January 28, 2026, following a two- 26 day delay due to his medical condition, and that the trial concluded on February 10, 2026. (Id., at 27 ¶¶ 5-6.) Further, counsel declares that he primarily practices in the United States District Court 1 for the Southern District of California, and has “only filed and litigated a few cases” in this 2 district. (Id., at ¶¶ 8-9.) Counsel declares he does “not recall ever having responded to a Noticed 3 Motion” in this district, and when Defendants’ filed their summary judgment motion on January 4 29, 2026 [sic],” he was engaged in trial. (Id., at ¶ 11.) Counsel states that when the Court issued 5 its minute order on January 29, 2026, his secretary notified him “that an order issued out of this 6 Honorable Court, taking the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment off-calendar due to an 7 error in the filing of defendants’ Motion.” (Id., at ¶ 12.) Further, counsel declares he “saw the 8 Text Only Minute Order on [his] email, and believed that the defendants’ Motion for Summary 9 Judgment had been taken off-calendar, and that the defendants were going to refile their Motion.” 10 (Id., at ¶ 13.) Counsel states he “formed this belief because in both the United States District 11 Court for the Central District of California and the United States District Court for the Southern 12 District of California the date that the Opposition to a noticed Motion is determined by the 13 hearing date; not the filing date.” (Id., at ¶ 14.) Thereafter, counsel quotes the relevant Local 14 Rules in the Central and Southern districts. (Id., at ¶¶ 15-16.) 15 Counsel reiterates he was in trial from “January 28, 2026 through and including February 16 10, 2026” and restates his belief that Defendants’ motion had been taken off calendar. (Id., at ¶¶ 17 17-18.) He apologizes to the Court and defense counsel and states he “had forgotten that in the 18 Eastern District of California that Oppositions to Noticed Motions are determined from the filing 19 dates rather than the Motion Hearing date.” (Id., at ¶¶ 19-20.) 20 Lastly, Plaintiff’s counsel states that “the parties presently have a Mediation scheduled in 21 this case for March 11, 2026,” and asks that the OSC be discharged and that Plaintiff “be given a 22 reasonable opportunity amount of time to respond to the Kern County defendants’ Motion for 23 Summary Judgment.” (Id., at ¶¶ 21-22.) 24 Legal Standards and Analysis 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) governs requests for extension of time after the 26 time to respond has expired and requires a showing of excusable neglect. Courts analyze the 27 following equitable factors in determining whether a missed deadline was a result of excusable 1 potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was 2 within the reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 3 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); 4 Bateman v. United States Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2000).The Supreme 5 Court has noted that “[a]lthough inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the 6 rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect, it is clear that ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 7 6(b) is a somewhat ‘elastic concept’ and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by 8 circumstances beyond the control of the movant.” Pioneer Inv. Services Co., 507 U.S. at 392 9 (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has left “the weighing of Pioneer’s equitable 10 factors to the discretion of the district court.” Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 11 2004). 12 Danger of Prejudice to Opposing Party 13 There exists some danger of prejudice to Defendants. Defendants timely filed their 14 summary judgment motion on January 23, 2026. Although the deadline for filing an opposition 15 passed in early February, following issuance of the OSC, Plaintiff acknowledged the error and 16 now seeks an extension of time within which to file an opposition to the pending motion. The 17 Court notes Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration includes a statement that the parties will attend a 18 scheduled mediation on March 11, 2026. Because a resolution of this action is possible, 19 permitting Plaintiff to file an opposition to the pending summary judgment motion after the 20 planned mediation, despite the missed deadline, appears to benefit all parties. Nevertheless, in the 21 event the matter does not settle, Defendants’ pending motion, as discussed more fully below, may 22 not be determined prior to the pre-trial conference and jury trial set in this matter. As Defendants 23 have not moved to modify the scheduling order or sought to continue those proceedings, and as 24 accommodating Plaintiff’s tardiness likely would require material adjustments to the scheduling 25 order to the detriment of the pretrial conference, there exists some prejudice to Defendants (and 26 the Court). See Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9ths Cir. 2005) 27 (“Disruption to the schedule of the court and other parties in that manner is not harmless”). 1 Length of the Delay and Its Potential Impact 2 The delay to date is about 21 days. The extension sought —an otherwise unidentified 3 “reasonable” time following the March 11, 2026, mediation — would be set at the Court’s 4 discretion and add to that delay. The undersigned notes a pretrial conference of June 22, 2026, 5 and a five to seven jury trial on September 15, 2026, are presently set before District Judge 6 Jennifer L. Thurston. Given the extremely high caseloads in this district and the inevitable, 7 although unfortunate, delays resulting therefrom, there exists the significant possibility that those 8 proceedings may be delayed in the event the pending summary judgment motion cannot be 9 determined before June. See Wong, 410 F.3d at 1062. 10 Notably, however, that circumstance would exist even had Plaintiff filed a timely 11 opposition to the pending motion. Thus, the undersigned concludes the delay caused by Plaintiff’s 12 counsel’s inaction is relatively short, whereas its impact is largely unchanged. 13 Reason for Delay 14 According to counsel, the reason for the delay involves Plaintiff’s counsel’s 15 misunderstanding of the Court’s January 29, 2026, minute order and his obligations in a state 16 court criminal matter tried between January 28, 2026, and February 10, 2026, in the Orange 17 County Superior Court. 18 The minute order merely vacated the February 20, 2026, hearing noticed by Defendants; it 19 did not take the motion itself “off-calendar” or require Defendants to “re-file” their pending 20 motion, as counsel mistakenly believed.2 (See Docket Entry 59.3) 21 Concerning counsel’s trial obligations during the relevant period, the Court concludes 22 counsel should have known that an extension of time to oppose Defendants’ summary judgment

23 2 Counsel’s apparent explanation that he relied upon his secretary’s erroneous interpretation of the minute order does not constitute excusable neglect because he remains responsible for supervising the actions of his non-lawyer 24 employees. Rule 5.3 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides “[w]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer,” “a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the 25 nonlawyer, whether or not an employee of the same law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer” and “shall be responsible for conduct 26 of such a person[.]” See Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct 5.3(b) & (c).

27 3 It cites to this Court’s Local Rule 230(g) that provides, in relevant part: “the motion may be submitted upon the record and briefs on file if the parties stipulate thereto, or if the Court so orders, subject to the power of the Court to 1 motion would be necessary, regardless of any misunderstanding. The deadline for filing pre-trial 2 motions —January 23, 2026— was set on February 20, 2025 (see Doc. 46) and despite other 3 modifications to the scheduling order (see Doc. 56) has remained unchanged. Therefore, absent 4 an order from the Court permitting Defendants to file their summary judgment motion after 5 January 23, 2026, the motion could not be “re-file[d].” 6 To the extent counsel relies upon the fact he primarily practices in the Central and 7 Southern district and thus is familiar with their rules pertaining to motion practice, the Court is 8 unmoved. While counsel may not practice extensively in this Court, he is expected to familiarize 9 himself and comply with the Local Rules in this district. 10 In sum, the circumstances created by counsel’s inaction were not beyond his control. 11 Whether Movant Acted in Good Faith 12 “Good faith considers the presence or absence of tactical or strategic motives behind the 13 delay.” Galfayan v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-01991-RGK-SK, 2024 WL 5317267, 14 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2024). Here, the undersigned does not perceive the presence of tactical 15 or strategic motives were behind Plaintiff’s counsel’s delay. Rather, as discussed above, the delay 16 involves counsel’s competing obligations in a state court criminal jury trial, his failure to timely 17 seek an extension of the filing deadline for Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion, coupled with his 18 mistaken interpretation of the minute order issued January 29, 2026,. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at 19 1225 (finding that counsel's “errors resulted from negligence and carelessness, not from 20 deviousness or willfulness”). 21 Determination Regarding the Equitable Factors 22 Mistakes and carelessness can constitute excusable neglect. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392 23 (holding that excusable neglect is an elastic concept and may extend to circumstances where 24 moving counsel made a mistake in construing the applicable rules); see Romero v. San Bernadino 25 Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 12-cv-06433-MMM-JEM, 2014 WL 13133488, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 26 2014) (collecting cases where an attorney’s mistake of law or carelessness was found to constitute 27 excusable neglect given the circumstances). Here however, the Court finds counsel’s mistakes 1 | for an extension of time within which to oppose Defendants’ summary judgment motion will be 2 | denied. 3 Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 5 1. The OSC issued February 17, 2026 (Doc. 60), is DISCHARGED; and 6 2. Plaintiff's request for an extension of time within which to file an opposition to 7 Defendants’ summary judgment motion is DENIED. 8 | ITISSO ORDERED. 7 | Dated: _ February 27, 2026 | bo 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28