Carole Lopez v. Continental Can Company Incorporated Shell Oil Company T. Salter Incorporated

961 F.2d 147, 92 Daily Journal DAR 4655, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 734, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2937, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2246, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6155, 1992 WL 67213
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1992
Docket90-56346
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 961 F.2d 147 (Carole Lopez v. Continental Can Company Incorporated Shell Oil Company T. Salter Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carole Lopez v. Continental Can Company Incorporated Shell Oil Company T. Salter Incorporated, 961 F.2d 147, 92 Daily Journal DAR 4655, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 734, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2937, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2246, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6155, 1992 WL 67213 (9th Cir. 1992).

Opinions

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Carole Lopez sued her former employer, Continental Can, Inc., for fraudulently concealing the cause of her illness. The district court granted Continental Can’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Lopez’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Lopez appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. T. W Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n., 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.1987). We reverse.

Carole Lopez worked for Continental Can, Inc., cleaning floors and machinery at its Van Nuys, California plant.1 Lopez made daily use of cleaning solvents containing Methyl Ethyl Ketone and other toxic chemicals. After long-term exposure to the solvents, Lopez became ill. Her illness covered the period from 1984 to 1987, and was marked by a progressive deterioration of her physical condition. By 1987, Lopez, was physically unable to continue working. Lopez’s claim against Continental Can does not stem from her initial job related injury which was covered by California Workers’ Compensation law. Cal.Lab.Code § 3600(a). Rather, Lopez’s claim is that her injuries were aggravated by Continental Can’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of her illness.

At issue here is whether section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts Lopez’s state law fraud claim. Section 301 may preempt a state claim in either of two ways. First, a state claim will be preempted if the claim is “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements.” Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of [149]*149Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 n. 10, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1884 n. 10, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)).

Second, where the right is created by state law and not the collective-bargaining agreement, a state claim is preempted if application of the law is “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)). “[A]n application of state law is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 108 S.Ct. at 1885 (emphasis added).

We have previously determined that a state fraud claim brought against an employer by workers exposed to harmful chemicals is not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act. Gulden, 890 F.2d at 198. In Gulden two workers were exposed to noxious chemicals while scrubbing floors. The workers sought redress on the ground that the employer, Crown Zellerbach, did not comply with the state law duty to warn them of the hazards to which they were exposed. We held their claims were not preempted by section 301 because none of the elements of their claims required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 199.

Under California law, the aggravation of an employee’s illness resulting from the employer’s fraudulent concealment of its cause is a state tort claim, distinct from a Workers’ Compensation claim. Since 1980, California has recognized “a cause of action for aggravation of the disease, as distinct from the hazards of the employment which caused [the employee] to contract the disease.” Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal.3d 465, 477, 165 Cal.Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980). This rule has been codified in the California Labor Code which provides in pertinent part: “An employee ... may bring an action at law for damages against the employer ... [w]here the employee’s injury is aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment_” Cal.Lab.Code § 3602. Lopez’s claim arises out of a state created right.

To prevail on her claim, Lopez must show that Continental Can fraudulently concealed the fact that her illness was caused by exposure to toxic chemicals in the workplace. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal.3d at 477, 165 Cal.Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948. Lopez must also show that Continental Can’s concealment of the cause of her illness prevented her from receiving treatment for the disease and induced her to continue to work under hazardous conditions. Id. Determination of these elements requires a strictly factual inquiry into the knowledge and actions of Continental Can. To adjudicate Lopez’s fraudulent concealment claim, there is no need to interpret any provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Nor is Lopez’s claim founded directly on rights created by the collective bargaining agreement. We therefore conclude that Lopez’s fraudulent concealment claim is not preempted by section 301. The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sinea v. Denman Tire Corp.
732 N.E.2d 1033 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1999)
In re Bluffton Casting Corp.
186 F.3d 857 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Union Pacific Railroad v. Harding
958 P.2d 87 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1998)
Street v. Gerstenslager Co.
658 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1995)
Arno v. Club Med Inc
22 F.3d 1464 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
961 F.2d 147, 92 Daily Journal DAR 4655, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 734, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2937, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2246, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6155, 1992 WL 67213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carole-lopez-v-continental-can-company-incorporated-shell-oil-company-t-ca9-1992.